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Defining poor GP performance through the target-driven lens of the Quality and 
Outcomes Framework (QOF) has its limitations. General practices which consistently 
underperform on QOF may be disengaged with top-down quality improvement 
initiatives – their characteristics remaining largely unknown.  
Aim 
Through an ethnographically informed social constructionist methodological approach, 
I set out to capture the qualitative characteristics of ‘poor performers’ which lie beyond 
QOF targets. 
Method 
I spent time embedding myself in the day-to-day reality of five practices across 
England, which have consistently scored in the lowest 10% of QOF scores nationally, 
since QOF’s inception. As a participant observer, I conducted interviews with the 
practices’ teams, kept field notes and sourced practice documents. The data were then 
analysed to identify key themes pertaining to the practices’ reactions to QOF and 
organised into case studies. 
Findings  
Contrary to what would be expected from ‘poor performers’, there was evidence of 
high quality service delivery in some of the participating practices. The overarching 
themes concerned professional values and responses to QOF surveillance. A typology 







This is the first time QOF poor performers and their responses to QOF have been 
studied in depth and by bringing together rich multi-source qualitative data. This thesis 
is important in recognising the values driving ‘poor performing’ general practices and 
the multi-faceted nature of quality patient care, and thus in highlighting the limitations 
of ‘one size fits all’ quality improvement initiatives. Government regulation is 
discussed in the context of surveillance and presented within a Foucauldian framework, 
supported further by current theory. It is suggested that in order to be effective, 
performance management must appeal more directly to the values driving general 
practitioners and their teams. The study contributes to knowledge by attempting to 
reframe current understandings of responses to surveillance and by presenting a 
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 ‘The Panopticon is a marvellous machine which,  
whatever use one may wish to put it to,  
produces homogeneous effects of power.’ 
       Michel Foucault (1975) 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Within the policy backdrop of New Public Management, which saw a shift away from 
traditional public administration towards the application of private sector principles to 
public management, the general practice Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) 
was, at the time of the study, the largest healthcare pay-for-performance scheme in 
England, with the aim of performance management and quality improvement through 
evidence-based target indicators. This thesis presents an ethnographically-informed 
qualitative study of five persistently low QOF scoring general practices across England. 
The findings are presented as five case studies, with a sixth case study as a synthesis of 
overarching themes. The research is a comment on the limitations of pay-for-
performance schemes as an indicator of quality of care. The significance of values in 
how the low QOF scorers perceive QOF is explored. Furthermore, the study proposes 
a new theoretical framework to conceptualise responses to surveillance and suggests a 
typology of low QOF scoring practices. The study will now be introduced with a 
summary of the background to the research, the research questions with which it is 







1.1 Background to the Research 
A cohort of general practices, which consistently failed to achieve scores outside of the 
lowest ten per cent of QOF scores nationally, was identified. It was considered to be of 
research interest to gain a greater understanding of these practices, in order to discover 
whether indeed QOF helped to capture ‘poor’ performance and to draw conclusions 
about why these practices continued to underperform. It was assumed that this would 
have implications for the effectiveness of future quality improvement initiatives and 
would also potentially highlight some of the shortcomings of top-down financially 
incentivised performance improvement schemes in universally driving quality within 
general practice. The research was also conducted to enhance not only the academic, 
but also the professional learning of the researcher, whose professional background in 
healthcare management consultancy often placed her in service contexts which were 
deemed to be underperforming, with the often challenging task of ‘turning them 
around’. It was hoped, therefore, that the understandings gleaned from the research 
process would also inform and improve the professional practice of the author. 
The author entered the research process with an awareness of the existence of a growing 
political push for ever greater improvement and transparency in healthcare delivery; 
the resulting burden of increased bureaucracy and remote data monitoring potentially 
causing a rift between top-down managerial mandates and professionals ‘on the 
ground’. It was felt that an ethnographically-informed study would help to elucidate 
the perceptions and dynamics within general practice in ways that indicator-driven 







1.2 Research Questions 
The study was based around the following research objective and broad inductive 
research questions: 
The primary research objective – 
To gain an understanding of general practices which achieved low Quality and 
Outcomes Framework scores over a five-year period. 
The secondary research questions - 
 How is QOF perceived by the practice staff? 
 How do the participating low scoring general practices respond to a top-down 
target-driven quality improvement initiative? 
 What role does professionalism play in how the practices respond to regulation? 
 Why do some general practices continue to underperform on the Quality and 
Outcomes Framework? 
 What do the participating low scoring general practices do in terms of quality 













1.3 Chapter Overview 
The initial chapters of the thesis are inductive and explore the socio-political and public 
policy backdrop, as presented in the literature, to the regulation of the healthcare sector. 
These background chapters outline the introduction of QOF within general practice and 
describe the quality improvement framework. The chapter “Performance Management 
in Healthcare” explores some of the challenges with the assumptions of such 
frameworks and their implementation. The policy backdrop to performance 
management in the NHS is discussed, followed by an analysis of New Public 
Management. Through a literature review, concepts of quality are explored and the 
problematic nature of defining quality in healthcare is highlighted. Successive chapters 
discuss some of the challenges of a ‘pay for performance’ scheme such as QOF and 
identify issues around supposed ‘poor performance’ being captured through QOF 
scores. Following on from this, a group of persistent ‘poor performers’ is identified. 
Then, two potential theoretical frameworks for furthering understanding of these 
practices are suggested. To end the background and literature review chapters, 
theoretically-informed research questions are posed. 
The methods chapter follows. The structure of the thesis continues with a rationale for 
and a theoretically-driven explanation of the ethnographically informed qualitative 
research methodology and design.  This is then followed by a step-by-step outline of 
the research process. Limitations of the research methodology are also discussed. 
The proceeding chapter presents the findings as case studies for each general practice 
visited, followed by an overarching case study, drawing the findings together into 






discussion. Building on prior theory around government regulation and 
professionalism, a new theoretical framework for understanding the responses of 
healthcare practitioners to top down surveillance is proposed. Practical applications for 
practice and policy are explored. Limitations of the study are highlighted and 
suggestions for further research made. Finally, the concluding remarks draw together 
the contributions of this study. There are a number of appendices added to the thesis, 

















2. BACKGROUND  
Along with a review of policy, this chapter will introduce key concepts surrounding 
performance management within general practice and some of the controversies it 
poses. Performance management and healthcare quality are two very broad topics. The 
background section in some ways only scratches the surface; however, it sets the scene 
for development of existing theory, in light of the findings generated by the thesis. 
Theory plays a significant role in qualitative research. It influences several elements of 
research (Kelly, 2010), notably: 
 The development of research questions 
 The research design and methodology 
 Data analysis 
 New theory building. 
To give the reader a greater insight into the research process, it is worth noting even at 
this stage, that the writing of the thesis has been iterative, with the background section 
tailored post data analysis to highlight some of the key concepts relevant to the findings 
of the study. This also allows for the thesis to be more succinct and to give greater 
validity to the presentation of the findings. As such, a number of potential theoretical 
frameworks, initially explored in the literature review, were rejected at a later stage of 
the study. These were complexity theory, which had limited application, along with 
Mintzberg’s professionalised bureaucracy which was deemed over-simplistic and 







2.1 Performance Management in Healthcare 
This section of the background chapter introduces and explores some of the constructs 
and understandings which abound the concept of performance management within 
healthcare, particularly through the use of incentive schemes. 
In order to understand performance management, one must first define performance 
itself. Numerous attempts have been made at defining performance. Most simply, 
performance refers to the way someone or something functions, whilst in management 
terms, it is the achievement of a given task against pre-set standards. The discipline of 
performance management applies a number of tools and technologies in order to 
motivate teams and services to perform better by meeting established standards. 
Within health services, a number of standard frameworks have been proposed for 
capturing and improving performance. General practice performance may be assessed 
on areas such as effectiveness, equity and efficiency (Kruk & Freedman, 2008), safety 
and patient outcomes (Gillam & Siriwardena, 2011) or access and effectiveness 
(Campbell et al., 2000), to name but three.  
A King’s Fund report (2011), highlighted that in the current climate of NHS reforms 
the goal of improving ‘NHS performance and hence the quality of patient care’ remains 
a priority. This statement highlights a tendency in the academic and policy literature to 
use the words ‘performance’ and ‘quality’ almost interchangeably, indicating that high 
quality care is the product of good performance and that a quality health service is also 
a high performing one. To take this further, this suggests that performance measures 







Whilst still in its infancy relative to the business professions, performance 
measurement is seen to be an important tool for improving care quality and increasing 
the accountability of healthcare organisations (Adair et al., 2006). Performance 
measurement refers to the process of gathering and analysing performance data of an 
individual, group or organisation. It may also involve evaluating interventions used to 
improve performance. As the NHS has become more complex, it now routinely applies 
business tools to measure and evaluate performance. A significant facilitator of the 
application of performance indicators in healthcare, and perhaps the root of some of 
the problems associated with performance management through their use, has been the 
ubiquitous drive for evidence-based medicine, which will be briefly reviewed here.  
Historically, medical practice has been viewed as the application of professional 
knowledge, taken from physiological understandings and clinical experience 
(Djulbegovic et al., 2000). This perspective was contested by Cochrane (1972), arguing 
that the practice of medicine lacked robust evidence to support its effectiveness. This 
claim formed the beginnings of a push for greater standardisation and evidence-based 
practice (Miles et al., 2000), with evidence sourced from statistical data, namely meta-
analyses and randomised controlled trials being viewed as superior to other forms. Yet, 
the evidence-based medical model was defined by Sackett (1997) as the application of 
not only the best available clinical evidence form systematic research to the care of 
individual patients, but also of individual clinical expertise. It is likely that with the 
introduction of ever-greater performance management through standardisation within 
healthcare, the clinical expertise element of evidence-based medicine has been 






based evidence as putting medical practice at risk of becoming ‘tyrannised’ by 
interventions that may not be suitable for the individual patient. 
Nonetheless, there are a number of strengths to the evidence-based medicine model.  It 
enables the systematic identification, appraisal and application of up-to-date research 
findings as the basis for clinical decisions. The almost universal computerisation of 
general practice and the development of so called ‘inpractice’ systems that permit the 
rapid location of relevant evidence, have made it easier for busy clinicians to make best 
use of the published research in order to inform their clinical decisions. Therefore, it 
could be argued that, evidence-based medicine has actively narrowed the gulf between 
clinical research and clinical practice. Doctors are now better informed with 
contemporaneous new findings and can make informed diagnostic and treatment 
decisions more quickly and with greater ease, supported by information technologies 
(Rosenberg & Donald, 1995).  
However, this has been contested by Gabbay & Le May (2004) whose ethnographic 
study suggested that clinicians rarely use explicit systematic research evidence to make 
clinical decisions. Rather, clinicians use what the authors coined ‘mindlines’ – 
collectively reinforced, tacit guidelines based on experience. Through the ethnographic 
study of just two general practices, this work was able to elicit data which were 
sufficiently rich in highlighting the influence of informal interactions on patient care 
and clinical decision making. The authors of this paper nonetheless promoted the use 
of best available evidence in guiding the ‘mindlines’ themselves, but in order to be 
utilised effectively, the evidence-base required informal dissemination through 






the historical roots of the evidence-based approach, which stemmed from the 
promotion of standardisation to improve efficiency. 
The drive for evidence-based medicine can be viewed as rooted in scientific 
management or Taylorism (named after Frederick W. Taylor, its founding father). 
Taylorism’s main objectives were to improve productivity and economic efficiency, 
through scientifically-based methods. Traditionally, methods such as supervision and 
clear setting of standards, along with standardisation of the work process, had their first 
application in mass production factories. Taylor’s aim of achieving task optimisation 
remains a key principle in industry today and underpins the management tool of 
establishing systems of rewards for meeting pre-set goals. 
Incentive frameworks, therefore, build on the original principles of scientific 
management. However, one of Taylor’s four principles of the approach was to obtain 
‘intimate friendly cooperation between the management and the workers’ (Taylor, 
1914). Therefore, it could be argued that a lack of engagement from workers, here the 
low QOF scoring general practitioners, could undermine the effectiveness of Taylorist 
methodology i.e. QOF. It would be of interest to explore how disengagement with the 
tool affects its organisational influence. And yet, defining general practitioners as 
‘workers’ may be over-simplistic, as general practitioners are for the most part self-
employed contractors.  
Thus, general practitioners are independent contractors accountable to, but not directly 
employed by, the state health service. One of the advantages of the contractor model, 
is that it gives general practitioners the freedom to act as patient advocates, retaining 
also an accountability to the communities they serve. Thus, it could be argued that the 






allowing general practice to remain a clinically-led service. Yet, this notion of 
independence and autonomy has been rejected by some, particularly in the public 
media, which tends to present GPs as being at the mercy of the demands of the NHS 
system. Indeed, at the time of field work, GP performance and contract compliance, 
along with QOF output, was closely monitored and managed by the Primary Care 
Trusts (PCTs). The monitoring, inspection and regulation of general practice has since 
been taken up by the Care Quality Commission (CQC). 
Opinions are divided over the strengths and limitations of this self-employed partner 
model, in existence since the inception of the National Health Service. As an aside, it 
should be noted that the contractor status itself has been criticised as an attempt of the 
state to reduce the costs of direct employment, creating unrealistic financial and 
administrative pressures for the individual GP.  GPs are expected to fund their own 
training, professional memberships and insurance without state financial support. 
Nonetheless, GPs’ contractor status poses a question mark over the potential for them 
to ever be truly directly managed as an independent professional group. Furthermore, 
this raises questions of the malleability of professional groups in general, with their 
own set of professional codes of conduct, guidance and memberships to guide them, to 
the demands of top down state management. Thus, there may be an ill fit between 
evidence-based, scientific management methodologies and general practice as its 
subject.  
Whilst Taylorism has no doubt been of huge influence in shaping modern thinking 
about how optimal performance in workers is achieved, its one-size-fits-all approach, 
in particular the lack of applicability to a wide range of organisational settings 






Noble (1984), in his seminal book “Forces of Production”, identified these 
shortcomings. He stated ‘no absolute science of metal cutting could be developed – 
there were simply too many stubborn variables to contend with.’ Here, scientific 
management was applied to machining. Healthcare, with its numerous complexities, 
interacting variables and stakeholder demands, is undoubtedly an even more complex 
entity, where this approach is unlikely to flourish. 
Thus, the historical lessons in the wider applicability of Taylor’s model appear to have 
been somewhat ignored with the introduction of reward-based systems in order to 
improve the performance of clinicians. A further layer of supervision has been added 
to this framework in modern times, with the advent of information technologies. 
Evidence-based medicine, has brought about a culture of electronic patient data 
collection within healthcare, especially general practice. These data lend themselves 
easily to performance monitoring and measurement and can be compared against 
benchmarks and standards. To take this a step further, a key tool in performance 
management is the use of indicators as benchmarks of good performance, and clinical 
consultation data can be judged against those indicators, to allow (former) PCT 
managers in the case of general practice to draw conclusions about clinical 
performance. 
The drive for standardisation of work delivery in healthcare has been linked to a 
number of concepts. In turn, these concepts are also viewed as facets of quality. These 
are safety, effectiveness, patient-centeredness, timeliness, efficiency and equity 
(Timmermans & Berg, 2003). A drive to understand the quality of care which a GP 
practice provides would therefore comprise of these facets, with patient-centeredness 






that a practice may provide quality care in some areas and not others. The GP may offer 
timely appointments, but not provide the patient with respect for their values or an 
integrated experience, as patient-centred care demands. 
It is the limitations of the evidence-based approach, however, that are of particular 
relevance to this study. These shortcomings may help to shed light on the apparent 
disengagement of low scorers from QOF – consistently low scorers, statistical outliers, 
being of central interest to this study. The participants of the study will be introduced 
in more detail in the Methods chapter.  
Evidence-based practice underpins the use of indicators to improve performance. QOF 
indicators are developed by a committee of the National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence and formulated on the basis of best available current evidence 
concerning financially incentivised quantifiable and standardisable aspects of care in 
general practice. However, it is for this reason that QOF is vulnerable to the same 
criticisms which apply to evidence-based medicine and it being used to inform 
performance management through standardisation in healthcare, namely that it 
provides a limited view of GP quality.  
Further criticisms of increased standardisation relate to discourses of tension between 
medical professionals and management (this construct will be explored in more detail 
within Chapter 3). The key here is the threat evidence-based medicine poses to a 
doctor’s professional autonomy. Doctors are now faced with standardised frameworks 
and templates to order their consultations and diagnostic processes. Whilst these tools 
can be useful as time-saving devices for the diagnosis and treatment of the majority of 
their patient population, they may remove scope for intuition and professional decision-






of individual cases that didn’t fit the mould (e.g. Phineas Gage in the field of 
neuroscience), and thus evidence-based medicine may prevent a doctor from treating 
outliers with the unique approach required.  
Indeed, there are parallels here with the very premise of this thesis, which is concerned 
with phenomena that do not fit the expected mould. Evidence-based medicine, through 
undermining the recognition of the unique person/case, may hamper innovation and 
threaten person-centredness. However, it has been suggested that the evidence-based 
approach and the professional value of person-centeredness can be reconciled. A paper 
by Sanders, Harrison and Checkland (2010), exploring heart failure nurses’ interactions 
with protocol-driven care, concluded that the nurses were able to implement evidence-
based protocols into their daily routine, whilst still preserving a personalised approach 
to care. Yet, the authors do note that even within this approach, protocol-driven care 
did encroach on space within the consultation to explore patients’ own priorities, and 
call for an incorporation of the patient’s own values into the consultation process. 
Moreover, the evidence touted as gold standard within evidence-based medicine, may 
have a number of shortcomings (e.g. Feinstein & Horwitz, 1997). The lab-based 
simulated conditions under which randomised controlled trails are carried out for 
instance, commonly with a sample of young, healthy, males, do not translate well to 
real-life care settings. The danger here is the production of inappropriate and unsafe 
guidelines for clinical practice as a result of this research. 
A further criticism of evidence-based practice, upon which performance management 
in healthcare is often based, stems from the advent of technologies introduced into 
clinical practice in order to ‘supervise’ its implementation as mentioned previously.  






software programme during the general practice consultation. Various ‘inpractice’ 
programmes automatically compute these data, based on pre-set algorithms, and 
respond with prompts for the consultation. A number of these prompts are directly 
linked to the requirements of QOF and other quality improvement initiatives.   
Utilising ethnographic research methods, it has been argued that certain technologies 
used within general practice promote a power asymmetry between the professional and 
the patient. This is due to the clinician holding an element of control over the patient 
record, which the patient doesn’t possess (Swinglehurst, 2014). From a humanist 
perspective, the introduction of this ‘third-player’ in the consultation in the form of 
computer technology (Kumarapeli & De Lusignan, 2013), has reduced patients to 
objects and undermined patient-centred care and professional autonomy. It can be 
concluded that performance management models stemming from evidence-based 
medicine are likely to produce tensions between experiential and patient-centred 
clinical knowledge and population-based, technological approaches favoured by them. 
These clashes, and in particular professionalism versus surveillance through 
standardisation, will feature highly throughout the thesis. 
With time, these technologies came to not just serve the purpose of achieving increased 
standardisation within the clinical process, but also to act as a tool in public 
performance management by the state. Within QOF, data entered onto the system by 
general practitioners were now evaluated against certain pre-set standards. Rationalised 
by the Behaviourist incentive theory of motivation, meeting of those standards would 
be rewarded with a financial bonus, in order to motivate the clinician to maintain their 
performance. A lack of achievement against standards brought about penalties (e.g. 






a tool of monitoring and regulating performance through practice data surveillance. 
The impact of surveillance technologies will be appraised within Chapter 3. 
Furthermore, in their review of the role of incentives in the public sector, Burgess and 
Ratto (2003) maintain that optimal incentive structures in the public sector may differ 
from those in the private sector. They outline four reasons why the applicability of 
incentive schemes to the public sector is highly problematic, namely multiple principals 
and lines of accountability, extreme measurement problems, intrinsic motivation, and 
the importance of teams in generating outputs and outcomes. To apply this to general 
practice, general practitioners are clearly accountable to and seek guidance from 
multiple principals, including regulatory bodies, patients and professional membership 
organisations, such as the Royal College of General Practitioners. From the perspective 
of Burgess and Ratto, extreme measurement problems refer to the inadequacy of 
performance management frameworks in capturing complex data regarding the 
multiple goals and outputs of public sector organisations. Indeed, general practice has 
been likened to a complex, self-evolving system (Kordowicz, 2012), which suggests 
that the problems Burgess and Ratto raise are even more acutely applicable to the field 
of general practice.  
Similarly, Burgess and Ratto discuss that the motivation of public sector workers is 
largely intrinsic, and external motivators such as financial rewards are far less relevant 
than in the private sector. In line with oft-cited psychological studies of motivation (e.g. 
Deci, Koestner & Ryan, 1999; Ryan & Deci, 2000), it may be that increasing external 
incentives may undermine the more intrinsic altruistic motivations, such as helping 
patients, upholding values of professionalism and the like. These studies of motivation 






(appealing to intrinsic motivations) was more effective than tangible extrinsic rewards 
such as gold stars, which tended to undermine internal drivers of good performance.  
The importance of a successful team infrastructure is highly applicable to running a 
general practice, with multiple roles and tasks at both clinical and administrative levels 
needing to be fulfilled in order to support patient pathways and care. However, QOF 
financial rewards are paid out directly to the GP Principal, thus not directly rewarding 
members of the teams that also contributed to QOF achievement which, though a 
tangible reward, may undermine the motivations of the wider staff team to continue to 
sustain QOF performance. 
In addition, it can be argued that quality improvement through reward for the use of 
numerical indicators is a paradox, as it does not capture ‘soft’ data. By ignoring the 
qualitative aspects of care, such as compassion and the doctor patient relationship, it 
strays from a meaningful capture of the phenomenon of quality. Therefore, QOF as a 
monitor of and incentive for good performance has its limitations. Thus, one could 
argue that the framework is reductionist, and creates perverse incentives whereby QOF 
performance is all it captures, rather than performance in terms of overall service 
quality. However, QOF has resulted in some meaningful changes in primary care. 
These are reviewed later within this chapter in the section entitled “Quality and 
Outcomes Framework”.  
Yet, the managerialist culture of quality improvement extends to constantly refining 
quality improvement initiatives, thereby attempting to challenge this paradox. This is 
evidenced by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, which is tasked 






yearly, which takes into account previous QOF performance, the potential emergence 
of a new evidence base and the development of new care guidelines.  
Healthcare performance measurement itself is largely seen to be rooted in the work of 
Avedis Donabedian (e.g. 1966, 1997), the ‘father of quality assurance’ (Best & 
Neuhauser, 2004), who argued for a model for assessing healthcare which was based 
on an understanding of three interconnected factors: structure, process and outcome.  
Outcome is defined in terms of ‘recovery, restoration, and of survival’ of the patient. 
Process is concerned with whether ‘good medical care has been applied’ – which itself 
takes into consideration several factors, such as ‘technical competence in the 
performance of diagnostic and therapeutic procedures,’ and ‘coordination and 
continuity of care.’ Structure pertains to the ‘administrative and related processes that 
support and direct the provision of care.’ In most basic terms, one can view the outcome 
as the completion of a patient’s treatment, the process as the means by which the 
outcome is achieved, and the structure can be understood the broader framework within 
which it took place. It is because of Donabedian’s influence that performance 
monitoring in health tends to be concerned with information representing all three 
domains (Frenk, 2000). 
However, performance measurement in healthcare remains a controversial topic, 
namely because healthcare is a complex entity and does not lend itself easily to 
measurement. Suggesting that quality assurance in health is merely a tool in a hugely 
multifaceted environment, Donabedian himself is cited as saying: 
‘As I have repeatedly said: structure-process-outcome is a servant, not a master. I 
never intended to build my reputation on this paradigm. I only offered it as a handy 






Avedis Donabedian, last remarks, March 2000 cited in Harteloh (2003)  
Therefore, the controversy of performance measurement is the result of the difficulty 
of defining quality of care, and whether what is being captured through performance 
measurement tools is in fact meaningful.  
As such, numerous attempts have been made at defining general practice quality. The 
problematic nature of defining quality for the purpose of performance management will 
be explored later in the section entitled “Concept of ‘Quality’ in Healthcare”. 
Nonetheless, the trend in government policy over time has been to classify NHS 
services on the basis of their performance against top-down standards, as high or low 
performers. Data of performance are widely available within the public domain, under 
the policy rhetoric of greater transparency and patient choice.  
Talbot (2005) sees the growth of performance indicators from the 1980s onwards in 
public services management as resulting from New Public Management activity. In the 
UK, the approach was top down, implemented as part of administrative drives to 
improve performance. Targets were designed to capture more easily measurable 
outputs, rather than overall patient outcomes. As a critique of target frameworks, it 
could be argued that outputs are much more concerned with the process, rather than the 
outcome for the patient in terms of their wellbeing. Whilst indicators within QOF are 
evidence-based, it is not clear to what extent high scores on those indicators really 
achieve high quality care for the patient.  
The level of achievement on performance indicators has since the 1980s been distilled 
into publicly visible league tables, whereby public services are labelled as either a 






enforced replacement of senior leadership figures for instance, and rewards for high 
scores, which included increased operational autonomy (Ferlie, 2016). No doubt 
publicly available performance league tables can either encourage or undermine the 
trust of users in that service. Therefore, it may be of interest to this study if the label of 
‘poor’ performer has in any way been detrimental to the study’s participants.  
Furthermore, performance indicators became closely aligned with the aims of 
economic efficiency under ‘New’ Labour. Services were monitored for the value for 
money they offered the tax payer. In the case of QOF, a focus on meeting evidence-
based standards within primary care would reduce the costly burden placed on 
secondary care. To support this aim further, the achievement of points in areas of 
disease prevention, for example health promotion, and not just intervention, was 
incentivised. 
Under ‘New’ Labour the use of performance targets across the health services 
continued to grow. Probably the most prominent of these concerned the reduction in 
Accident and Emergency (A&E) waiting times. The achievement of four hour wait 
targets, or otherwise, were widely publicised in the mass media. Overall, there appeared 
to be a significant reduction in waiting times under ‘New’ Labour, though it is likely 
that a proportion of these improvements were not down to real changes, rather gaming 
strategies undertaken by the NHS Trusts (Mears, 2014).  
For instance, there were reports of A&E departments carrying out nurse-led triage 
within the four hour window so that the patient could be recorded as having been seen, 
whilst treatment may have been withheld for a significant amount of hours post this. 
Perverse effects such as patients waiting on temporary beds in hospital corridors, so 






as being in operation.  Gaming as applied to QOF will be reviewed later in the 
Background chapter.  
Therefore, the star rating system for hospitals implemented by the Department of 
Health in 2001, did at times come under fire as to how reflective it was of true 
performance. Yet, under the drive for increased performance management in 
healthcare, more information was being made available to patients to enable them to 
make choices about where they wanted their treatment to take place. The reality, 
however, was that patients were still often bound by their postcodes as to the level of 
services that were available within their referring GP’s Trust. Managerially, poorly 
performing hospitals could be singled out, as they often were within the press, and 
advisory bodies such as the NHS Modernisation Agency would put intense 
interventions into place to raise performance against top down standards. A lack of 
significant improvement within a prescribed timeframe could result in financial 
sanctions of closure. 
As a reflection of this climate of gaming along with the imposition of top-down 
punitive measures, this period of performance management through targets was aptly 
coined ‘Targets and Terror’ by Bevan and Hood (2006). Next the policy context leading 










2.2 Policy Context of Performance Management in the NHS 
This chapter will discuss the policy backdrop to performance monitoring in the NHS 
and how, over time, performance capture for the purpose of quality improvement has 
become ubiquitous within the public sector. 
Since the foundation of the NHS in a post-war climate in 1948, government policy 
papers revealed financial tensions and power shifts between the clinical and managerial 
domains. As early as two years into its operations, a ceiling on NHS expenditure was 
imposed and successive reports highlighted the need for financial astuteness, such as 
the “Guillebaud” (1956) and “Porritt” (1962) reports. The financial pressures on the 
NHS have continued to mount over consecutive decades, with significant cuts in 
spending imposed under the previous Conservative/Liberal coalition of 2010 and 
embraced by the Conservative government of 2015 at the time of writing.  
Significantly, Margaret Thatcher’s reforms played a key role in establishing 
performance management within the public sector. 1980-1990 brought an unrelenting 
focus on efficiency, resource control and accountability. Under Thatcher, the 
introduction of competitive tendering for ancillary NHS services demanded potential 
providers to be able to demonstrate a level of both financial and service performance 
which would secure contracts. Towards the end of Thatcher’s time in office, internal 
markets, along with a purchaser/provider split, were introduced into the NHS, working 
on the assumption that increased competition drives service performance. 
Moving into John Major’s government (1990-1997), the “Patients Charter” 
(Department of Health, 1991) recognised the central role of patient choice in improving 






more options should be offered to the patient to enable them to ‘vote with their feet’. 
Considerations about best value to the tax payer were highlighted and it was proposed 
that the patient voice should be at the centre of service and policy decisions. In order 
for this to happen, patients had to be well-informed and there were calls for greater 
transparency about NHS service performance, through publicly available performance 
data e.g. hospital league tables. However, some of the limitations of measuring 
performance against top-down indicators as a marker of quality came to the fore in 
1996, when league tables were criticised by professional bodies as pointless and 
misleading after ranking some of the country’s leading hospitals among the worst 
performers (Goldstein & Spiegelhalter). 
Yet, under Tony Blair (1997-2007), ‘New’ Labour wholeheartedly embraced principles 
of driving quality improvement through performance management. The policy 
language of the time in the “Modernising Government” (1999) and “Our Healthier 
Nation” (1999) White Papers became increasingly influenced by private sector 
principles. The focus was on reviewing NHS services and identifying best suppliers for 
them. New targets and performance indicators were introduced to achieve ‘real 
improvements’ and ‘quality and effectiveness’. These goals were supported by a new 
information technology strategy and infrastructure, regular audits and data submission 
from those on the ground to management and, in turn, to the government bureaucrats.  
It is worth noting, that this top-down target-driven audit-led era of governance is coined 
New Public Management (Ferlie, 1996), with its origins firmly rooted in Thatcherite 
principles of public sector management. The features and subsequent impact of New 
Public Management on the control of the public healthcare sector will be explored in 






Under ‘New’ Labour targets were designed to be ‘tougher but attainable’ and there was 
a recognition of the need to focus on priority areas. Contracts were put into place 
between central government and local services, with local providers having to evidence 
the quality of their service delivery. There was particular drive for reducing health 
inequalities, with a clear focus on primary care for public health gains, in order to 
reduce the utilisation of more expensive secondary care. “The NHS Plan” (Department 
of Health, 2000) paved the way for standard setting with an annual assessment of NHS 
organisations, along with the publication of results in the public domain. It is within 
this climate that QOF was introduced in 2004. 
Forming the policy backdrop to the times during which the fieldwork was undertaken, 
the loftily titled White Paper of the Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition “Equity 
and Excellence: Liberating the NHS” (2010) set out the plans for GP Commissioning, 
a reduction in management costs by more than 45% and £20 billion of efficiency 
savings. Alongside this, the new Health and Social Care Act (2012), focussed on 
greater transparency and accountability, with increased powers given to regulatory 
bodies, such as the Care Quality Commission (CQC) replacing PCTs, in order to 
monitor and inspect health and social care services and take enforcement action where 
necessary. It is clear that performance management through the use of quality indicators 
and monitoring is not going anywhere any time soon. 
In parallel to these developments regarding the use of performance management in the 
NHS, prompted by economic considerations, the debates around clinical versus 
managerial leadership in the NHS also began around the time of the inception of the 
NHS.  Initially, hospitals were clinically led by a matron and a medical superintendent. 






officers of area boards. Four years later, the “Farquharson-Lang Report” (1966) stated 
that chief executives need not be medically qualified. The same year, the “Salmon 
Report” pushed for raising the profile of the (cheaper) nursing profession in hospital 
management. The 1970s saw the advent of multidisciplinary management teams and 
power devolved to local health authorities under the 1972 “NHS Reorganisation” 
White Paper. It is clear, that there were a number of concerns around the roles managers 
versus clinicians should play in the administration of the NHS, with managers 
potentially posing a threat to the clinicians’ expertise and the clinicians perhaps not 
being best utilised or best placed to manage financial resources and lead teams. 
Famously under Margaret Thatcher’s rule, Sir Roy Griffiths (1983) was commissioned 
to write a report into the effectiveness of the public sector. This appointment was 
controversial, as Griffiths had been the former deputy chairperson of Sainsbury’s 
supermarkets, a for profit retail business, driven by private sector principles, which 
were seen to be at odds with the value-driven altruistic public sector ethos (Le Grand 
& Bartlett, 1993; Le Grand, 2003). Griffiths (1983), emphasising the need for improved 
management in the NHS, is famously cited as saying: 
‘If Florence Nightingale were carrying her lamp through the NHS today, she would 
be searching for the people in charge.’ 
Thatcher’s era of New Public Management brought about increased non-clinical 
leadership of the NHS, with a power shift away from professionals to budget-holding 
managers and market incentives to improve efficiency. This continued under ‘New’ 
Labour, with numerous commentators lamenting the increased managerialisation of the 
healthcare sector and the bureaucratic mechanisms employed as methods of control 






rule in the UK, has reversed the trend of non-clinical management. The present 
government’s drive to implement clinical leadership is evidenced by GP 
commissioning, for instance, along with their commitment to reduce management costs 
by almost half.  
However, it is important to consider some of the policy and social dynamics leading up 
to and during QOF’s inception, within the context of New Public Management. The 
next section of the thesis will explore the features of New Public Management in more 
detail and revisit the use of incentives in NHS performance management against its 
backdrop. 
 
2.3 New Public Management 
This section will give a brief overview of some of the features of New Public 
Management, and suggest that the implementation of QOF across general practice is a 
product of this era. 
New Public Management is the term which refers to an era of public management based 
on Thatcherite principles of the introduction of market incentives into the public sector 
in order to improve efficiency. These principles were embraced by Tony Blair’s ‘New’ 
Labour government, where performance management regimes became ubiquitous 
within the public sector. New Public Management also assumes the responsiveness and 
flexibility of organisations to be able to effectively engage with top-down performance 
improvement measures. New Public Management is tied to discourses of consumerism, 






salient feature of competitive tendering where cost was a key determinant in securing 
contracts to provide NHS services.  
Despite adopting a strategic approach to implementing improvements in line with pre-
set top down standards, New Public Management is interesting in the ways through 
which it proposes to meet its aims. Unlike a traditional Weberian bureaucracy structure 
typically associated with the public sector, namely a formal hierarchical structure and 
management by rules, New Public Management aims for flexible rather than 
hierarchical public sector organisations, with management through targets and 
performance indicators. The goals of New Public Management are supported by an 
improved information technology infrastructure and increased computerisation to 
facilitate the collection and monitoring of performance data.  
Therefore, New Public Management signals an indirect rather than direct control 
(Walsh, 1995). In this vein, it could be argued in line with Carter (1989) that New 
Public Management created ‘decentralisation downwards, not accountability upwards.’ 
Managers retain an ownership over performance indicators, which enables them to 
practice indirect ‘hands off’ control. Financial incentives, designed to motivate 
professionals, are aligned closely to policy goals of increased efficiency. 
Another feature of New Public Management, is the power shift it brings towards 
managers and away from older established professional groups, not achieved through 
direct management, but by surveillance and control by indicator-driven performance 
management frameworks, of which QOF is an example. This has led some 
commentators to claim that the traditional professional dominance model (e.g. 
Freidson, 1970), which will be discussed in the section entitled “Professionalism vs. 






1991; Ferlie et al., 1996). This dynamic has allowed governments to limit the traditional 
autonomy and power of professionals such as medics, primarily through gaining 
increased control over their budget decisions. With the introduction of QOF, GPs now 
had to justify up to a third of their practice’s income on the basis of QOF performance, 
leading to increased transparency over financial remuneration within general practice. 
Whilst QOF was initially introduced as a voluntary scheme, practices were unlikely to 
opt out of a scheme which would account for up to third of their annual income. 
Similarly, the potential stigma attached to being labelled as a ‘poor’ performer within 
publicly available league tables also puts a question mark over the voluntary nature of 
the framework.  
New Public Management reforms promote improved performance within healthcare 
services by offering financial incentives for meeting pre-established ‘quality’ targets 
(Ferlie, 2006), along with an increase in public transparency, and therefore 
accountability to the tax payer. Indeed, a number of studies have demonstrated that the 
publication of performance data can play a meaningful role in quality improvement 
(Marshall et al, 2000). 
The drive for improving quality in health services through performance indicators can 
therefore be understood as a product and tool of New Public Management and the 
introduction of market incentives to improve the efficiency of public services (Walsh, 
1995). New Public Management was embraced by New Labour’s White Paper “Saving 
Lives: Our Healthier Nation” (Department of Health, 1999) and subsequent policy, 







However, the “Health of the Nation” White Paper of the 1992 Conservative 
Government upon which ‘New’ Labour’s “Our Healthier Nation” was based, was 
criticised for not promoting evidence-based targets and data capture mechanisms 
(Department of Health, 1998). Furthermore, a review of the impact of this earlier White 
Paper suggests that the engagement of GPs with local quality improvement initiatives 
was slight, and overall GPs lacked an interest in the ‘bigger picture’ of strategic action 
nationally. This may be one of the limitations of New Public Management principles, 
whereby the lack of professional ownership over strategy may result in a sense of 
isolation from and disengagement from any resulting schemes.  
 
No doubt, New Public Management has paved the way for a culture of increased 
monitoring and regulation, through the use of electronic surveillance technologies and 
sanctions in healthcare services, rather than by the direct engagement of clinical 
professionals. Nonetheless, “Our Healthier Nation” continued New Public 
Management discourse with the rhetoric of increased accountability through 
monitoring and evidence-based target-based quality improvement frameworks. 
 
Following on from this policy trend, QOF was conceived in 2004 as part of the new 
General Medical Services Contract (nGMS) (Department of Health, 2003) and became 
the dominant model for monitoring the quality of general practice in England on a ‘pay-
for performance’ basis. Against the policy backdrop of improving the quality of patient 
care through measurable targets becoming a key preoccupation within health services 
(Elwyn & Hocking, 2000), QOF became synonymous with general practice quality in 






background chapter will explore some the challenges of defining the concept of quality 
within healthcare. 
 
2.4 Concept of ‘Quality’ in Healthcare 
During the past four decades, there has been an intense debate as to what constitutes 
quality of healthcare, with the search for how to define high quality at the centre of this 
debate. This section will explore some of the challenges of defining quality and argue 
that it is short-sighted to let a quantitative target-driven definition of quality 
predominate.  
A definition can be described as a statement which expresses the nature of an entity. 
Definitions are important as they facilitate a common understanding and uniformity in 
the conceptualisation of an issue. Being on ‘the same page’ when dealing with a 
particular problem allows for meaningful interventions, in this case quality 
improvement and performance management. Accurate definitions are key to the 
success of such interventions, clarifying how they will work, what benefits they will 
bring, and make us aware of the benchmarks against which the effectiveness of them 
will be judged. 
There are a number of drivers of the ‘quality agenda’ within the NHS and they relate 
to public concerns about the quality of medical practice, which are often evident in the 
mass media. As NHS services are tax payer funded, they must remain accountable to 
the tax payer and provide value for money. Before the inception of QOF, there was a 
growing concern about perceived failures of self-regulation post Shipman (a single-






desire to decrease variation in practice and thus support the goal of reducing health 
inequalities. 
Defining healthcare quality, however, remains problematic. While overwhelmingly 
quality is presented by policymakers as measurable and as meeting predefined top-
down targets, it has been argued that quality in general practice is multiform and 
multifaceted (Kordowicz & Ashworth, 2013). Quality is a notion that is hugely difficult 
to pin down in all its richness and complexity and countless attempts have been made 
at defining quality in healthcare. Definitions range from the more concrete – quality as 
access and effectiveness for instance (Campbell, Roland & Buetow, 2000) - to the 
abstract - quality as purely a social construct rather than an objective entity (Harleloh, 
2003). Therefore, there exists a clear challenge of bringing together the day to day 
realities of care delivery within general practice with subjective norms into one 
construct. 
As seen earlier on in this chapter, there is a predominance of numerical information 
capture within general practice and healthcare more broadly, as part of the increased 
drive for performance management and quality improvement. Naturally, these types of 
data lend themselves more easily and more quickly to comparisons against pre-set 
standards. This facilitates evaluation of services against one another and strategical 
service decision-making based on quantifiable evidence, which can also be used to 
evaluate the impact of strategy over time. ‘Softer’ more complex markers of quality of 
care, such as compassion and the doctor/patient relationship prove problematic in such 
instances. 
QOF is the dominant method of data collection and monitoring in general practice. 






the subsequent section of this chapter. The problem lies with QOF being perceived as 
crucial to quantifying quality. Indeed, as demonstrated in the previous section, the 
policy rhetoric of raising general practice quality through data submission has been 
wholly embraced by successive governments. Yet, it is likely that instinctively this 
view feels rather short-sighted to those delivering frontline care within general practice. 
Policy rhetoric appears to lack an understanding of the complexities of providing 
quality care in general practice. These complexities encompass a broad range of factors 
including, but not limited to, the doctor/patient relationship, communication skills, 
holistic patient-centred care within a biopsychosocial framework and staff team 
dynamics. 
As suggested previously, increased monitoring poses a further challenge for quality 
capture. The resulting climate of increased bureaucracy, monitoring and surveillance 
can undermine GPs’ sense of professional values, which are strongly linked with 
‘softer’ concepts of quality, for instance altruism and compassion. Nevertheless, Lord 
Darzi (2008) claimed that ‘we can only be sure to improve what we can actually 
measure’ and here again one faces the paradox of quality measurement through 
reductionist means. QOF is in part guilty of this, with a focus on usable indicators 
related to outputs rather than outcomes, efficiency rather than effectiveness.  
Therefore, QOF implies that quality is an entity which can be meaningfully measured, 
and that it is synonymous with general practices meeting top-down quantitative targets. 
In contrast, it can be argued that quality lies on the other end of the 
quantitative/qualitative spectrum and, according to Harteloh (2003), is socially 






Since the inception of “The Patient’s Charter” under John Major, incorporating service 
user views into quality service provision does demonstrate a greater awareness of the 
‘beholder’s’ perspective. It could be argued, that traditionally quality was seen largely 
in patriarchal terms as, for example, in the definition: ‘degree to which the care 
delivered is in agreement with medical professional criteria’ (Simons & Van Mansvelt, 
1976). Today, the patient voice challenged this traditional patriarchal view and has 
more prominence in policy design (e.g. by taking on board responses to national patient 
surveys) and service delivery (e.g. through patient participation groups). Thus, in line 
with Harteloh’s social constructivist definition, quality is not an objective concept 
which exists independently of social construction. Rather, quality has an ephemeral 
essence which changes according to the socio-political context which seeks to define 
it.  
It is these more transient ‘soft’ aspects of what constitutes quality of care in general 
practice that have posed a challenge for those attempting to define and measure it. 
Naturally, in a climate of constant performance management, this also renders 
performance difficult to measure.  A recent BMC series edited by Swinglehurst (2015) 
exploring the meanings of quality in healthcare from interdisciplinary perspectives, 
highlighted some of these complexities around quality capture. Interestingly, the article 
collection presented a number of novel ways through which quality can be 
operationalised in patient care. These, amongst others, include increased awareness of 
ethical practice through education (Wintrup, 2015), recognising stakeholder 
perspectives of quality (Millar et al., 2015; Farr & Cressey, 2015) and the use of a 
community arts project to challenge assumed reductionist meanings of quality in 






standardisation within healthcare is explored by Pflueger (2015), who calls for a new 
system of accounting as applied to health, which will not be for political benefit, but 
will act for social good through highlighting some of the uncertainties surrounding 
quality capture. These current academic perspectives do promote a notion of quality 
which clearly lies beyond basic quantification. 
Nonetheless, it is clear, that the performance of general practices and their ability to 
deliver care which is of high quality has been the focus of public, media and 
government scrutiny in recent years. Modern general practices have to contend with 
market dynamics and top-down regulation, and an expectation that they will strive to 
deliver high quality services to their patients. Indeed, the term ‘quality’ itself has been 
conceptualised by Heath (2015) as a slogan used to wield top-down power over clinical 
professionals and the human body as an ‘object’ rather than a ‘subject’ of care.  
Furthermore, there are a number of statutory bodies that GPs remain accountable to 
(e.g. NHS England, Royal College of General Practitioners etc.) in terms of the quality 
of care they provide and that hold a ‘stake’ in how quality and performance are defined. 
However, it is worth noting that at the time the fieldwork for this thesis was carried out, 
the NHS was about to enter a period of unprecedented change under the newly elected 
Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government - namely the implementation of 
GP-led commissioning and cuts in funding, particularly around management costs. 
Therefore, the study’s participants must be understood with an awareness of the wider 
political context of which they are part. 
Quality improvement through performance management often assumes uniformity and 
rationality of the organisation and the actors within it. However, the factors which may 






could relate to organisational characteristics of the practice itself, or factors specific to 
the GP. For instance, stress and depression are a well-documented cause of GP 
underperformance (Cox et al., 2006). A number of features common to low QOF 
scoring practices have been identified in previous research (Ashworth et al., 2011) and 
these will be described within section 2.6. 
In sum, in order to gain a greater understanding of performance in general practice, one 
needs to be aware of its multi-faceted nature and the resulting lack of holistic tools for 
capturing GP performance in its entirety. This thesis is in part a comment on the 
shortcomings of government-driven top-down targets in truly capturing performance 
and quality in general practice.  
Yet, none of the aforementioned challenges with defining quality preclude the 
continued drive to raise it within the delivery of healthcare services. However, they 
strongly suggest that a more nuanced approach to defining healthcare quality is 
appropriate. It would be of interest to see if the practices participating in this study do 
indeed demonstrate facets of quality outside of the remit of QOF. It is apt to conclude 
this section with the following quote, which is reflective of the zeitgeist of continuous 
quality improvement upon which QOF was launched: 
‘The one thing that has remained constant is our aspiration to make quality 
the organising principle for everything we do. It is a focus on quality that will 
make services more efficient; that will drive and inspire people to think of new 
ways to provide care through innovation; and it is a focus on quality that will 
move the NHS towards concentrating on prevention as well as cure.’ 






The features of QOF are discussed in more detail in the next section. 
 
2.5 Quality and Outcomes Framework 
Here, a comprehensive overview of QOF is given, along with an assessment of its 
strengths, limitations and impact within general practice. 
As previously explained, the dominant paradigm for capturing quality in general 
practice in England is the Quality and Outcomes Framework or QOF for short, which 
is a pay for performance scheme, whereby GPs are remunerated for meeting pre-
established ‘quality’ targets. 
QOF was introduced in 2004, with a budget of £1.8 billion earmarked for the scheme. 
Targeted payments directly linked to indicator achievement would be made yearly and 
indicators revised, to ensure continuous quality improvement. Whilst during thesis 
write up the number of QOF domains had significantly reduced, at the time the study 
took place QOF covered the following areas: 
 Clinical: 80 indicators across 19 areas incl. coronary heart disease; heart failure; 
hypertension 
 Organisational: 36 indicators across 5 areas incl. organisational records and 
information; information for patients; education and training; practice 
management; medicines management 







 Additional services: 8 indicators across 4 areas incl. cervical screening, child health 
surveillance, maternity services, contraceptive services. 
As can be seen, general practices would receive payments for QOF points achievement 
on a variety of indicators in clinical, organisational and patient experience domains –
with a 1000 QOF points maximum at the time of the study and a payment of around 
£120 per point achieved (presently there is a maximum of 559 points available to 
practices across QOF).  
 
Prior to the introduction of QOF, GPs were paid for list sizes, the number of doctors 
within the practice and the number and types of services provided. QOF, at the time 
presented as a voluntary scheme, was to account for about a third of a practice’s income 
and appeared to be a welcome scheme, offering GPs an opportunity for an earmarked 
pay rise. In 2003, an overwhelming majority of GPs (79.4%) voted to accept the new 
contract.  
 
Next, the strengths and limitations of QOF will be presented, followed by an 
assessment of the impact of the framework in general practice, particularly from a 
qualitative angle. 
 
As far as QOF strengths are concerned, there is no doubt that measurement plays a key 
part in enabling focused quality improvement initiatives, for instance by identifying 
need in specific patient populations, and on a wider-level QOF is likely to be a valuable 
tool in supporting commissioning decisions. QOF consists of targeted payments clearly 






‘throwing money at a problem’. QOF now holds data for 99.7% of registered patients 
and has therefore resulted in the creation of the largest general practice database in the 
world, prompting research around processes and outputs and their relationship to 
outcomes in general practice. Greatly improved informatics and almost universal 
computerisation are clear achievements of the scheme. 
 
However, the framework also has a number of limitations. In terms of informatics, QOF 
itself does not allow for cross-tabulation of data, rendering them difficult to 
operationalise within research and clinical practice, in particular linking demographics 
with health outcomes directly within QOF. The accuracy of the data, particularly in 
terms of disease prevalence within QOF registers has been questioned. As with any 
data-based framework, QOF is liable to coding errors. The achievement of QOF 
indicators is linked to Read codes which allow the identification of data. There are 
numerous codes within each disease area that may be confusing to the GP. When QOF 
was first introduced, there were variations in codes used to capture performance by 
different PCTs. The Read code for depression demonstrates this, with the clinician 
having the option to tick ‘depression’, ‘depressive disorder’, ‘low mood’ and ‘history 
of depression’, unclear as to which label would facilitate register inclusion and prompts 
for treatment reviews. 
  
Furthermore, this could be one of the reasons for the mismatch between chronic disease 
register prevalence within general practice and census data (Martin & Wright, 2009). 
However, this discrepancy is more likely to be linked to the use of financial incentives 






encourage the inclusion of patients with clinical measures on the cusp of diagnostic 
criteria on a particular chronic disease register. Naturally, over-inclusion has direct 
implications for the quality of patient care, since it may put patients at risk of 
unnecessary disease monitoring, and possibly unsuitable treatment interventions.  
On the other hand, the process of ‘exception reporting’ necessarily allows certain 
patients deemed ‘unsuitable’, to be excluded from the overall target for patients 
registered at the practice. Patients may understandably be excluded if they are 
terminally ill or if they do not agree (after three written requests) to attend an 
appointment at the surgery for the management of their chronic disease. This suggests 
that non-attenders will be further excluded from drives to engage patients in public 
health improvement initiatives. They will therefore be invisible to QOF targets and the 
public health effectiveness of population targets will be reduced.  The overall exception 
reporting rate for 2008/9 was 6.88% for indicators measuring an outcome and 1.70% 
for indicators measuring a process. So, on average, almost 7% of patients in England 
were excluded from public health targets such as achievement of a serum cholesterol 
of <5mmol/L. 
As with other indicator-based incentive schemes, QOF is vulnerable to gaming. Here, 
Hood’s (2006) theory of gaming has been adapted to illustrate the possible gaming 












Reduction of performance to just what the target requires 
 Practices will still be rewarded financially for working to a certain percentage of 
the target, rather than meeting it for  100% of patients on a given register 
 Exception reporting so as to reduce workload. 
Ratchet Effect 
Underperformance to prevent target increases 
 Targets are set nationally and underperformance in single practices is unlikely to 
influence the level at which a target is set. 
Output Distortion 
Intentional manipulation of reported results 
 A spectrum running from selecting indicators for data entry which fit the target 
best, through to QOF fraud. 
Threshold effects, for instance, could lead to the patient population outside of the QOF 
thresholds for maximum scores not being included in chronic disease reviews so as to 
reduce non-incentivised workload for the practice. In the case of distorting the output 
to fit target achievement best, this may be linked to inconsistent clinical guidance. A 
blood pressure reading on a patient’s electronic notes may be the ‘best’ of three 
measurements taken in a consultation, the average of readings taken on separate 
occasions or even the reading that is closest to the target entered electronically from 






target levels recommended by the GMS contract differ from those promoted by NICE 
and the British Hypertension Society. This suggests that defining QOF targets without 
clear guidance to support them may be meaningless. Therefore, what can appear to be 
fraudulent data recording may simply be the result of clustering due to unclear 
methodological guidance.   
A further limitation pertains to the apportionment of reward to the indicators 
themselves, which is overall attached to workload not patient gain. Thus, for example, 
the indicator DM23 (50% achievement of an HbA1c target for diabetics of 7.0 or less) 
is awarded 17 points, whereas DM18 (influenza vaccination target of 85% for 
diabetics) merely attracts 3 points.  
In addition, paradoxically, some of the indicators have proven problematic for the 
quality of care provided to the patient. For instance, in April 2009 GPs were to be 
rewarded by QOF for reducing glycated haemoglobin in half of their patients with type 
2 diabetes to below 7% to earn the same amount that they were paid for achieving a 
target of 7.5% previously. Reducing glycated haemoglobin below 7% is not supported 
by evidence and could potentially be put patients are risk (Lehman & Krumholz, 2009). 
The tightening of this indicator was later withdrawn. It is also worth adding that QOF 
may reduce the focus from non-incentivised domains, such as gastrointestinal and 
rheumatological disease which were not captured by QOF at the time of writing.  
Finally, as explored throughout the course of the thesis, the dominant criticism of QOF 
is that it does not capture the qualitative domains of excellence, such as rapport, 
compassion and consultation skills. To offer a balanced view, the qualitative impact of 






The Impact of QOF 
In order to avoid some of the pitfalls of a purely reductionist approach to quality 
discussed earlier, the qualitative impact of QOF within general practice will take 
predominance in the following analysis. 
Overall, general practitioners have been supportive of the QOF target regime 
(McDonald, 2014). Generally, doctors appear to have welcomed the new structures and 
better organised working practices implemented as a result of QOF, which may explain 
their acceptance of the scheme nationally. However, a select few practices have 
underperformed on QOF year on year, suggesting that there remains a small handful of 
practices which have not embraced the scheme. 
According to a study by Grant and colleagues (2009), the introduction of QOF led to a 
number of positive organisational changes, particularly due to improved IT systems 
and a more organised managerial infrastructure within the practices. This could perhaps 
be an indication to some of the managerial principles of QOF becoming internalised by 
general practice. Additionally, the authors indicated that QOF also brought about a shift 
in professional boundaries, whereby practice nurses gained greater ownership over 
reviews for specific disease areas.  
However, studies have also revealed a dramatic increase in workload since QOF’s 
introduction, particularly for practice nurses (O’Donnell, Jabareen & Watt, 2010), with 
a lower than expected remuneration in relation to the financial rewards for the practice. 
Nurses were also feeling frustrated due to the adherence to ‘box-ticking’ imposed by 






Employing an ethnographically-informed organisational case study design, Checkland 
and Harrison (2010) drew conclusions as to the impact of QOF on service organisation 
and delivery. Practice organisational structures shifted in terms of the adaptation of 
roles, with practice nurses holding new control over long term conditions indicator 
performance, and in terms of a new stronger IT infrastructure (supported through 
additional PCT funding) to manage the implementation of OQF within the practice.  
Notably, QOF has led to near on universal computerisation of general practice in 
England, creating the largest primary care database in the world. It is worth noting, that 
there appears to be a link between the type of ‘inpractice’ IT system and practice QOF 
performance (Kontopantelis et al., 2013), which suggests that QOF performance is 
heavily influenced by successful IT navigation, rather than purely the ‘on the ground’ 
performance it is designed to capture. Checkland and Harrison note that QOF led to the 
introduction of greater monitoring and surveillance. Interestingly, the practices 
included in this study claimed that they had not undergone change in terms of 
performance and rather QOF had easily fitted their existing organisational paradigm.  
Whilst there is a prominent body of literature arguing that increased managerial 
interventions undermine clinical professionalism and therefore should be resisted (e.g. 
Freidson, 1985; Mangin & Toop, 2007), in contrast Harrison and Checkland’s findings  
point towards the development of a new status quo where surveillance is regarded as 
legitimate and a necessary tool in quality capture. However, that may only be the case 
for practices which engage with QOF. To gain a broader view of responses to increased 
surveillance through QOF, it is of interest to also explore the characteristics of practices 
which continue to underperform on the framework. This continued underperformance 






could also signal a lack of engagement with QOF and a resistance to QOF surveillance. 
These concepts will be explored further within section 3.2. 
An unpublished meta-synthesis of papers relating to the qualitative impact of QOF was 
undertaken by the author of this study in 2010, to help narrow down its research focus, 
whilst the thesis was still very much in its infancy. A systematic search of electronic 
databases was carried out using the search terms ‘qualitative’, ‘general practice’, 
‘quality and outcomes framework’ and ‘pay for performance’. English language papers 
using qualitative methodology only, conducted in an English general practice setting 
and  concerned with the experiences and impact of QOF in general practice post its 
introduction in 2004 were extracted. 
Initially, after the removal of duplicates, 100 potentially relevant studies were 
identified. The abstracts of these were assessed against the inclusion criteria and nine 
papers were found to be appropriate for meta-synthesis. The quality of these papers 
was judged to be acceptable for inclusion using the Critical Appraisal Skills 
Programme (CASP) quality assessment tool for qualitative research (Public Health 
Resource Unit, 2006). Finally, nine qualitative papers (McDonald et al., 2007; Rycroft-
Malone et al., 2008; Campbell et al., 2008; Maisey et al., 2008; Checkland et al., 2008; 
McDonald et al., 2008; McDonald et al., 2009; Grant et al, 2009) were synthesised.  
It was of methodological interest to the PhD that the use of ethnographically-informed 
observation appeared to be limited in the synthesised studies and utilised in some 
simply to support or refute interview data. In contrast, this study aims to enrich this 
methodological approach by bringing together interviews, field-notes from observation 
and documentary evidence to form cohesive case studies of ‘poor performing’ general 






synthesis supported the notion that QOF had an impact on organisational facets of 
general practice, highlighting the saliency of studying organisational responses to QOF.  
The synthesis further suggested that QOF was a ‘mixed blessing’, having had both 
negative and positive influences on general practice. Negative influences included the 
introduction of a ‘tick-box’ medicine approach to care and a lack of person-centredness, 
with patients reportedly being treated as algorithms because of QOF’s implementation. 
The meta-synthesis also revealed some tensions stemming from what was perceived to 
be a fine line between PCT supportive feedback and intrusive monitoring of the 
practice, again pointing towards the importance of considering the theme of 
surveillance when understanding QOF’s impact in general practice. Monitoring which 
was perceived by the participants of the studies to be excessive tended to lead to 
frustration and loss of motivation. This can be linked to classic psychological literature 
concerning the role of incentives and monitoring in intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, 
whereby increased surveillance leads to a loss of interest in the task at hand, particularly 
when it is rewarded externally (Greene & Lepper, 1974). Further, this is in keeping 
with the argument that quality improvement initiatives such as QOF have to appeal to 
intrinsic professional values to maintain long term clinician motivation and cannot rest 
their success solely on financial rewards. It has also been suggested that monitoring 
quality improvement through professional networks of clinicians, rather than by 
external regulatory bodies, leads to greater affiliation with initiatives (Sheaff et al., 
2004). 
Positive influences of QOF highlighted by the meta-synthesis, centred on the improved 
organisation of the practice, driven by the IT infrastructure put into place alongside 






nurses.  The findings of the meta-synthesis suggested that the hopes for QOF bringing 
with it an improved IT infrastructure and better role definition and team working have 
largely been realised.  
The meta-synthesis was an important preliminary step in providing a rationale for this 
thesis. It became clear that the organisational dynamics behind measurable quality 
indicators are of interest to both clinicians and policy-makers, particularly in light of 
what makes the implementation of QOF acceptable to practice staff. For instance, it is 
of relevance to both managers and policy-makes that there appeared to be a fine line 
between surveillance and feedback in terms of motivation to perform on the QOF. The 
findings of the meta-synthesis suggested that excessive monitoring may lead to a 
frustrated workforce, whereas role clarity, target ownership and regular feedback have 
the potential to build trust and motivation. 
It was recognised that the meta-synthesis offered a useful starting point for 
understanding what makes quality improvement initiatives impact positively on 
general practice. This thesis builds on this recognition by presenting a study of practices 
selected on the basis of their QOF scores, to gauge whether or not particular responses 
to the implementation of QOF may have a detrimental effect on QOF performance. 
Undertaking this research has the potential to fill a gap in the literature highlighted by 
Glickman and others (2009) – namely that we know more about how quality 
improvement initiatives affect the organisation and less about how the organisation 
affects the success of quality improvement initiatives. 
To focus on the impact of QOF more broadly, what of the measurable elements of 
quality that QOF actually purports to measure? Have there been positive improvements 






evidence of public health gain in the domain of diabetes management and 
cardiovascular risk factors in diabetic patients (Millett et al., 2007). Furthermore, a 
narrowing of difference in QOF achievement between deprived and prosperous areas 
was demonstrated over time (Ashworth et al., 2008). In fact, the greatest improvements 
in QOF performance in specific indicators were seen in deprived communities (Lester, 
2008), suggesting that QOF was an effective tool in the drive for reducing health 
inequalities.  
In addition, smallest practices improved their QOF scores at the fastest rate and by year 
three had the highest median reported achievement rates of 91.5%. As small practices 
were represented among the highest and lowest QOF scorers, the authors of that 
specific paper concluded that QOF appeared to have reduced variation in performance 
and the differences between large and small practices also (Doran et al., 2010). 
It is worth noting that in the first year of QOF the mean score nationally was an 
unexpectedly high 954.2/1000 points. This suggests that QOF may have simply 
captured high performance that was already in existence, rather than leading to tangible 
improvements. In line with this, an independent enquiry carried out by the King’s Fund 
(2011) concluded that there was insufficient evidence that financial incentives for GPs 
have improved national health overall. Whilst echoing Lester that practices in deprived 
areas improved more on specific QOF indicators than those in the least deprived, the 
report also highlights that their overall achievement was still lower than that of less 
deprived area practices. Unlike Lester therefore, the report does not suggest that QOF 
can be a driver of the reduction of health inequalities, rather that there is limited 






inequalities. This report finding was linked to QOF not providing incentives linked to 
public health outcomes.  
One of the few findings within the King’s Fund report in support of QOF, was that  the 
framework was seen as effective in helping practices to implement improved 
approaches to secondary prevention. Furthermore, practices with an effective 
organisational and staff infrastructure were identified by the report as being more likely 
to be rewarded well by QOF. This implies that practices in deprived areas which may 
already be under-resourced, are likely to not do so well overall due to their poor 
organisational infrastructure. This finding highlights the need to study the impact of 
QOF on an organisational level. 
Yet, the research reviewed here did not explore the impact of QOF on the persistent 
low scorers. Indeed, practices which appear to remain outside of the reach of 
performance management frameworks may react quite differently to them. The premise 
of this thesis is of course to gain a greater insight into those general practices. The next 
section will highlight further why this particular group is of research interest.  
 
2.6 Persistent Low Scorers 
A group of persistent low scorers was identified by Ashworth and colleagues (2011). 
How this was achieved will be discussed in detail in the Methods section. Throughout 
the review of the background so far, it has been implied that this cohort of general 
practices would be of particular research interest, due to their outlier nature and 






changes brought about by QOF cannot be generalised to the cohort of consistent low 
QOF scorers.  
It would be thought-provoking to gain an understanding of why certain practices 
consistently underperform and whether the causes of their low QOF scores are similar 
across all cases of the participating low scorers. Furthermore, an insight into why 
certain general practices apparently remain immune to performance management 
through QOF would be of value to policy makers and managers, who could adapt their 
interventions to gain ‘buy in’ from these outliers. 
To date ‘poor’ performing general practices have not been studied qualitatively. 
However, a previous study has attempted to capture the qualitative characteristics of 
poor performing hospitals (Mannion, Davies, Marshall, 2003). The conclusions of the 
study suggest that the findings of this thesis may concern concepts of management, 
accountability and the use of information systems to name but a few. These concepts 
appear to be relevant to the level of organisational performance in light of quality 
improvement schemes and performance monitoring. 
This section is intentionally kept brief, so as not to make assumptions about the low 
scoring cohort. Rather, the study will seek to get a greater understanding of its 
participants through the data generated throughout the research process. The next 
chapter of the thesis will assess the potential theoretical frameworks that can be applied 
to enhance this understanding. Theoretical constructs of professionalism and 
managerialism, along with responses to surveillance, will be put forward as potential 
frameworks for aiding understanding as to the dynamics that underpin the successes 
and failures of incentive-based quality improvement schemes. It is likely, that a group 






responses to QOF which are unusual in comparison with general practice in England 























3. TOWARDS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This study will draw on pre-existing knowledge throughout, in order to provide a 
framework – building on past concepts and literature to potentially develop new 
understandings. It is hoped that the frameworks used will shed light on understanding 
low QOF scoring practices and will guide the best methodology for this purpose. 
Concepts which can potentially be used to understand and define why a select group of 
general practices would persistently end up with lower than average QOF scores are 
reviewed. This enables movement beyond basic description to in-depth description, 
interpretation and analysis, with potential explanations for observed phenomena 
offered by proposing potential theoretical frameworks. 
To contextualise this statement within health services research, Crabtree and Miller 
(1999) argue for greater inclusion of theory in the study of general practice. They state 
that traditionally general practitioners do not work with abstract concepts, rather 
specific factual information. Yet, we shouldn’t assume that a quantitative approach of 
this nature is the only lens through which to view the world. For instance, theoretical 
understandings stemming from qualitative enquiry about patient/doctor relationships, 
and how they affect engagement with treatment, are also key to a successful patient 
outcome. Furthermore, Kelly (2010) promotes the use of theory at the planning stage 
of qualitative research, hence these chapters are exploratory in nature, enabling the 
planning of this study. It is not unusual, however, for researchers to iteratively go back 
and forth between the literature, research questions and research findings throughout 







3.1 Professionalism vs. Managerialism 
 
‘The role of the family doctor is in part to protect the patient from the excesses of 
specialized technocracy; to defend him against narrow mindedness; and to help him 
humanely to find his way among the complex maze of scientific medicine.’ 
Richard Titmuss, Commitment to Welfare (1968) 
 
Professionalism stands out as one of the key policy discourses in the present 
government White Paper ‘Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS’ (Department of 
Health, 2010). The White Paper promises to empower healthcare professionals, to 
liberate them from excessive state interference, stating that they are best placed to make 
decisions about how the NHS is run. It claims that bestowing this freedom and trust 
upon professionals will lead to better quality patient care. This policy sentiment 
suggests the existence of an interrelationship between the state and healthcare 
professionals. In light of this, the potential tension between state governance (i.e. QOF) 
and general practice will be explored in this chapter.  The supposed strengths, as well 
as limitations, of professionalism in facilitating health services quality will also be 
examined.  The overarching purpose of this chapter is to introduce professionalism and 
related themes as one possible explanatory framework for understanding general 
practices with low QOF scores. 
An interest in the nature and role of the professions is not new. Johnson, writing in 
1972, argued that the professions are assumed to hold unique characteristics which 






provides a justification for the distinct body of theory ‘the sociology of the professions’. 
Within this discipline, attempts at defining professionalism have been explored. In its 
most basic sense, professionalism can be defined as the length of formal training and 
experience of employees (Daft, 2001), though this may be overly simplistic. In contrast, 
Friedson’s (1994) thirty page chapter in his seminal work “Professionalism Reborn”, 
seeks to find an appropriate definition, but concludes with an argument against defining 
something so complex and evolving.  
However, some commentators have proposed lists of the qualities of professionalism 
as useful definitions. In 1994 Sir Kenneth Calman, then Chief Medical Officer, 
published a paper in the British Medical Journal in which he argued that it was 
important to consider defining the facets of professionalism in a time of ‘questioning 
of professional standards and the quality of care’ and that the medical profession should 
espouse the following values: 
 Driven by a sense of vocation or calling, implying service to others 
 Has a distinctive knowledge base, which is kept up to date 
 Sets its own standards and controls access through examination  
 Has a special relationship with those whom it serves 
 Is guided by particular ethical principles 
 Is self-regulating and accountable. 
Professionalism is a concept that is familiar, yet complex, resulting in differing 
understandings of its meaning.  Professionalism might simply imply a positive feeling 
and attachment to one’s vocation. For instance, Newkirk (1982) defined 






positively represent the standards of one’s profession and a commitment to advancing 
the program or activity of the profession.’ 
Furthermore, an understanding of the root word profession is required before exploring 
the behaviors that characterize professionalism. Three suggested fundamental elements 
of a profession (Adapted from Brown, 1971) are as follows: 
• A value orientation to service for the welfare of society/service 
orientation/welfare of others is uppermost 
•  Abstract knowledge used adaptably and skillfully in the area of service/expert 
knowledge for the service/a theoretical framework 
• Autonomy in decision-making and action relative to the service/decisions are 
made and actions taken based on expertise, knowledge and reason.  
These characteristics must be translated by individuals into patterns of action that 
convey the image of a professional person, suggesting that professionalism refers as 
much to a code of conduct, as to the traits of an individual or group. However, a 
common critique of attempts to define these traits is that they are based on a flawed 
assumption that professions are internally homogenous. Indeed, social groups have 
been observed to demonstrate intra-group variations in behaviour (Traindis, 1989). 
Similarly, it would be naïve to assume that all general practitioners conduct themselves 
in the same way, across all situations.  
However, given this relatively ambiguous and qualitative nature of the facets of 
professionalism, whilst conduct may be variable, there is clearly a push for a 
commonality of values to underpin the general practice profession. In addition, a 






acceptable standards which govern the behaviour of staff within the practice. Without 
such values, individuals may pursue behaviours which are in line with their own, rather 
than the practice’s value systems. Yet, it is worth noting, that the values of external 
organisations providing a mandate to the practices, may be at odds with the 
professional, and autonomous by their very definition, values of the general 
practitioner. 
Further discourses surrounding the professions explore the notion of governance and 
power within them. Professions can be viewed as networks with the goal of the 
preservation of social standing, unique expertise and power at their core (Rogers & 
Pilgrim, 2001). As such it serves the professions to become penetrable only through a 
strict and lengthy initiation process; years of education and training and membership 
of accreditation bodies in the case of medicine. The values that underpin their conduct, 
may also influence how the professions govern themselves internally. It could be 
argued that there is a level of collegial pressure, only ‘a quiet word’ uttered, as a mode 
of self-surveillance through semi-formal networks within the medical profession 
(Sheaff et al., 2004). In his seminal book “Profession of Medicine: A Study of the 
Sociology of Applied Knowledge”, Freidson (1970) explored the medical profession’s 
history and internal dynamics. In “Doctoring Together: A Study of Professional Social 
Control” (1975) he expanded on his observations and concluded that doctors have no 
effective way for disciplining members of their own profession for misconduct or 
malpractice and instead they have an unspoken and unofficial mechanism of steering 
patients away from poor performance. 
However, professional standing and belonging to a professional group bestows the 






change process in order for it to be implemented. Policy makes the assumption that 
professionalised organisations are flexible and responsive to change. Yet, Weberian 
arguments, at odds with principles of New Public Management, propose that 
organisations maintain an authority to block change through their bureaucratisation and 
thus nurture an internal governance based on discretion and abstract knowledge.   This 
conceptualisation can be tied in with ideas about the distribution of power within 
organisations, with power very much resting at the operational core of the general 
practice. Minztberg (1983) saw the professional bureaucracy as a system of expertise, 
whereby the organisation relies on highly trained employees to achieve its mission. 
This can be linked with Foucauldian view of professionalised organisations as distinct 
concentrations of power, with knowledge a means by which power is wielded 
(McKinlay & Starkey, 1998). Friedson (1994) develops this argument by asserting that 
there will always exist a dependency on specialised bodies and therefore expert 
organisations, with their monopoly of knowledge, are a necessity. In this way, the 
continued existence of professional silos of power becomes justified. 
Additionally, through the application of Mintzberg’s ideas to health ministries, Unger 
and colleagues (2000), argue that the lack of evaluation of outputs in the 
professionalised organisational model leads to high healthcare costs for the 
organisation itself. It follows, therefore, that a pay for performance system such as QOF 
which standardises and evaluates a large chunk of a GP’s workload plays a key role in 
reducing the costs of care, albeit in part through a process of deprofessionalisation, 
whereby some clinical expertise is removed from silos of professional power and 






Unger and others suggest that the drive to conserve the prestige and decision-making 
freedom that a professional bureaucracy brings, is detrimental to the organisational 
elements of a health body, leading to further service inefficiency. It is, therefore, of 
particular interest to study those longitudinally low scoring practices which appear to 
resist QOF, to test the assumption that professional structural models will have 
inefficient organisational practices.  
Professionalisation is thus often presented as being at odds with managerialism, which, 
as discussed in previous chapters, promotes standardisation to eliminate unnecessary 
variation in conduct and service delivery. The use of incentives to promote this 
standardisation, can again be viewed in Foucauldian terms as ‘governmentality’ or the 
techniques by which medical networks of power are rendered governable and governed 
by state bureaucrats. This in itself is an external form of control and, in the 1980s and 
1990s, Freidson warned of increasing bureaucratisation as a threat to the independence 
of the professions and cause of the erosion of doctors’ autonomy.  
Nonetheless, it would seem that professional values provide an important function in 
society today – they suggest an ethos of altruism and service to others. The notion of 
the professional as an ethically driven public servant is not a recent one. In 1933, Carr-
Saunders and Wilson described the professions as providing moral stability to society 
and that by preserving tradition they ‘stand like rocks against which waves raised by 
these forces beat in vain’. To take this analogy further, the “Liberating the NHS” White 
Paper suggests that the key to improved healthcare is to reduce the assault of negative 
forces, namely ‘political micromanagement’ through the reduction of bureaucratic 






Indeed, state-imposed bureaucracy has been an ongoing theme in the study of 
professionalism, often presented as a threat to the stability and dignity held by the 
professions. Almost twenty years after Carr-Saunders and Wilson so eloquently 
expressed their support for the professions, Lewis and Maude (1952) identified British 
governmental officialdom as a key risk to the correct functioning of the professions. In 
this vein, the noted sociologist C Wright Mills (1951) warned of ‘managerial 
demiurge’, whereby the manipulative politics of management practices steal power 
from the professions, leading to a society governed by coercion and yoke. Clearly, there 
is a sense of professions needing to remain independent of the control of the state in 
order to maintain their status. Therefore, routinisation and bureaucratic control, of 
which QOF is but one tool, can be seen as gradually eroding the expertise of the 
professions. This can be best described within the context of deprofessionalisation, 
implying a helplessness of the professionals to these external state forces.  
Today, the tension between bureaucracy and professionalism remains a central theme 
in the study of GP performance management. A provocative opinion piece by Mangin 
and Toop (2007) presented QOF as signalling the loss of GP independence to the 
external forces of the state. They warned that QOF, based on the premise that GPs are 
motivated by financial gain, rather than the wellbeing of their patients, would erode the 
trust between the public and the GP profession.  
At core of the bureaucratisation of medicine versus professionalism argument, notions 
of medical practice and professionalism as complex entities require attention; they are 
both constructs which cannot ever be completely captured as a series of measurable 
outputs for the purpose of external monitoring and financial reward. Mintzberg (1983) 






standardised. As covered in earlier chapters, one could take this further, and argue that 
healthcare provision is uniquely complex and therefore attempts at distilling it into 
measurable outputs are futile. Due to its inherent complexity, healthcare should remain 
‘professionally-owned’. 
It follows, that this is often the argument posed by QOF’s opposition. As discussed 
previously, Iona Heath and colleagues (2009) argue for medical holism over QOF. 
Furthermore, in line with Sir Kenneth Calman’s characteristics of professionalism, 
QOF undermines a professional’s power to dictate their own standards (Mangin & 
Toop, 2007). Yet, such counterarguments to QOF could also be seen as a means of 
legitimising non-conformity with state rules, in order to maintain professional power. 
There is some evidence from ethnographic research that claims of professional clinical 
judgement are often used to normalise breaking rules (Dixon-Woods, 2010). To take 
this further, this process of legitimisation may not necessarily result in better more 
patient-centred care, but rather act as an excuse for not engaging with QOF. These ideas 
could be applied to low QOF scoring practices, whose low scores are the result of a 
lack of engagement with the quality improvement initiative. Such practices may justify 
their rejection of QOF through asserting their professional values of patient-
centeredness over the tick-box pay for performance approach of QOF. 
Yet, it is also worth noting that as GP practices operate as small businesses, an outright 
rejection of financial gain over patient-centred care is thus an oversimplification. And 
indeed in order to survive and to keep providing quality services to their patients, a GP 
practice must retain an income stream, which requires some conformity with state 
administration. Therefore, it would be of interest to explore how the low QOF scoring 






of professionalism, and perhaps other values, influencing the level and type of 
engagement with QOF is an interesting premise. 
The dichotomy of state bureaucracy versus GP professionalism is not perfectly clear 
cut. Whilst a question mark is raised over the extent to which GPs can remain truly 
autonomous in the face of QOF monitoring, Friedson (1970) suggested that doctors are 
entirely subordinate to the state in terms of the social and economic constraints of their 
work. In Friedson’s view doctors retain control over the technical aspects of their work, 
but it may well be that such autonomy and monopoly are only possible because of their 
dependence on and sponsorship by the state (Larson, 1977). This was termed 
‘organised autonomy’ by Friedson, a mandate bestowed by the state upon the 
professions to control their own work.  
In other words, the professions only remain so because of the recognition they are given 
by state institutions. This is in keeping with Michel Foucault’s (1973) studies of the 
interaction of the state and medicine, where modern professions are constructed as a 
product of governmentality.  Although this is a complex notion, warranting its own 
thesis, within this framework GPs can be conceptualised as tools of the state used to 
enact government policies. Thus GPs are only officially recognised as experts in order 
to be given the remit to facilitate the implementation of government agenda.  
It would certainly be of interest to explore the relationship of low QOF scoring 
practices with state controls, and the extent to which they feel that their professionalism 
is undermined through QOF.  Qualitative studies in existence at the time of writing, do 
not indicate a loss of GP autonomy, or QOF undermining clinical decision-making for 
that matter, rather QOF has been credited with increasing professional power amongst 






(e.g. Checkland & Harrison, 2010). One study exploring the influence of bureaucratic 
controls in general practice suggests that the impact of bureaucracy on GPs may be 
exaggerated and its effects dependent upon their place within the organisational 
hierarchy (Boreham, 1983). So while the work of specialists lower down the 
organisational hierarchy (e.g. salaried GPs, practice nurses) may be becoming 
increasingly routinised through OQF, professionals in senior positions may still be able 
to retain their autonomy and professional control. This is because the general practice 
continues to rely on their clinical expertise.   
This suggests that it is important to have an awareness of the internal distribution of 
power within a general practice if one is to study the full interrelationship between 
professional autonomy and bureaucratic control. Some commentators have argued that 
professional autonomy is contingent rather than fixed (Harrison & Dowswell, 2002), 
implying that inflexible top-down management frameworks therefore go a long way to 
undermine it. Here, clear parallels can be drawn with Mintzberg’s characteristics of the 
professionalised organisation. In order for this structure to be effective, the 
professionals at the helm of it should retain their autonomy and power. Because their 
power is distributed down through the hierarchy, professionalised organisations are 
difficult to change. This no doubt holds implications for how general practices react to 
government monitoring. 
It appears therefore, that professionals in senior hierarchical positions can still manage 
to resist the encroachment of bureaucratic controls and managerialist ways of thinking 
into their specialist domains. This may to some extent explain why low QOF scoring 
practices tend to be single-handed (Ashworth et al., 2011). Within this framework, it 






without the normative effects of a partnership or group. On the other hand, a lack of 
normative influence in general practice can be detrimental to its performance and the 
quality of care it provides (Campbell et al, 2009). Conversely, patients may prefer the 
personalised care offered to them by a single-handed practice. It may be found 
therefore, that the underperforming single-handed practices studied for the purpose of 
this thesis may continue to deliver person-centred care in spite of their low QOF scores.  
The Shipman Inquiry (2002-5, sourced from The National Archives) – an extreme case 
of a single-handed GP’s abuse of power – resulted in a recent call for greater GP 
professionalism.  The Inquiry emphasised increased accountability through self-
regulation.  Yet, there is perhaps an inherent paradox here. Citing the Harold Shipman 
malpractice scandal, Randall and Munro (2010) argue within a Foucauldian 
framework, that there exists an illogicality whereby abuses of professional power such 
as Shipman’s result in even greater calls for ‘professionalism’.  Although an extreme 
example, clearly the Harold Shipman scandal calls into question the notion of 
professional power as the key to achieving quality patient care. On the other hand, such 
events can lead to cries within professions for better self-regulation, as well as a 
recognition of the limitations of professional knowledge. 
Therefore, the desire to preserve professional power can be a limiting factor in 
improving patient care, and certainly in implementing government policy successfully. 
This may well be the view taken by policy-makers calling for greater GP accountability 
and transparency through QOF monitoring and publicly available QOF ratings. 
Furthermore, it is clear that consistently low scoring practices react to QOF monitoring 
in a unique way – they appear to remain in opposition to this form of surveillance, or 






Managerialism creates a negative culture of ‘bureaucratic accountability’, achieved 
through external surveillance. GPs may be critical of this situation, but are viewed as 
demonstrating little resistance to it (Harrison & Dowswell, 2002). Increased monitoring 
poses a further challenge for quality capture. The resulting bureaucracy and a feeling 
of being ‘watched’ can lead to GPs’ sense of professionalism being undermined. It is 
not a new point of view that potentially reducing patient care to a ‘pay for reporting’ 
approach can be demotivating and even reduce quality in non-incentivised areas 
(Kordowicz & Ashworth, 2013). The next section in this chapter will explore notions 
of surveillance in more depth. 
 
3.2 Regulation & Surveillance 
‘The first task of the doctor is ... political: the struggle against disease must begin 
with a war against bad government.’  
                                                     Michel Foucault (1963) 
This part of the theoretical literature review will demonstrate that, in the context of a 
Foucauldian framework, QOF can be viewed as an electronic surveillance technology 
within general practice. Potential GP responses to regulation through surveillance will 
also be explored. 
Foucault’s theory of power and concept of governmentality were touched upon in the 
earlier chapter on professionalism. It is by refining his theory of power, through his 
studies of the interaction of the state and its subjects, that Michel Foucault developed 






moved away from the traditional understanding of power as lying within the apexes of 
societal hierarchies. Rather power, as discussed previously, is presented as becoming 
internalised by professional strongholds through knowledge.  According to Foucault, 
power lies in a loose ensemble of the state and expert groupings, within what he termed 
a power/knowledge nexus. The medical professional can be viewed in the context of 
an existing part of this wider nexus, whereby their power is, to an extent, at the mercy 
of state apparatus. 
Thus, the knowledge that professional groups are recognised as experts by the 
government, conversely leads to more effective forms of social control. In Foucault’s 
view, this is because knowledge enables individuals and groups to govern themselves. 
To apply this to the professions, by recognising certain groups as holding professional 
power, the government renders them officially capable of enacting government policy. 
Therefore, the ways in which the professions self-govern are tacitly infiltrated by 
government influence. Furthermore, knowledge facilitates the creation of self-ruling 
and auto-regulated groups, resulting in ‘the formation of a whole series of specific 
governmental apparatuses’ (Foucault in Burchell, Gordon & Miller, 1991). 
Foucault’s ideas are often cited and rarely critiqued. Marxist critiques relate to the 
notable absence of economic and capitalist considerations within his frameworks and 
there are also feminist critiques in existence (see Martin, 1982). A review of the 
literature reveals that the main criticism of the concept of governmentality is that it is 
at times defined with undue complexity. One commentator described Foucault as the 
archetypal post-structuralist philosopher – prolific and impenetrable (Wood, 2003). 
Indeed, for the sake of brevity, it is not appropriate to unpick this complexity here. To 






operationalisable (e.g. Miller & Rose, 2008).  In this thesis, elements of the definition 
of governmentality and his notions of surveillance, which illustrate how QOF can be 
viewed as a surveillance technology, are expanded upon. But perhaps the simplest 
definition of the concept could simply be ‘the way people are governed to exercise 
political power.’ 
Governmentality can thus be understood at its most basic level as the means through 
which a government fulfils its policies and governs its citizens. It also spans the 
strategies that are employed by the government to render its subjects governable and 
how best to mould society into enacting its policies. Foucault saw modern professions 
as a product of governmentality. Applied to general practice, GPs are granted the power 
of belonging to a professional group in order to be given the remit to enact government 
policies. Thus, in this context, GPs are utilised to enact government policies, and 
achievement of this is continuously monitored and regulated. 
Furthermore, as general practices have been structured as small business entities since 
the inception of the NHS, and GPs continue to work as contractors to the state, it is apt 
to refer to Foucault’s notion of ‘neoliberal governmentality’. Here, within the liberal 
democracy of England, power is devolved and its citizens play an active role in their 
own self-government. Neoliberalism is characterised by the predominance of market 
mechanisms, which as previously discussed, were introduced by the Thatcher 
government into the public sector and continue to feature strongly within the modern 
NHS. Thus as independent contractors, GPs are given remit to self-regulate and auto-






As was touched upon in the previous chapter, in today’s public management, one key 
tool to achieve the aim of monitoring is the use of electronic systems. Therefore, it can 
be argued that QOF is a means through which the government monitors the standard to 
which GPs ‘perform’ the task of enacting their mandate. In the case of QOF, this is 
achieved by the infiltration of ‘inpractice’ computerised systems through QOF Read 
clinical encoding, templates and reminders flagged automatically during consultations, 
as well as data submission through the GP payment calculation system (previously 
GMAS and now the Calculating Quality Reporting Service). The use of incentives to 
promote this standardisation, can again be viewed in Foucauldian terms as a facet of 
governmentality, or the techniques by which medical networks of power are rendered 
governable. This is achieved by an external form of bureaucratisation with the potential 
to erode doctors’ autonomy, as was elaborated upon earlier in the chapter.   
In addition, each practice’s data are made publicly available, opening the practice up 
to scrutiny. Though a distinct model in itself, which will not be explored as part of this 
thesis, it is nonetheless apt to view this as a product of what Dunleavy and colleagues 
(2005) coined ‘digital-era governance’, whereby professional groups are placed under 
close monitoring. QOF can therefore be conceived of as a technology of power, utilised 
for surveillance.  
Indeed, the rise of modern surveillance technologies have perhaps made Foucault’s 
concept of the Panopticon even more relevant in the study of the interaction of the state 
with its subjects. Foucault utilised the Panopticon as a metaphor for the operation of 
power and surveillance in modern society. The Panopticon was an architectural 
structure, created by Jeremy Bentham in the 19th Century, primarily for use in prisons 






constant observation; an internalised coercion, whereby inmates were monitored 
unceasingly from a vantage point within a high central tower. No communication or 
interaction between the inmates was permitted. Parallels with QOF can easily be drawn, 
whereby in a neoliberal market where competition between GP practices is encouraged 
in terms of reaching high QOF scores, practices seek to moderate their behaviour very 
much in isolation. The belief that one is under constant observation and scrutiny, leads 
to increased control of the subject through a rise in self-monitoring. Simply put, the 
awareness of being watched influences one to moderate their behaviours. Surveillance 











The Panopticon metaphor suggests that power and knowledge are produced by 
observing others, supervising and recording events. This surveillance is internalised, 
resulting in the acceptance of rules and a passivity in the inmates, identity shifts and 
the creation of a new and reformed self (Starkey and McKinlay, 1988). This reaction, 
desired by the observer, is rooted in the looming threat of discipline. This analysis 
suggests that day to day technologies of pervasive surveillance may act as a source of 
discipline and eventually encourage the observed to adopt reformed conduct, although 
resistance to the control regime remains possible. 
Thus, the more one observes, the more power one gains (Foucault, 1975). Therefore, 
the proliferation of QOF targets, with the growing level of detail required from the GP 
in order to meet them and achieve an incentive payment, can be seen within this 
framework as the quest of the government for more power over general practitioners 
and professionals more widely. This is captured by what Foucault described as the 
observers’ drive for more power through ‘new objects of knowledge over all the 
surfaces on which power is exercised’. Therefore, self-surveillance is a product of 
surveillance, whereby individuals make an assumption that they are being observed, 
and as a result begin to subconsciously police their behaviour, aiding the 
implementation of policy.  
In line with this assumption, in the context of the regulation of the medical profession 
through patient safety policy, Waring (2007) argues that doctors seek to subvert 
government managerial reforms through ownership of components of those reforms to 
reinforce claims to medical autonomy. This take develops the Foucauldian concept of 
internalisation. Waring describes this acceptance and normalisation of policy by the 






managerialism and to maintain professional power. However, according to Waring, this 
rebellion of sorts ‘leads to new and rearticulated forms of self-surveillance, self-
management or ‘governmentality’, ultimately negating the need for external groups to 
explicitly manage or regulate professional practice’. This suggests that choosing to 
implement policy may simply be a move amongst clinical professionals to get 
managers ‘off their backs’. 
In a similar vein, Sheaff and colleagues (2004) analysed the development of clinical 
governance systems in primary care, seen as a shift away from self-regulation which 
has traditionally been strongly developed in general practice. Using a Foucauldian 
framework, the authors suggested that the internalisation of clinical governance 
discourse could be seen as a way of promoting self -surveillance and self-discipline 
linked to value shifts among primary care doctors, who were a group most difficult to 
control through direct managerial lines. This obedience of sorts is presented by the 
authors in a negative light. Yet, in contrast, Waring appears to support this 
internalisation through his calls for managerial technologies to be drawn into 
professional identity. It could be argued, however, that this in itself would, according 
to Foucault, be a manifestation of the medical professional becoming a tool within a 
system of governmentality.  
In addition to internalisation, one can assume a range of responses to surveillance. For 
instance, the challenge of standardisation in healthcare suggests that incentive 
frameworks, such as QOF, are susceptible to gaming. This can be placed within the 
context of reactions to surveillance, whereby gaming can be seen as a form of rebellion 
in the face of QOF as a top down government driven monitoring technology. Gaming 






usefulness, whereby participating practices work to only the target threshold required 
by QOF and some even go so far as to distort the output, rather than use the framework 
as a legitimate means of improving their clinical performance. 
Furthermore, Sheaff and colleagues (2004) argue that top-down clinical quality 
improvement initiatives, such as QOF, have conversely led to a shift away from the 
autonomous self-regulation of an individual general practitioner towards the 
establishment of networks as performance monitoring mechanisms. To apply this to 
general practice, such networks include formerly the Primary Care Trusts, now the 
Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs), NHSE (NHS England), collegiate bodies and 
the British Medical Association’s Local Medical Committees, and it may be that the 
persistently underperforming practices choose to remain outside of such regulatory 
influences. It would be of interest to gauge the feeling of low QOF scorers towards the 
NHSE which will take responsibility for much of Primary Care Trust’s former work. 
No doubt GP-led CCGs add an extra dimension of complexity to this process. 
Increased regulatory transparency is likely to result in defensive reactions from 
clinicians. Drawing on a Foucauldian framework, in their qualitative interview-based 
study of how doctors, psychotherapists and counsellors react to regulation, McGivern 
and Fischer (2012) highlight that the greater the unique complexity of the profession 
and the level of tailored service to the individual patient (i.e. psychotherapy) the more 
likely it is to resist regulatory transparency. Yet again, to support the dichotomy 
between person-centred care and top-down surveillance technologies, the authors 






Moreover, electronic surveillance can breed resistance. Doolin (2002), in his study of 
the implementation of a medical information management system in a New Zealand 
hospital, noted that the increased scrutiny and visibility of the management system 
caused doctors to engage in resistance and counter conduct. One such form of 
resistance was to undermine the validity of the electronic system, by asserting one’s 
values in the face of this imposed top-down change. QOF, which to an extent produces 
a yearly public general practice ranking table, opens GPs up to scrutiny and is therefore 
likely to result in some counter conduct.  
Indeed, this could be an explanation for why some practices have underperformed on 
QOF for a number of years – they chose to rebel against it. As discussed in earlier 
chapters, QOF has been widely criticised by the GP community as undermining 
patient-centred values through needless and often dangerous standardisation (e.g. 
Mangin & Toop, 2007), which can perhaps be viewed as a public rebellion of sorts. 
Therefore, it would be of interest to explore whether QOF low scorers rationalise their 
underperformance by citing professional and holistic values as the reason for their 
disengagement.  
 
So what of the future of QOF as a surveillance technology? Here it is apt to draw on 
Shoshana Zuboff’s seminal 1988 text “In the Age of the Smart Machine: The Future of 
Work and Power”. As early as 1988, Zuboff explored the potential future impact of 
computerised technologies as an enabler of organisational control. Building on 
Foucault with her theory of the ‘electronic panopticon’, Zuboff’s work supports the 
concept of information technologies challenging professional autonomy and seeking to 






internalisation of management tools as she presents professional groups as bestowing 
their own meaning upon, and creating a sense of ownership over, the knowledge and 
information they apply in their day to day practice. Zuboff argues that the future (rather 
bleak) implications of monitoring technologies are as follows: 
1. That which can be automated will be automated 
2. That which can be informated will be informated 
3. Every digital application that can be used for surveillance and control will be 
used for surveillance and control. 
Zuboff states that ‘information systems that translate, record, and display human 
behaviour can provide a computer age version of universal transparency that would 
have exceeded even Bentham’s most outlandish fantasies’. This strongly suggests that 
the organisational effects of new monitoring technologies and their application within 
electronic surveillance systems should be a major theme in the Foucauldian analysis of 
modern healthcare organisations. 
Therefore, the electronic panopticon, it could be argued, will only continue to grow as 
a tool for continued surveillance of the medical profession. Ferlie (2016) argues that 
there now exists a climate of ‘decentralised centralisation’, whereby the performance 
of seemingly autonomous providers of health services is repeatedly surveyed through 
electronically reported indicators. In addition, the policy centre holds the power to carry 
out visits to and audits of the providers as an additional tool for on the ground 






The next section of this chapter will summarise the key questions raised by the 
theoretical review, the answers to which would potentially aid the understanding of 
persistently low QOF scoring general practices. 
 
3.3 Summary 
This summary is a consolidation of the key questions raised by the preceding 
background chapters and how these will be applied in the context of stating the research 
aims and methodology of this study. 
Against the policy backdrop of New Public Management, the notable constructs within 
the literature review concerned the tensions amongst clinicians that can be brought 
about by the top-down implementation of managerially-led quality improvement 
initiatives. How government surveillance through performance monitoring can 
undermine professionalism and a sense of values was explored, along with some of the 
potential limitations of measurable indicator-based performance improvement 
frameworks in capturing the true essence of quality of care within general practice 
Whilst pay for performance incentive frameworks hold some advantages, they may not 
capture all facets of quality, in particular the qualitative elements of care in general 
practice. Therefore, it would be appropriate to get under the ‘skin’ of consistently 
‘poor-performing’ general practices with the aim of qualitative enquiry being to shed a 
light on how the practices operate and respond to QOF. Is it that practices are truly 
poorly performing and QOF captures this appropriately? Or is there more in terms of 
how they operate beyond the scope of QOF that needs to be understood? Are these 






between professionalism and managerialism? Are the practices’ low scores an 
indication of their perceptions of the shortcomings of the QOF incentive scheme? How 
do general practices perceive and respond to QOF surveillance? 
These reflective questions are somewhat leading of course, as they make a number of 
assumptions about the policy and social discourses that the low QOF scores of the 
practices of interest may be a reflection of. However, it is nigh on impossible to carry 
out research with a complete ‘tabula rasa’ to begin with and the researcher will always 
bring their own values and beliefs to the research process, which is recognised by the 
epistemological standpoint of this thesis - social constructionism. This is discussed in 
more detail throughout the Methods chapter. This thesis therefore recognises that 
‘social research can never be entirely objective, itself being conducted within a social 
and political context’ (Tarling, 2006). Indeed, the tensions between professionalism 
and managerialism, along with Foucauldian notions of electronic surveillance and 
panopticism appear to be promising theoretical frameworks at this stage of the study. 
 In order to eliminate bias however, it is important that the researcher’s prior 
understandings are rooted in a sound evaluation of research evidence, as demonstrated 
by the preceding review of the literature. The research questions of the study however 
will be phrased in a neutral tone, avoiding assumptions. This allows for a more 
inductive approach, which will also be described within the Methods chapter of the 








3.4 Statement of Research Questions  
The primary research objective constructed from the review of the literature is as 
follows: 
 To gain an understanding of general practices which have achieved low Quality 
and Outcomes Framework scores over a five-year period. 
The secondary research questions are: 
 How is QOF perceived by the practice staff? 
 How do the participating low scoring general practices respond to a top-down 
target-driven quality improvement initiative? 
 What role does professionalism play in how the practices respond to regulation? 
 Why do some general practices continue to underperform on the Quality and 
Outcomes Framework? 
 What do the participating low scoring general practices do in terms of quality 













The methods chapter will begin with a review of the epistemological approaches found 
within the social sciences and, more specifically, health services research. Next, this 
will be placed in the context of the subject of the thesis, namely a study of general 
practices with consistently low QOF scores. Then detail will be provided about the 
study design and methods, before elaborating on how analysis was carried out, from 
data collection to theory building. Strengths and limitations of the methods undergo 
analysis. In this section, ethical factors as well as issues of reflexivity are explored. In 
keeping with the ethnographic tradition, personal reflections are offered throughout.  
 
A note on the use of personal pronouns: 
I have used both the first and third person throughout the thesis. The first person has 
been used within the Methods section and case studies. The use of the first person is 
commonplace in ethnographic research.  One of the key features of ethnography is that 
it sees the research process as lived experience (e.g. Kleinman & Kleinman, 1991). 
Ethnographers often use the first person perspective in their writing to acknowledge 
their presence as both observer and active participant in their research setting. On the 
other hand, in order to present a more formal academic stance, the third person has been 
used in the theoretical chapters. Writing in the third person is more widely accepted 
academic practice. 
The process of ethnography tells the story of the research itself, beginning the case 
studies at the outset with the arrival of the researcher as a key player in the process. 
According to Van Maanen (1990), the use of ‘I’ conveys a phenomenological 






of the practices may feel informal. However, it is hoped that the style of language used 
may in itself subtly communicate, or even be reflective of, the culture of the practices 
being studied. It is apt to quote Clifford Geertz (1988) here, a highly influential 
American cultural anthropologist, who stated that ‘getting themselves into their 
text…may be as difficult for ethnographers as getting into their culture’.  
This suggests that these two elements are deeply connected, with the text through which 
research findings are expressed, potentially being an expression of the culture of the 
organisation being studied. However, Geertz was critical of the ethnographer’s 
contemplative auto ethnographical stance and dismissed it as a ‘pretence’, when it 
amounts to no more than the insertion of the ‘self’ within the text. To counteract this 
rather superficial approach to what Chua, High and Lau (2008) coin ‘one-dimensional 
reflexivity’, I took notes throughout the research process to record my thoughts, 
feelings and reflections on the research experience, in particular about the role I played 
in the research process itself. Thus, my use of the first person is more than just simply, 
to use Chua, High and Lau’s terminology ‘a game of words’. Yet, as a note of caution, 
I tried to avoid the pitfall of ‘navel-gazing’ and to participate in personal reflection 
which was both relevant to the research and research-led (Hemmingson, 2008). 
It should also be noted that this is in keeping with the social constructionist 
epistemological standpoint of this thesis. This is a theory of knowledge that explores 
the way actors construct their understandings of the phenomena and how these 








4.1 Study Design 
This is a longitudinal qualitative organisational study, the aim of which is to formulate 
case-studies of the low QOF scoring practices to shed light on the thesis’ research 
questions. The methodology is ethnographically-informed, with data gathered through 
the process of participant observation. The study is intended to be inductive and 
exploratory, with a social constructionist focus on how meanings surrounding QOF are 
created, negotiated, sustained and modified (Schwandt, 2003) by general practices with 
low QOF scores. 
With there being a broader element to the concept of quality in general practice beyond 
the measurable as discussed previously, as well as the complexity of general practices 
as organisations, a qualitative approach was deemed most appropriate to the 
exploratory research questions.  
The study consists of five free-standing low QOF scoring general practice case studies, 
with the emergent findings subsequently being brought together to create a data-driven 
overarching case study of low QOF scorers. The design is iterative, in the sense that 
the methodological framework evolved by being enhanced with each case study (Yin, 
2003). For instance, the interview questions were reformulated to elicit more 
information on the basis of what worked well in previous interviews. 
Additionally, the study design is ethnographically informed, not only through the 
application of participant observation in the research process as discussed below, but 
also being accompanied by theoretical ideas concerning the social processes of the 
general practices studied. Therefore, ‘social process is not captured in hypothetical 






involves getting inside the world of those generating it’ (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991) 
and thus an awareness of the social constructions of those studied and how the data 
may be socially constructed by me as the researcher. This is a pragmatic view of 
knowledge based on how truth is judged in relation to what is already known. This 
notion of becoming almost an insider of the studied organisation in order to form a rich 
understanding of it, is rooted in the ethnographic approach, which will be explored later 
on in this chapter. 
First, in order to present a clearer rationale as to why qualitative methodology was 
employed to study the low QOF scoring practices, one needs to understand the 
epistemological considerations underpinning both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches. The next section will explore these concepts in more depth.  
 
4.1.1 The Quantitative/Qualitative Distinction 
The division between quantitative and qualitative research is based on the contrasting 
purpose and thus methods of both approaches. The purpose of quantitative research is 
the attempt to quantify social phenomena in order to establish the veracity of a theory’s 
generalisability. Simply put, its ultimate goals are to establish causes and make 
predictions. Quantitative research aims to therefore determine causal explanations 
through the use of empirical data.  
In contrast, the qualitative process of inquiry holds the contextualisation and 
interpretation of social or human experiences and perspectives at its centre. Qualitative 
research therefore emphasises interpretation over quantification and is more concerned 






quantitative and qualitative inquiries raise different questions about the social worlds 
that they aim to capture. 
With divergent purposes, the two processes unsurprisingly apply different approaches 
and methodologies. Quantitative research is based on testing a hypothesis generated 
from an existing theory and is therefore seen to be deductive and confirmatory in 
nature. In contrast, qualitative research uses an inductive approach, whereby 
hypotheses are generated through the research. In both methods there exists a 
systematic interaction between theories and data, but in what appear to be opposing 
directions. 
Often, quantitative research collects numerical data in artificial laboratory settings to 
remove bias by controlling for extraneous variables. Statistical techniques are then 
applied to the data.  Qualitative research is conducted in a natural ‘field’ setting with 
the phenomenological aim of exploring constructs (attitudes, behaviours and 
experiences) through methods such as interviews or focus groups. Its data are usually 
in the form of transcripts and words, rather than numbers. Naturally, the interest at the 
centre of this study, namely contributing to an in depth understanding of low QOF 
scorers, is suited to qualitative enquiry. 
The differing roles of the researcher should also be noted in a discussion of differences 
between the two methodologies. In keeping with the objective approach of quantitative 
methodology, the role of the researcher is seen as that of a detached and impartial 
scientist. Objectivity is attained through adherence to established procedures which 
prevent the researcher from distorting the data. In fact, a basic criterion in research used 






of tools and procedures. Being objective can thus be defined as seeing the world free 
from one’s personal position in that world.  
On the contrary, the view of the qualitative tradition, to which this thesis is aligned, is 
that the personal context of the researcher cannot be separated from the data. Indeed, 
there exists a belief within some qualitative research traditions, notably ethnography, 
in the researcher becoming an insider being the only means of understanding the world 
view of your subject. However, within this, the researcher should continue to retain an 
awareness of the subtleties one’s own personal socio-cultural contexts and how they 
may impact on the data gathering and interpretation.  
Although, pointing to the subjectivity of the qualitative approach, this awareness of, or 
reflection on the researcher’s own role almost paradoxically is seen as a way of 
protecting qualitative research findings from claims that they lack validity or 
credibility. This concept is termed as reflexivity (see Woolgar, 1988) – the researcher 
reflecting on the role their own prior assumptions play in the development of their 
research and how the construction of research findings may have been influenced by 
the adopted methodology and analysis. Although, one might argue, that simply stating 
one’s awareness of subjectivity may not be the same as endeavouring to remove it 
altogether, the claim made by quantitative research. A key critique of the social 
constructionist standpoint, rather entertaining in its tautology, is that because social 
constructionism is itself a social construct (Hammersley, 1992), then it has no more 
claim to be advanced as an explanation than any other. This self-refuting nature of 







The apparent dichotomy that both the purpose and method of these two approaches 
create, has been the subject of a longstanding debate around which research process 
might be more ‘scientific’ and therefore favourable. Quantitative methodology is 
praised for its high external validity and associated ability to make strong generalizable 
claims, usually due to using a larger sample of participants and ability to control for 
confounding variables, and as such can make the claim of greater objectivity.  
However, some argue that through this, internal validity is sacrificed as empirical data 
cannot capture the realism and diversity of the social world (e.g. Glaser & Strauss, 
1967).  Reason and Rowan (1981:15), in reaction to what they term ‘quantophrenia’, 
state: ‘There is too much measurement going on. Some things which are numerically 
precise are not true; and some things which are not numerical are true. Orthodox 
research produces results which are statistically significant but humanly insignificant; 
in human inquiry it is much better to be deeply interesting than accurately boring’. As 
seen in the literature review, this lack of human significance may, of course, also be 
one of the critiques levelled against QOF itself. 
The scientific rationalism of quantitative methodology is based upon an ontology 
which assumes that ‘the world (social or natural) possesses qualities both independent 
of our ideas and empirically accessible to us’ (Giacomini, 2010). However, this view 
is challenged by commentators who argue that this positivist approach fails to 
appreciate context and ‘abstracts away from time as experienced by practitioners’ 
(Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011). It is important to note that my own professional 
background as a healthcare management consultant may bring with it pre-established 
understandings of primary care processes which can helpfully shed a light on some of 






other hand, the inter-subjective understandings proposed by interpretivist approaches, 
whilst identifying socially embedded knowledge in context, can fail to attend to 
underlying structural mechanisms which impact on social actions (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992). 
However, qualitative methods are considered to benefit from high internal validity 
(though some commentators have argued that the concept of validity should not be 
applied within the qualitative approach, rejecting the realist assumption that there is a 
reality external to our perception of it (Lincoln & Guba, 1985)), due to their focus on 
real world phenomena and attention to individual variation by studying a smaller 
sample more closely and naturalistically. Yet, it is not possible to make strong 
predictions or make causal conclusions at population level with qualitative 
methodology, which is what in opposition to Reason’s and Rowan’s view would imply 
that it is quantitative research that holds human significance. 
It is worth noting, that the nature of input of each practice into the research process 
may be a reflection of their sense of empowerment or otherwise. The categorisation of 
being a ‘poor-performer’ may have an impact on the day-to-day life of the practice. As 
a social researcher, I had a responsibility to maintain an awareness of this (Tolich & 
Davidson, 1999). 
It is clear from the literature review, that qualitative methodology which allows for the 
capture of the softer facets of performance which cannot be defined using standardised 
quantitative data tools, is key to understanding the outlier practices. Health services 
research has increasingly started to recognise the value of such methodology (e.g. 






There clearly exists a tendency to treat qualitative and quantitative research as being 
‘mutually antagonistic’ (Bryman, 1988). However, while there are differences between 
the two traditions, these may not be as clear cut as the dichotomous categorisation 
implies. The chasm within the supposed quantitative-qualitative dichotomy has at times 
grown through political, social, historical and cultural influences. An oft quoted 
example is that of some voices of the feminist movement, which highlight the gendered 
nature of research methodology (e.g. Graham, 1983; Reinharz, 1979). The search for 
an objective world view through the use of statistical data may be seen as masculine in 
nature. Qualitative methodology in contrast aims for interpretivism and exploration 
more closely linked to female characteristics.  
Thus, to put forward a crude example, the qualitative interview method may be better 
suited to female participants, whereas numbers may appeal more to the male mind. 
Currently the debate continues - Mies (2003) for instance speaks of the androcentrism 
that prevails within research practice. A critique of this standpoint may be that it 
purports supposed, rather stereotypical, differences between the sexes, and thus 
becomes a gendered world view in itself.   
One may perhaps go as far as to say that the quantitative-qualitative divide is a product 
of dissenting voices not immune from social context and fashion, rather than of intrinsic 
irreconcilable differences between the two processes. Either way, it becomes clear that 
the theoretical concepts and assumptions underlying both schools of thought need to 
be considered. 
The quantitative-qualitative divide is therefore also a divergence of epistemologies – 
the positivist versus the interpretivist. The key opposing features of the two 






Table 1: Positivism versus Constructivism 




The nature of reality 
Reality is single, tangible, 
and fragmentable.  
Realities are multiple, 
constructed, and 




The relationship of 
knower to the known 
Knower and known are 
independent, a dualism.  
Knower and known are 
interactive, inseparable.  
 
The possibility of 
generalisation  
Time- and context-free 
generalisations 
(nomothetic statements) 
are possible.  
Only time- and context-
bound working 
hypotheses (idiographic 
statements) are possible.  
 
The possibility of causal 
linkages 
There are real causes, 
temporally precedent to or 
simultaneous with their 
effects.  
All entities are in a state 
of mutual simultaneous 
shaping, so that it is 
impossible to distinguish 
causes from effects.  
 
The role of values  Inquiry is value-free. 
Inquiry is value-bound. 
 
 
While quantitative methods are based on a natural science, positivist model of testing 
theory, qualitative methods are based on interpretivism and are more focused around 
generating theories and accounts. Positivists treat the social world as something that is 
'out there', external to the social scientist and waiting to be researched. Interpretivists, 
in the social constructionist epistemological standpoint of this thesis, on the other hand 
believe that the social world is constructed by social agency and therefore any 






between quantitative and qualitative approaches - quantitative approaches traditionally 
seek to minimise intervention in order to produce valid and reliable statistics, whereas 
qualitative approaches traditionally treat intervention as something that is necessary, 
often arguing that participation can lead to a better understanding of a social situation. 
Perhaps, the resolution depends upon the ontological and epistemological perspective 
of the researcher. It may be that some research questions are better suited to a particular 
methodology, which is specifically the case here, with the research aims being to gain 
a greater understanding of the qualitative facets of low QOF scoring practices. 
 
4.1.2 Conducting Ethnographically-Informed Research 
There are a number of epistemological approaches in the field of health services 
research and ethnography is a relatively new, but growing method in this discipline 
(e.g. Allen et al., 2001). When I began drawing up the design of this study, ethnographic 
methods within the field of health services research were relatively new and few and 
far between. As part of an immersion within the world of ethnographically-informed 
research, at the early stages of the PhD, I spent time meeting prominent ethnographic 
health service researchers at conferences and individually. These meetings reconfirmed 
my resolve to apply an ethnographically-informed approach to the study of ‘poor-
performing’ practices.  
I began to understand the methodology as an ideal way to shine light on a phenomenon. 
These new colleagues I met helped me understand that ethnography as a tool in social 
research can simultaneously capture a number of facets of a case – the organisational, 






of exposing myself to the reflections of others in the field, as the beginning of my 
initiation into ethnographic healthcare research, helping me to understand that multiple 
factors intersect to inform the research journey.  
To conceptualise this within theory, I learned about what Buchanan and Bryman (2009) 
refer to as the need to attend to ‘organizational, historical, political, ethical, evidential, 
and personal factors relevant to an investigation’ and how these influence research. 
Indeed, Van Maanen (2009) argued that these factors play a clear role at the analysis 
stage, when uncovering thematic aspects. 
Ethnography can be defined as the study and systematic recording of human cultures, 
customs and understandings. It is not just a methodology, but also a construct about 
ways of perceiving cultures and societies. The word ethnography itself comes from the 
Ancient Greek for ‘folk’ and ‘I write’. It is the presentation of recorded data on human 
societies which has grown in popularity in the field of social science. However, 
ethnographical research is rooted in anthropology. Traditionally, anthropologists 
would spend years immersing themselves in the field, usually seeking to understand 
the cultures of distant tribes and to present those findings within ‘thick description’. 
Indeed, traditional anthropological texts, such as those of Malinowski, make for 
fascinating reading, giving a powerful insight into the day to day realities of tribes and 
disparate cultures. Naturally, the time constraints of a PhD do not allow for such 
profound immersion in one’s research subjects. Therefore, the methodology of this 
study can only claim to be ‘ethnographically-informed’. This symbolises that the 
research process embraces principles of participant observation and the socially-







4.1.3 Combining Inductive & Deductive Approaches 
This study will use a hybrid of the inductive and deductive approaches. Although 
potentially a Foucauldian theoretical framework has been established in line with a 
deductive approach of applying pre-existing categories to data, this will be used 
loosely. This means that Foucault’s is seen as a promising theoretical perspective at 
this stage, however the applicability of this framework will be evaluated against the 
data. Therefore a data-driven inductive approach was employed, allowing for new 
unexpected information to be included in the study.  
 
Thus, the following question will be asked throughout: can the patterns of 
organisational behaviour that are observed be understood using Foucault’s theoretical 
framework, and furthermore how should the framework be modified in the light of the 
evidence? Indeed, according to Yanow and Tsoukas (2009), qualitative research rigor 
is concerned with recognising openings rather than following a predetermined schedule 
inflexibly. To support this, Langley (1999) calls for an inductive approach, which is 
nonetheless balanced against early structure. This combination of approaches will also 
be employed during the analysis phase. 
 
4.2 Recruitment 
Recruitment began in the year 2010 and continued alongside fieldwork within already 
recruited sites until 2012. A previous study (Ashworth et al., 2011) quantitatively 
identified a cohort of 212 general practices (2.7% of general practices in England) 
which remained in the lowest decile for total QOF scores in the four years following 






four years April 2004 to March 2008 for all general practices in England. These data 
covered the following domains: chronic disease management; practice organisation; 
patient experience; additional services; and access. Longitudinal cohorts of poorly 
performing practices were defined based on their total QOF score over each of the four 
years for which QOF data are available. More detail of this method can be found in the 
publication of the study itself which is included in Appendix 11D. 
From this cohort of 212 practices, five practices were purposively selected from a 
number of different geographical locations to ensure that there is some representation 
of the spread of general practices nationally, as well as of practice type. However, with 
such a small sample of five representation may not be achievable. This is not 
necessarily seen as a limitation within the interpretivist tradition, whereby Lincoln & 
Guba (1985) argue that ‘the naturalist can’t specify the external validity of an enquiry, 
she can only give a thick description essential to enable someone interested in making 
transfer to reach a conclusion about whether a transfer can be contemplated as a 
possibility.’ Furthermore, within this purposive sample, practices were recruited at 
opportunity in terms of who could be contacted on the ‘phone first and who appeared 
to show an interest in taking part. Beyond being mindful of geographical location and 
whether or not the practice was a group practice or a single hander, I tended to work 
upwards from the lowest QOF scores nationally on the list, which were around the 300 
point mark, compared to around 700 out of 1000 at the top of the lowest 10%. The 
lowest of the low scores may have indicated a real sense of poor performance or 
perhaps simply an outright rejection of taking part in QOF recording and thus I focused 







At the start of the direct recruitment process, the lead GP or the practice manager was 
approached by telephone in the first instance. At this point assurances were made that 
their contributions to the study would be confidential, no identifiable data would be 
published and findings would not be reported to the PCTs (now disbanded and replaced 
with a new managerial infrastructure, PCTs were in place at the time of the study). The 
potential participants were then provided with the information sheet (see Appendix 2). 
The information sheet was designed to be informative, indicate that the research would 
be minimally intrusive and to engender trust in the potential participants that their 
contributions to the study would be kept confidential. Following this, the lead GP was 
given two weeks or so to consult with their teams if appropriate and decide whether or 
not to take part. Once the lead GP agreed to include their practice in the study, written 
consent was sought from them and an information sheet was forwarded to them to be 
distributed to the practice staff. 
Written consent was sought (see Appendix 3) from the practice staff members at the 
first face to face contact with them, which took place at least two weeks from the staff 
receiving the information sheet, giving them time to decide whether or not to take part 
in the research. All practice staff were able to opt out of the observation and/or 
interview elements of the study. 
The lead GP or practice manager was offered a £200 payment made to the practice 
account for time lost due to participation in the study as a goodwill gesture. 
Challenges were foreseen at the recruitment stage. The stigma of being labelled as a 
poor performing practice is a worry for most GPs. The research process was kept as 






challenges are presented in the findings of this study, as it was felt that resistance from 
the practices to recruitment itself was relevant to case construction. 
A further challenge was the need to identify a local collaborator at the research site for 
the purpose of local R&D research approval, requiring permission from the lead 
practice GP to be named as such, before the form is submitted. This led to a time-delay 
before agreement for this was given by the GP and the practice visits actually took 
place. This was appropriately managed by keeping in touch, so that the GP did not lose 
interest.  
 
4.3 Setting and Participants 
Five general practices were chosen from the cohort of low scoring practices.  
In line with what is known about the characteristics of poor performing practices, to 
increase representativeness, the selection of practices was purposive on the basis of 
practice location, representing the North and South of England, as well as urban and 
rural settings. Single-handed practices and group practices were recruited to the study. 
A total of five practices were recruited to increase the potential of transferability of 
findings to other general practice settings, yet also for the study to be completed within 
the time constraints of the PhD course. 
Within each practice, a purposive sample of staff members representing the range of 
general practice professions were interviewed (GP, Receptionist, Nurse, Practice 
Manager etc.), until a data saturation point was reached (i.e. no new information 
relevant to the study questions emerged from the interviews). Minimal participant 






anonymised information about the study’s participating practices and the staff members 
interviewed from each practice (the order of the practices in the table corresponds with 
the order of the cases within the findings chapter): 
Table 2: Participating Site Information 



















































There was some discussion between my first supervisor and me as to whether inclusion 
of a specialist practice would be appropriate to the study, as it is really an outlier 






may shed even more light on why QOF may be a limited lens through which to view 
quality and was therefore included in the sample. 
 
4.4 Research Process 
On-site data collection took place in intervals between 2010 and 2013. Interactions with 
study participants for the purpose of data collection and clarification e.g. by email and 
member-checking of findings continued to take place throughout the PhD write up until 
late 2015. It is worth noting that whilst ethnographic approaches are vulnerable to 
critiques concerning their lack of generalisability, this section of the methods chapter 
gives a transparent description of the research process that was followed, facilitating 
the potential of replicability. 
 
4.4.1 Semi-Structured Interviews 
The interviews were semi-structured, allowing for the discussion of themes emerging 
from the literature review, but with questions being exploratory rather than leading in 
format (see Appendix 4). The ordering of the questions was flexible, so that the 
schedule could be adapted to the participant and the direction of their responses. This 
also gave the interviewer the opportunity to explore themes emerging from the 
interview which were not previously considered. 
The participants were interviewed for up to 45 minutes, in a private room within the 






The interview questions were formulated as the direct result of literature searches in 
medical, medical sociology, healthcare management and organisational study fields, 
with a particular focus on factors which are thought to influence performance and 
engagement with quality improvement initiatives (see Appendix 5). The questions were 
intentionally open-ended to elicit richness of data, which could potentially be analysed 
leading to almost a participant-led theoretical framework. The questions were 
straightforward and practical, rendering them easy to answer. They were designed in 
such a way that they could be answered by all professional groups within the practice, 
allowing for a triangulation of responses between the different staff members. The 
interview questions pertained roughly to the following areas:  
 Perceptions of general practice quality 
 Organisational characteristics and behaviours of the participants’ practice 
 Influences on their own and their practice’s performance 
 Perceptions of QOF. 
A key disadvantage of leaving the interview questions rather general and open-ended 
is of course the breadth of findings they may elicit, outside of the scope of the thesis. 
However, as the aim of the thesis was to gain a greater understanding of the 
participating practices through a social constructionist lens, it was decided that this 
understanding of the meanings that interviewees ascribe to their experiences of QOF 
can only truly be gained by greater induction and openness. The interview questions 








4.4.1.1 Piloting the Interviews 
The interview schedule was piloted with six individuals working in general practice – 
two GPs, one male, one female; a nurse practitioner; a practice manager; a healthcare 
assistant/smoking cessation advisor; and a healthcare assistant/receptionist. The 
interviews lasted between 20-55 minutes. Some of the findings from the pilot phase are 
presented below. 
The pilot interviewees were asked to comment on the interview questions and process, 
bearing in mind that the actual interviews would be conducted with members of low 
QOF scoring practices. The feedback of the pilot interview participants has been 
incorporated into the final interview schedule (see Appendix 4). This was a useful stage 
in the research development process by helping me to become more confident in and 
familiar with conducting the interviews. 
The following is the feedback provided by the pilot interviewees on the interview 
schedule and process. I asked the participants to give feedback in light of the research 
interviews taking place with low QOF scoring practices. 
 All pilot interviewees liked the way the interview flowed and felt that it was 
suitably open ended, with questions acting more as prompts  
 
 The Healthcare Assistant said it was very useful how the questions were 
adapted according to the flow of the interview, as that had the potential of 







 The Practice Manager and one of the GPs said that it would be helpful if I was 
more explicit about the first question which asks for a definition of quality. 
Although I have kept this rather vague in order to elicit as much of the 
respondent’s opinion, in line with the feedback of the Ethics Committee, I have 
since broken this question down into ‘define good and bad quality’ (see 
Appendix 4) 
 
 The Healthcare Assistant/Smoking Cessation Advisor and Practice Manager 
felt that more personal questions would create a better rapport in the interview 
and achieve a more open disclosure. Therefore, I have altered questions around 
incentives to the more interviewee-centred ‘what motivates you to perform 




As can be seen in Appendix 9, the data from the pilot interview stage were analysed 
using NVivo qualitative analysis software. This was used as an opportunity to trial the 
software and discover whether its use would facilitate the analysis of the study data. 
Although useful in helping to organise large datasets which are inevitable with 
ethnographically guided research, the programme seemed to surprisingly forge a 
distance between me and the data. In the actual analysis process, as an emphasis of the 
ethnographic principles of immersion and observer interaction with data, I preferred to 
refer directly to interview recordings and transcripts and conduct the analysis manually 







However, interviews in themselves may only reveal an element of what a practice is 
like as an organisation, particularly as the interview process can be influenced by social 
desirability response bias, whereby the interviewee wishes to come across in a 
favourable light to the interviewer (Fisher, 1993). Therefore, the additional tools of 
participant observation and documentary analysis where appropriate, were included to 
formulate the practice case-studies, in order to facilitate a qualitative ‘triangulation’ of 
data within the cases. 
 
4.4.2 Participant Observation 
The ethnographic tool of participant observation was employed. A distinction can be 
made between participant and non-participant observation. Although I was unlikely to 
be taking part in the life of the practice in the same way an employee would, by having 
a presence in the practice and communicating with practice staff I became a participant 
observer.  
Initially, to gain greater confidence in taking field notes during participant observation, 
I had the opportunity as a healthcare management consultant to practice this within one 
of my consultancy client practices with their verbal permission, over two hours. The 
notes were discarded on the same day. This very brief pilot gave me an insight into 
how the field note taking process ought to be sensitive to the participants of the study, 
and how not be perceived as inspectorial. I am able to demonstrate greater sensitivity 
by taking notes out of sight, and not when openly observing an event, so as not to make 






act in ways that they naturally would not and this could potentially confound the 
findings of my study.  
Furthermore, it was important that I regularly explained why I was taking notes, the 
likely content of those notes, and that any identifying data would not be included in 
them. This acted as reassurance for the participant, which again enabled them to be 
relaxed and act more natural around me. My reflections here are guided by Van 
Maanen’s approach, as he maintains even these sorts of almost routine interactions 
should not be taken at face value. Rather, I should maintain a sensitivity to them 
throughout the research process. Here, I was approaching the research process with my 
student ethnographer rather than management consultant hat on. 
I observed the day-to-day life of each practice over a minimum of five days. The 
rationale for this minimum length of time, is that it could allow for a range of practice 
situations to be observed over a working week, such as a practice meeting or the 
reception area during clinical sessions.  I made field notes throughout. 
These observational visits were not always consecutive, depending on what was 
convenient, as well as emerging data. However, five days really was a minimum, 
established for those practices which may have been reluctant about being visited for 
any longer. Rather, it was hoped that sufficient time would be spent to try to understand 
how participants construct their social worlds in terms of the theoretical framework and 
its limitations, whilst maintaining an openness to ‘uncharted ground’ (Rosen, 1991). 
The time spent on observation would also have to be in keeping with the time constrains 






I often ended up contributing to some of the tasks at the GP practice. This meant that I 
quickly underwent an initiation into the role of participant observer. Contributing to 
tasks such as welcoming patients, making teas or filing paperwork, meant that I could 
provide concrete help that reduced others’ workloads and provide reciprocity for the 
many opportunities that were useful to my research. Becoming a participant observer 
in this way helped me to appraise the practice organisation almost from the vantage 
point of being its staff member and thus greatly facilitated my immersion in the field. 
I endeavoured to take fieldnotes in a sensitive and open manner; however, at times it 
was more appropriate to suspend immediate concerns with writing to participate more 
fully in the situation that was being observed (Emerson et al., 1995) and then would 
complete my notes at the end of the day. 
 
4.4.3 Documents 
Emerging data from participant observation and interviews was ‘triangulated’ by 
sourcing practice documents, such as policies and guidelines, leaflets and job 
descriptions. For instance a member of staff mentioned the lack of job role clarity and 
further evidence for this was sought by looking at job descriptions, if these were in 
existence. Patient notes were not accessed; however, the methods used to record and 
submit QOF data were observed. The GP from case study 4 submitted lengthy 
typewritten accounts of their views of QOF to me, which were included in the analysis 








4.4.4 Thematic Analysis 
Data in the form of field notes, interview transcripts and document content if 
appropriate, were analysed thematically. 
Thematic analysis focuses on categorising, analysing and reporting themes within data. 
A framework of analysis based on the six-phase model of inductive/deductive hybrid 
interpretive thematic analysis proposed by Fereday and Muir-Cochrane (2006) was 
applied, using levels of coding in order to generate overarching themes with subthemes.  
The six phases are as follows: 
1. Developing the code manual 
2. Testing the reliability of the codes 
3. Summarising data and identifying initial themes 
4. Applying a template of codes and additional coding 
5. Connecting the codes and identifying themes 
6. Corroborating and legitimating coded themes. 
The thematic analysis was conducted from an interpretive, social constructionist 
standpoint. Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) state: 
‘Interpretive studies assume that people create and associate their own subjective 
and intersubjective meanings as they interact with the world around them.  
Interpretive researchers thus attempt to understand phenomena through accessing 
the meanings participants assign to them.’ 
Interpretive thematic analysis is suited to the phenomenological aims of this study, 






of general practice quality and the subjective experiences of key players within the 
general practice organisation. 
Thematic analysis is suited to more data-driven inductive approaches, as well as 
deductive studies guided by the application of pre-existing frameworks to the data 
(Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). However, the interpretive stance suggests that a 
truly inductive approach, free from the application of pre-existing meanings by the 
researcher, is not possible. Therefore, prior literature review themes which related to 
Foucault’s notions of surveillance and tensions between clinicians and managerialist 
frameworks were sought out within the data throughout the analytical process. 
However, during the phase of data analysis, these were not the only promising 
theoretical frameworks; complexity theory and Mintzberg were also considered as 
potential explanatory models. It is only post the analysis phase that Foucault and 
Managerialism vs. Professionalism were selected to be reviewed in depth in the 
literature review. Bringing these a priori understandings to data analysis is in keeping 
with the epistemological standpoint of social construction, whereby our realities are 
viewed as being shaped by our prior knowledge and experiences. 
It is clear, therefore, that a balance between induction and deduction was sought within 
this study. This brings together the benefits of both approaches, whereby the emergence 
of new findings about low QOF scoring practices is facilitated, whilst remaining guided 
by, but not limited to, the theoretical framework. This approach underpins Fereday and 
Muir-Cochrane’s six step approach as described above. 
Member checking of emergent findings was carried out by asking the participants to 
comment on the accuracy of the themes and amalgamating their feedback with the data. 






the legitimacy of that generalisation. Therefore, member checking helped to overcome 
this, whereby participants were asked to clarify some of their reflections noted within 
the interview transcripts and fieldnotes and to comment on their case studies. This was 
not done in a systematic manner, as the level of engagement in the research process 
varied from practice to practice. Often, I sent excerpts of transcripts and field notes for 
clarifications, along with the case study drafts by email and hoped to get a response. 
This may have been followed up with a telephone call to the practice and I noted down 
any feedback I received and incorporated it into the cases. Notably, contact was lost 
with case study 3; the data from which are arguably the most controversial. Had the GP 
from this practice been able to comment on the findings, member checking would have 
been employed in a sensitive manner, restating that confidentiality would be upheld at 
all times. Therefore, some practices had a more significant ‘voice’ in the analysis phase 
of the research process than others. However, recognising the uniqueness of the 
contributions of each case within the research process is one of the strengths of the 
ethnographically-informed approach.  
Emerging themes were discussed in supervision meetings and a small selection of data 
was checked by the PhD supervisors for blind inter-rater reliability (Boyatzis, 1998). 
 
4.4.5 Documentary Analysis 
There are a number of ethnographic questions which can be asked about text to 
facilitate its analysis. These questions were utilised throughout the analytical process. 
1. How are texts written? 






3. Who writes them? 
4. Who reads them? 
5. For what purposes? 
6. On what occasions? 
7. With what outcomes? 
8. What is recorded? 
9. What is omitted? 
10. What is taken for granted? 
11. What does the writer seem to take for granted about the reader(s)? 
12. What do readers need to know in order to make sense of them? 
Hammersely & Atkinson (1983) 
This approach was not, however, followed systematically. Usually, these questions 
were almost subconscious considerations, part of the process of me understanding the 
extent to which the few practice documents I did look at (e.g. practice policies) could 
contribute to case construction. I asked myself whether or not the documents somehow 
reflected the working practices of the study’s participants, as well as potentially their 
understandings of what it means to deliver high quality care. The GP at Practice 4 in 
particular chose to communicate through the use of documentary evidence their 
experiences of QOF and it is at this practice that documentary analysis was mostly 
applied. 
It is worth noting, that texts in themselves, as standalone data, are not sufficient to 
answer the research questions posed by this study. For instance, it cannot be gauged 
from analysing text alone, how a general practice functions on a day-to-day basis. 






concrete evidence of what they report. In this vein, the analysis here viewed texts as 
social constructions, in line with the interpretivist approach. In most cases, documents 
were simply used to cross-check or clarify some of the claims expressed during 
interviews. 
 
4.4.6 Constructing Case Studies 
Some commentators have argued that explicitly stating the intent to develop case 
studies at the outset, before the analysis stage, increases reporting bias (e.g. Feifer et 
al., 2007). However, from the perspective of this study, the aim to create individual 
cases served the purpose of highlighting the uniqueness of each practice studied and 
presenting an in depth illustration of them. The aim of an ethnography is to provide a 
‘thick description’ of the phenomena studied, eliciting an immersion-driven richness 
of themes. 
An ethnographically-informed organisational case study can be seen as being 
‘predominantly concerned with those social relations coalesced around a subset of 
goal-oriented activities’ (Rosen, 1991). A case study can be defined as a method of 
illuminating ‘a set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and 
with what result’ (Schramm, 1971). However, beyond that, the study design aims ‘to 
uncover and explicate the ways in which people in particular work settings come to 
understand, account for, take action, and otherwise manage their day-to-day situation’ 
(Van Maanen, 1979). The study design is therefore not only suited to the aims of 
building an understanding of low QOF scoring practices as organisations, but also to 






questions. Gaining an unprecedented rich insight into the uniqueness of cases is often 
the focal point of ethnographic research. Therefore, the outlier nature of the study’s 
participants was not viewed as confounding factor, rather a focal point, allowing me as 
the researcher to embed myself in the social life of the practice, whilst adopting a 
reflexive approach to the field of study. 
Conversely, the criteria for ensuring rigor in the formulation of case studies are seen to 
be largely conflicting within ethnographically-informed organisational research 
methods. Gibbert & Ruigrok (2010) argue that, in light of this, researchers should take 
care to explicitly outline the actions they take to construct their case studies. 
Furthermore, they claim that formulating a description based on a formulaic step-by-
step process may mask the reality of the emergence of the case. Thus, being more 
transparent about the true case study formulation process raises the credibility of the 
results.  
Indeed, the approach to case construction within this study was not always systematic, 
and rather drew on saliency of themes and concepts related the study’s research 
questions. Furthermore, the process employed an element of deduction, whereby the 
potential theoretical frameworks suggested from the literature review (e.g. 
Foucault/Managerialism vs. Professionalism) were to an extent used as a comparative 
checking mechanism against emerging themes. Whilst this could be criticised for 
limiting the richness of data to fully reveal itself and drive the study’s findings ‘bottom 
up’, it can also be argued that case formulation was clearly rooted in pre-existing 
theoretical evidence. Furthermore, this helped to organise the immense volume of data 






Data from interview transcripts, field notes and documentary analysis were brought 
together to build the cases. These different forms of data were analysed together by 
analysing parallel themes across them. So for instance, themes common to both 
interviews and fieldnotes would be highlighted on the basis of salience. These themes 
then comprised the individual cases. Case study construction was also iterative between 
the cases during the course of the study. Therefore, to an extent, the structure of each 
new case built on the preceding one. Hence, the presentation and formatting of each of 
the cases is slightly different, in order to more closely reflect the natural flow research 
process experienced within the field. Some cases consist mainly of thick description, 
whilst the data from other cases lent itself better to organising data around themes from 
the outset. This approach recognises the uniqueness of each case.  
This iterative approach recognised the development of learning, built on emerging 
knowledge and aided the development of the overarching case. The overarching case 
was constructed from the synthesis of common and salient themes across all the cases 
studied, to bring together the findings into workable clear overarching themes. It was 
felt that an overarching case would usefully distil rich findings pertaining to low QOF 
scorers in a way that would allow the reader to understand the commonalities and 
differences amongst them through a concise account. It may be questioned whether or 
not the overarching case study in fact constitutes a ‘case’. However, as Simons (2009) 
points out, a case in the research sense is difficult to define. Here the definition 
proposed by Stake (1995), which argues that the utility of the case is to understand 
‘activity within important circumstance’, appears to support the creation of the 
additional case, whereby it was intended that this would shed light on the low scorers’ 






4.4.7 Constructing Typologies 
Typologies have a number of strengths and limitations. Firstly, typologies are useful in 
helping us to understand complex social realities, through the ease of classification. A 
further key strength is that typologies also allow for a clear comparison between cases 
and are heuristic devices used to clarify the theoretical dimensions of a specific type 
(Bailey, 1994). The limitations of this approach include the fact that typologies are 
often not mutually exclusive or always fully comprehensive. Thus, there may be 
similarities and differences between cases, and typologies may create pigeon-holing by 
ignoring significant characteristics of the cases studied. Classifications, once defined, 
are also usually static, and seldom allow for changeability within cases. Of course, 
social sciences mostly perceive the social world as dynamic and constantly in flux (e.g. 
Lerner, 1978). Therefore, typologies are perhaps more useful in helping us to 
understand cases at a specific point in time. So, it could be argued that typologies are 
descriptive rather than predictive. Bailey (1994) proposed that typologies are 
vulnerable to reification, meaning that they will erroneously be treated as ‘real’ 
empirical entities. However, in order to avoid this problem within this study, the 
typologies were constructed directly from the findings of this study. The typology is 
presented in this thesis with the aim of operationalising complex phenomena into 
usable labels which would help to promote understanding of ‘poor’ QOF performance 
with quick ease. The typology is designed to be easily usable and to capture facets of 
the study’s participants with short but salient labels, which would appeal to the 
imagination of policy-makers and clinicians alike. 
In addition, it is worth noting that a number of these issues pertain to the field of social 






understanding social phenomena mean that cases will always be difficult to define fully 
and comprehensively. This does not of course preclude an attempt to do so as helping 
us to achieve a depth of knowledge and understanding unavailable prior to undertaking 
research.  
So how were the typologies within this thesis constructed? As one of the few explicitly 
recorded approaches for developing typologies of social phenomena, the methods of 
Kluge (2000) and Kelle and Kluge (1999) were loosely followed. The following steps 
employed in this study were adapted from their methods: 
 Development of relevant analysis dimensions 
o Identifying dimensions to group the cases on their similarities 
o The overarching themes were utilised for this purpose 
 Grouping the cases and analysing data commonalities across cases 
o Asking whether there is sufficient heterogeneity within and between 
cases to warrant grouping  
o The cases were grouped in the overarching case study  
 Analysis of meaningful relationships and type construction 
o Meaningful relationships were revealed through thematic analysis, 
resulting in type construction 
 Characterisation of constructed types 
o Types are described by means of their unique attributes 
o Appropriate memorable titles were given to the types in order to broadly 
capture their characteristics. The characterisations were discussed and 
reviewed further at academic supervision, to reduce the bias of the 






Notably, Bailey (1973) pointed out that empirical commonalities and relationships 
between cases must be analysed in order to construct meaningful types of social 
phenomena. The labels proposed in the typology offered at the end of the findings 
section offer a useful meaningful glance into the organisational character of the studied 
practices. There labels are drawn from the salient themes within the cases, but also 
from an awareness of what makes each case distinctly different from the other, or 
indeed where the commonalities between cases lie. 
 
4.5 Ethical Considerations 
This study gained ethical approval from the Brighton West Research Ethics Committee 
on 15th March 2010 (REC Reference 10/H1111/15). The Ethics Committee made a 
number of useful suggestions for developing the study which were utilised, such as 
endeavouring to approach the GP partner directly in the recruitment process to increase 
its chances of success. 
 
In addition, local Research Governance permission for each practice locality was 
obtained. There were some difficulties with the process and, at the time, they were 
expressed with a British Journal of General Practice opinion piece (see Appendix 11 
C). 
 
The principles of informed consent, confidentiality and the right to withdraw were 
adhered to throughout the study. Written consent was collected from all participants. 
Participant observation and interviews did not take place until consent to participate 






who were involved in the situations being observed (e.g. they may have appeared 
within the scenario for a very brief period of time which was not significant to the 
research process, e.g. porters collecting samples) and guided by research ethics, I did 
not include their contributions in the thesis or any resulting publications. 
In order to preserve confidentiality and anonymity, no participant identifying details, 
other than designation within the practice (and age and sex, if relevant and did not allow 
for identification), are included in the thesis or any resulting publications. Data are 
stored and presented in an anonymised fashion, using participant codes (e.g. Practice 2 
Nurse 1). Due to the stigmatising nature of being a poor QOF performer, the practices 
included in the study are not identified and any possible identifiers such as list size are 
presented in a range and others, such as location, kept general.  Contributions to the 
study were not shared between the participants, nor details of other participating 
practices. 
It was in the interest of the study to conduct the fieldwork in an unobtrusive manner, 
so as to keep the situations observed as natural as possible. Yet, some disruption to the 
practice’s day with the researcher observing, asking questions and conducting 
interviews was unavoidable. However, this disruption was kept to a minimum, 
particularly in patient areas, so as not to affect the level of patient care offered. Patient 
consultations were not observed. Any patient information linked to identifiable patients 
revealed through the course of the study was not used in the research. 
The interview questions have been designed to be as non-leading as possible (see 
Appendix 4) so as not to cause the interviewee distress. The protocol to be put into 
place for dealing with misconduct or malpractice coming to light was to raise any issues 






Register, is bound by the General Medical Council’s Code of Conduct. Situations of 
this nature were to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, though no such reportable 
issues became apparent. 
As there exists a stigma around being labelled a poor performing practice, as well as a 
fear of reprisal from regulatory bodies such as former PCTs, to counteract this the 
research process was be kept open and collaborative, so as to make sure it did not 
have an ‘inspection feel’ about it. Thus, I explained my activity within the practice to 
participants regularly and revisited consent. The participants were able to view all 
field notes if requested and give feedback on findings. 
 
4.6 Reflexivity 
Reflexivity was practiced throughout the study, recognising the existence and impact 
of researcher bias within the research process. Following Van Maanen (1990), these 
issues contribute to the social context of the study and can therefore directly impact on 
its delivery.  Reflexivity can be defined as an awareness of the researcher’s own 
contribution to the construction of meanings and an acknowledgement of the 
impossibility of remaining impartial to one’s subject matter.  
Reflexivity can somewhat be linked to the earlier analysis of combining inductive and 
deductive approaches. Even at the very inception of the thesis, my interests and values 
have influenced my choice of research topic and methodology. I have a background in 
healthcare management consultancy and, at the time of the study’s inception, was 
carrying out a number of projects to help general practices improve their QOF scores. 






patient care, as GPs and their staff rushed to input data on system in order to increase 
their QOF scores. It was likely that my personal views here may have elicited similar 
views from the participants, due to me potentially presenting an empathetic stance to 
this and them feeling like they can communicate similar perspectives with ease. 
Nonetheless, I was careful to avoid conveying my own views explicitly. My main 
professional interests were more qualitative, developing teams, teaching 
communication skills; I began to resent constantly needing to validate the outputs I was 
helping my clients to achieve through the numerical.  
Therefore, in the spirit of reflexivity, my professional background, along with a 
Master’s degree in Public Management, led me to plan and undertake this study. I did 
however desire to understand the practices studied without preconceptions where 
possible and rather be passive and not leading in my approach. This enabled me to alter 
my world view by gaining a greater understanding of the numerous facets of GP 
performance and engagement with quality improvement initiatives. Nonetheless, it can 
be seen that my professional context and experience had an influence on the design and 
conduct of the research presented in this thesis. 
To relate the above reflections to theory, this openness to new understandings has been 
coined as the ‘phenomenological attitude’ (Finlay, 2008). Openness is intertwined with 
reflexivity, but the researcher undergoes an ‘iterative struggle’ whereby previous 
assumptions have to be managed against retaining an objective stance, but should also 
be, according to Finlay, ‘exploited as a source of insight’. Therefore, our previous 







Reflexivity is also an understanding of the dynamics between the researcher and their 
subjects. As a researcher, I am likely to have a different set of beliefs to my research 
participants, therefore, I am unable to achieve complete objectivity in the way I view 
the studied practices. I have therefore endeavoured to recognise when my own 
assumptions about the world and social context have played a part in the research 
process. In particular, I have done this when writing field notes, by noting down my 
own personal reflections, thoughts and feelings throughout and weaving these into the 
creation of the case. Ways in which my own personal explicit and implicit perspectives 
constructed the research interpretation were therefore reflected upon during the course 
of the study. 
I have strived to be reflexive in my approach to participant recruitment, attempting to 
maintain an awareness of how my previous experience of working professionally with 
poor performing general practices as a management consultant may have influenced 
my recruitment approach. My professional background here may have been a facilitator 
of successful recruitment as I was aware of some poor performing practices tending to 
have a sense of mistrust towards external institutions. Therefore, my approach to 
recruitment was based around engendering trust towards me as a PhD student with a 
transparent research goal, rather than as a management consultant or manager. 
Furthermore, reflexivity is an important consideration due to the interpretive stance of 
this study. Geertz’s definition of data (1973) underlines to me the need to be able to 
reflect, in a social constructionist framework, on the way my values influence the 
research process: ‘what we call our data are really our own constructions of other 
people’s constructions of what they and their compatriots are up to’. Most importantly, 






towards the relationship between theory and practice is that the researcher can never 
assume a value-neutral stance, and is always implicated in the phenomena being 
studied’. Therefore, my role in and influence on the research process are reflected on 
throughout. 
It is worth noting therefore, that in line with Orlikowski and Baroudi, the presentation 
of the findings themselves within the thesis may also be a reflection of my professional 
background. As an independent management consultant, I often had what I perceived 
to be the luxury of not being prescribed models and performance management 
frameworks to use with my clients. Rather, I preferred an inductive approach, where 
during my initial visits to clients I would allow for a flow of information, which I would 
often record through note taking, almost in the sense of ‘thick’ description, which only 
then I would set about organising into meaningful themes which could help me identify 
suitable interventions where required. The case studies are presented within the thesis 
in a similar way, as stories, which I then organise around the emergence of key salient 
themes. 
 
4.7 Supervision and the Writing Up Process 
Supervision sessions were initially held weekly with the first supervisor and gradually 
developed into less frequent session with both supervisors towards the end of the 
writing up process. Supervision was primarily used to explore the applicability of 
potential theoretical frameworks to understanding the case studies. In later months, this 
moved towards what the study could bring in terms of new knowledge and potentially 






improvement initiatives. Having the input of supervisors was invaluable in helping to 
gain greater understanding of the phenomena studied (e.g. Zhao, 2003). 
The writing up process was in itself iterative and data-led. Whilst a literature review 
was conducted to inform the research questions, as mentioned previously, a number of 
potential theoretical frameworks were rejected due to their limitations in elucidating 
the findings. Therefore, a mix of induction and deduction was employed, with the slant 
of the thesis being tailored after the analysis. During the course of the write up, the 
research participants were contacted for feedback as part of member checking, and their 
comments integrated as appropriate. 
The course of the PhD itself was staggered. As a result, the research was undertaken in 
a policy and NHS climate different to that of today, whereby applying ethnographic 
research to the study of healthcare organisations was relatively unique. However, the 
write up has endeavoured to align the findings of the study to current research where 
appropriate, raising questions about the future outlook in today’s NHS. 
 
4.8 Context of Health Services Research 
The healthcare sector is of course one of huge importance, playing a crucial and 
necessary role in maintaining the health of the nation and screening for and treating 
disease. Economically, the healthcare sector is of great scale and scope, with around 
9% of UK GDP apportioned to it and rising (World Bank Group, 2011). The NHS is 
one of the largest employers in the world, employing groups of different professional 
staff, including doctors, nurses, allied healthcare professionals and non-clinical 






promoting the health of the public. McGivern and Fisher (2012) describe the health 
sector a being of high sociological interest, particularly in the case of being a key site 
for researchers who are interested in the notion of professionalism, which is of 
relevance to the themes of the literature review. 
Health services research has been defined as ‘the multidisciplinary field of scientific 
investigation that studies how social factors, financing systems, organizational 
structures and processes, health technologies, and personal behaviours affect access 
to health care, the quality and cost of health care, and ultimately our health and well-
being. Its research domains are individuals, families, organizations, institutions, 
communities, and populations.’ (Academy for Health Services Research and Health 
Policy, 2000). 
The research problem of this thesis is therefore inherently aligned with the discipline 
of health services research. It is hoped that this thesis will contribute to a greater 
understanding of the characteristics of low QOF scoring general practice organisations 
and the socio-political context which surrounds them. Potentially, implications which 
may contribute to more effective implementation of quality care are likely to be put 
forward.  
 
4.9 Strengths and Limitations of Methodology 
To sum up the methods chapter, the strengths and limitations of the proposed 
methodology will be appraised. 
The key limitations of the methodology concern pitfalls of qualitative social research 






This constraint will be expanded upon in the discussion section of the thesis, however, 
it is worth noting that the study did not seek to construct generalisable findings. Instead, 
its main focus is to reveal unique, non-generalisable, phenomena. Therefore, attempts 
at generalisability may have undermined the richness of a case. 
Furthermore, it has already been explained that critiques are levelled against the 
subjectivity of the participant observer approach, in that my personal views may lead 
me to draw biased conclusions. Nonetheless, in the tradition of ethnography and social 
construction, my personal interaction with the field is viewed as a key facilitator of 
eliciting richness of data and thick description (Geertz, 1988). 
Significantly, the patient voice was omitted from the study. Therefore, patient 
consultations were not observed and patient perceptions of the practice not taken into 
account. Naturally, this would have enhanced the findings. However, within the time 
constraints of a PhD, the inclusion of patient data may have been too broad, shifting 
the focus away from the key aim of the study of understanding persistently low QOF 
scorers. 
Lastly, the limitation of the process of typology construction paralleled some of the 
aforementioned shortcomings of typologies more broadly, namely their reductionist 
nature and overlap of features. Sensitive to Bailey’s (1994) claim that ‘a classification 
is no better than the dimensions or variables on which it is based’, it was a challenge 
distilling richness of qualitative practice data into essentially a soundbite. Indeed, there 
were some similarities between the types, however, they did not outweigh the 
differences enough to warrant including those practices within one typology. Utilising 






the typologies were firmly rooted within the rich overarching synthesised findings, in 
order to decrease the problem of reductionism.  
Nonetheless, the typology is a powerful time saving device in capturing the dominant 
features of the practices studied, which are relevant to the main tenets of thesis, namely 
understanding low QOF scoring practices and their responses to the scheme. It is worth 
underlining, that the typologies proposed in the thesis are not intended to be static 
entities, they simply illustrate and seek to define a point in time and do not preclude 
the possibility of change. Here, the researcher actively seeks avoid the paradox of 
falling into the same predicament as QOF - imposing a static framework to understand 
complex phenomena. 
Next, the findings of the thesis will be presented as five case studies, with a final 
















The findings presented here take the form of five case studies and one overarching case 
study. The presentation of each case reflects the flow of the research process. 
 
5.1. Case Study 1  
Recruitment 
The longitudinal QOF performance data suggested that this practice was particularly 
disengaged from QOF. Its scores were some of the lowest in the country overall (circa 
300 points), with no significant increase over the six years since QOF’s introduction. 
The recruitment itself is however relatively straightforward. Unlike with the majority 
of low scoring practices, I am able to get through by telephone straight away. In fact, 
despite calling outside of clinic hours advertised on NHS Choices, the single-handed 
GP picks up the phone. There is some initial resistance from the GP, which is 
highlighted by the phrase I note down in my recruitment field notes ‘you’re lucky to 
have caught me on the ‘phone at all’ and a slightly suspicious ‘how did you identify 
us?’. However, soon the conversation becomes pleasant and the GP voices their desire 
to be able to voice their views, which they suggest are negative, by confidential means.  
The GP agrees to research participation and claims that the process will be 
‘therapeutic’. 
The Practice 
The practice is in a quiet well-maintained residential area of a small village, with a 






The end of the road on which the practice is situated flows into wild open countryside. 
It is the middle of Summer and I feel grateful to be based in such idyll.  
The practice premises are neat, purpose-built and around twenty years old, with a 
designated car park. I arrive and am warmly welcomed by the receptionist, who is 
aware that I was coming. She says that they were excited about having me at the 
practice. I briefly wait in the clean waiting room, alongside two patients. The waiting 
area has unique circular red velvet seating and appears to be well-stocked with tidy, up 
to date local and national health information. There are young people’s Chlamydia 
screening packs at reception and seasonal ‘flu posters, suggesting engagement with 
current public health initiatives. The practice rooms are clearly signed. I can hear 
relaxing panpipe music playing in the background. I am then taken to the homely staff 
room and kitchen area and offered a drink. I immediately notice the smiley staff photos 
displayed in the staff room. I feel at ease. 
I learn that this single-handed practice is staffed by a senior receptionist full-time, two 
job-share receptionists, a practice nurse two days a week, and a notes summariser three 
half days a week, who is also a trained phlebotomist. The practice nurse is away at the 
time of my visit, as is one of the half-time receptionists. The practice nurse is a recent 
addition to the team, employed by the GP to improve QOF data recording. I attempt to 
book a telephone interview with the practice nurse post my visit but prior to me going 
on maternity leave, but this doesn’t come to fruition. It is an oversight that I do not pick 
up on this again post my return from leave and therefore the voice of the practice nurse 
is not included in the presentation of this case study. There is no practice manager, but 






by patients and other agencies, she does not get the pay. A midwife runs clinics 
fortnightly from the practice. A health visitor runs a clinic from the practice monthly. 
The practice has a drugs dispensary in house. The receptionists have all completed 
dispensing courses. It strikes me how convenient this is for the residents of the village, 
who would otherwise have to travel to the nearest town for medication. Apparently, a 
new chain pharmacy was opposed by village residents who wanted their medications 
to continue to be dispensed at the practice and subsequently planning permission was 
rejected. 
The practice is open five days a week with clinics formally advertised as running 10-
11 and 17-18 only, with 10-11 on a Wednesday. However, the day-today reality is quite 
different. The practice operates an open appointment system with patients starting to 
show up for appointments from the time the practice opens at 8.30. The GP arrives 
soon after and begins to see patients. I witness the clinics take place until the last patient 
is seen. This often takes the GP up to one o’clock or well past seven in the evening. 
The GP on average sees 15 patients per session. Between clinics, the GP is busy with 
home visits, phone calls and paperwork. The dispensary is open throughout the day and 
as are the doors of the practice. Patients may pop in to have informal chats with the 
receptionists and the GP. Wednesday, however, is strictly a half day, and it offers the 
team an opportunity to catch up on orders and paperwork. The receptionists time their 
lunch to the minute and take turns to go for their break between 12 and 13. 
The Visit 
I visit the practice daily for just over one working week and conduct nine interviews in 






Throughout my time at the practice, I am made to feel welcome and part of the team 
through small touches from the staff such as being offered tea and biscuits and 
colleagues approaching me to exchange pleasantries. The staff are engaged and 
interested in my research. They are keen to talk to me and to share their stories. Despite 
the GP appearing busy, it is emphasised by the GP each day that I can talk to them 
about anything and the GP makes time daily for an interview. I do not come across any 
significant discrepancies between what the team members say to me in the interviews 
and what I observe in practice. I take this as evidence of a close-knit team. 
Throughout my visit, I am offered car lifts and the receptionist asks me to text her when 
I get back to my hotel to make sure that I am OK. I think my pregnancy compounds 
their sense of worry and need to make me feel well looked after. The village and 
surroundings and local people are incredibly friendly and a far cry from my base in 
London. The GP does give me a lift a few times, and this I find is a good opportunity 
to elicit views and reflections about QOF and the practice. 
On the penultimate day, the GP organises a team dinner as a way of saying ‘goodbye’ 
to me and to spend the £200 research participation fee. The GP says that it would be 
unfair if the money wasn’t used for the team as a whole. There is a buzz of excitement 
about the dinner, before and after. I remember it as a warm, pleasant, but professional 
experience in the surroundings of the most expensive restaurant near the local area. I 
get the sense that the team like their boss. It is the restaurant where the practice has its 
Christmas parties. Everyone dresses up for the occasion and the dinner cements for me 









Theme 1: Patient-Centred Practice Ethos 
This theme pertained to the ethos of the practice which was rooted in values of placing 
the patient at the centre of its operations. I note that on the ‘First day (the) senior 
receptionist proudly shows me sign in reception stating “top 99% of patient survey 
scores”’ (FN, pg. 4). 
The staff seem oblivious to the existence of QOF as they are ‘surprised about my 
study’s selection criteria – that their practice in the lowest 10% of “anything” 
especially as they receive such high patient satisfaction survey results. I am told that 
the patient survey was given out to everyone in the waiting room.’ (FN, pg. 9). Here 
the patient-centred ethos appears to not have been undermined by QOF, with the GP 
stating that they resisted getting their team involved in QOF ‘to protect them from the 
workload and so that they could focus on our patients’ (GP Interview 1).  
This patient-centred ethos continues to be echoed by interview data and the observed 
reality. I too am becoming drawn into this value-driven delivery of care. For instance, 
‘I jot down a potential paper idea – what can we learn from small/single-handed 
practices? This suggests that I think that this practice has a lot of examples of good 
working practices, which other surgeries could learn from.’ (FN, pg. 6).  
The following is a selection of quotes and field notes which demonstrate the saliency 






‘This is a very good practice. Because the GP is nearby, they can respond to any 
emergency and are flexible to patient need. Also everybody knows everybody in the 
community. There is also a longstanding relationship between the GP and patients, 
which means that the quality of care is good.’ (Receptionist Interview 1) 
‘One patient wanted a hook for the dog outside when collecting their prescriptions, so 
we put a hook outside.’ (GP Interview 3) 
 ‘I think quality is improving with the GP’s age, as most of the patients are like family 
members now.’ (Summariser Interview 1) 
‘the practice is friendly, accommodating and approachable...it is a community hub. It 
is a well-organised and well-managed practice. I have never seen any chaos or heard 
any complaints.’ (Summariser Interview 1). 
This local community knowledge appears to be of central importance to the delivery of 
person-centred care. ‘I mention portrait photos hanging in reception area of current 
GP and his predecessors. These go back three generations of local GPs.’ (FN, pg. 12) 
The personal staff stories echo this community oriented the practice ethos. Here is a 
selection of data excerpts to further support theme 1: 
‘GP has lived in the local area for 24 years – 6 years running a practice down the road, 
then 18 in this purpose built accommodation. GP lives in house next door to the 
practice.’ (FN, pg. 5) 
‘Informal chat with receptionist in common room. Knew other PT receptionist well 






Suggested PT option to GP as felt that FT was too much for her. GP accepted and she 
is grateful for this.’ (FN, pg. 20) 
 ‘I learn that senior receptionist plays with GP’s granddaughter – GP let her make 
snowmen during work with the child, which she remembers fondly.’ (FN, pg. 24) 
‘Senior receptionist knows all patients, has lived in the village all her life and has 
worked for the surgery for 19 years, she is really proud of this.’ (FN, pg. 6) 
Furthermore, the maintenance of person-centred care was at times achieved by resisting 
top down mandates:  
‘The priority for the practice is access. We have tried to resist the pressure for 
appointment systems, as I know patients want open appointments as they have told me 
time and time again so I promise them I will keep this system for as long as possible’ 
(GP Interview 3) 
The following quote sums up the first theme well:  
‘A practice that is caring is a good practice…we try to do our best in helping people 
with their problems, rather than go through templates and that sort of thing. Trying to 
do our best for our patients…putting ourselves in their shoes and asking what we would 
want as a patient.’ (GP Interview 3) 
 
Theme 2: Cohesive Working Practices 
There was clear evidence of cohesive effective way of working within the team, along 






as being instrumental to the successful running of the practice. A climate of support 
within the team appeared to be an incentive to work well:   
‘everybody is trying to help everybody in the team so it is an incentive to work hard.’ 
(Summariser Interview 1) 
Here are some key data excerpts which contributed to the construction of this theme: 
 ‘The smallness of things makes teamwork easier….they say a happy team is a 
productive team’ (GP Interview 3) 
‘GP believes that happy workforce, rather than a driven workforce will work better. 
Senior receptionist says that day goes quick when you are enjoying yourself’ (FN, pg. 
23) 
‘I try to be approachable, so if you have a problem come and tell me, so I hope the staff 
feel that they can approach me’ (GP Interview 3) 
 ‘we enjoy working together and say that we are happy working together.’ 
(Receptionist Interview 1) 
 ‘Close-knit team, mutual trust’ (FN, pg. 14) 
In terms of working practices I note that the ‘practice has some outdated systems but 
ones which seem to work well for their patient size and small team – e.g. GP collecting 
boxed notes as a way of knowing his clinic list. If the notes are not collected the 
receptionists will give the GP a call, understanding that the GP may not be aware that 






These types of rather over-elaborate modes of working appear to be sustained on 
mutual trust and instinct, which may also render them not generalisable to other 
settings. This construct appears to extend to the patients also, who adapt the practice’s 
routines: 
 ‘When I ask receptionists if people ever get confused when GP calls ‘next patient’ they 
say that patients know system well and just count how many other patients are in front 
of them.’ (FN, pg. 14) 
 
Theme 3: Responses to QOF Surveillance 
The theme of responses to QOF surveillance featured highly within this case, due to 
the GP’s numerous reflections on the quality improvement framework within 
interviews and passing conversations. Whilst the rest of the practice staff were 
oblivious to QOF’s existence, this theme is the product of the single-handed GP’s 
unequivocal contributions to the data. In fact, the GP stated that my visit was a form of 
therapy for them, as they could offload some of their misgivings about QOF. The 
practice’s responses to surveillance were ones of resistance to the framework and how 
it was implemented, largely seen a posing a threat to the patient-centred ethos of the 
practice.  
The GP almost felt resentful of the framework and how it was at odds with their 
professional values. I noted that the ‘GP describes how taking part in QOF as against 
their nature “would like QOF to disappear”’ (FN, pg. 7). This reluctant attitude 
towards QOF surveillance is further supported by the following interview excerpt: ‘If 






criticism. The PCT say do this and do that, but if you can’t afford the resources to do 
this….sometimes the demands are conflicting and not complimentary. The 48 hour 
appointment thing for example…those making the demands are not willing to fund the 
demands’ (GP Interview 3). 
Furthermore, QOF surveillance was viewed by the GP in the context of sanctions and 
the drive to weed out single-handed practices. The ‘GP mentions that QOF used as  a 
stick to beat small practices with – taking over patient lists of small practices means 
bigger budgets for big practices with minimal increase of resources’ (FN, pg. 18) 
The GP’s response to QOF surveillance is strongly guided by their concerns with the 
limitations of QOF. For instance, in this field note the ‘GP says “QOF does not 
measure quality, as this is a subjective thing that cannot be measured”’ (FN, pg. 6). 
Furthermore, the ‘GP says one size fits all approach to policy-making does not work 
as there needs to be variation in practice.’ (FN, pg. 11). In this vein, we discuss ‘EMIS 
and Read codes being inflexible and a flawed system – clinicians are preoccupied with 
chasing correct codes as it impacts on their income, losing sight of clinical care 
according to GP.’ (FN, pg. 31) 
In addition, the GP stated that QOF ‘is a false economy because ten hours spent chasing 
£10 payment. So we avoided that, but we got into trouble because we were outliers 
GP.’ (FN, pg. 31) and that ‘You lose focus away from what the patient has come to you 
with. QOF does not add to the care of the patient at all. It is not of clinical importance 
or of importance to the patient and it misses the nuances of the practice of medicine’ 






The GP is aware of the improved organisational infrastructure and new working 
practices required to achieve high QOF scores: ‘You will find that the practices that do 
well on QOF have organised themselves in such a way that they have high scores, 
particularly through their use of IT, but you speak to the patients and they cannot get 
an appointment. So they would do better to organise themselves around what the 
customer wants and not what the government wants.’ (GP Interview 1). The lack of 
engagement with QOF was not down to the lack of IT skills within the practice:  ‘The 
doctor is really good at the computer, (they are) so clever, but (they do not) like them 
for some reason, prefers paperwork, so (they are)  not that keen on QOF.’ (Receptionist 
Interview 1). 
However, the GP could not continue to resist the scheme in the face of mounting 
pressure from the PCT, and had employed a practice nurse for improving the practice’s 
QOF performance. I note that ‘The practice nurse is a recent addition to the team. The 
GP explains this as a reaction to having to increase the practice’s QOF scores or risk 
being shut down by the PCT’ (FN, pg. 11). The GP indicates in an interview that this 
is a reflection of the ‘QOF technostructure not being advanced enough, so admin core 
grows e.g. IT support, someone on the phone. I have made a  conscious decision not to 
have admin structure grow as it has no tangible benefit, financial or clinical. I did not 
want QOF to encroach on our systems.’ (GP Interview 1). 
 I note that ‘now that there has been a permanent nurse for the past nine months systems 
have improved according to GP – nurse provides phlebotomy, smears, contraception 
advice, STI screening, smears, health checks, flu clinics, QOF, may be a reflection of 






QOF surveillance was very much viewed within the context of a threat to professional 
autonomy: ‘the autonomy has been eroded. So although we are self-employed we are 
increasingly treated as salaried employees without the benefits of being salaried 
employees’ (GP Interview 3). Along with the enforcement of an unwelcome top-down 
mandate:‘there is a culture of diktat over time, as we as professionals are not able to 
decide what is good for our patients. And the authorities are telling us what to do and 
how to do it, down to which drug we should give, which is irritating...this is recent and 
it has gathered pace in a sense.’ (GP Interview 2) 
However, in parallel with the resistance to QOF surveillance, the GP continued to 
uphold regular self-regulation activities. I note that the ‘nearest other surgery is half 
an hour away by train with 5k patients – the two doctors meet up regularly as a support 
network and to discuss patient cases.’ (FN, pg. 14) and the ‘GP sees himself as grass-
roots GP. He is an elected member of LMC.’ (FN, pg. 21). 
 
The Goodbye 
I am sad to leave at the end of my visit. I enjoyed my week at the practice and I feel 
invigorated at having been part of such a cohesive and positive team. I also feel like I 
have learnt a lot, in particular through the conversations I had with the GP. I also note 
that at the start I felt that the receptionist was quite timid. I get the sense that since our 
interview and dinner last night that the receptionist has gained more in confidence - 
this is conveyed by her speaking with a louder, clearer voice, laughing with patients, 
relating stories and talking to the senior receptionist. I hope that some of this is down 






end of my visit, I am regularly asked when I am going, to make sure the team gets to 
say goodbye. 
On my last day, the practice team gathers to say goodbye, they mention that they really 
enjoyed my visit and the GP talks openly to their team about low QOF scores at this 
point. I am given a card with thoughtful wishes for my impending motherhood and 
chocolates. I leave feeling fulfilled and I reflect that this personal touch is what 



















5.2 Case Study 2  
The Practice 
A single-handed urban practice, this GP surgery operates from a converted house in an 
area of high socio-economic deprivation with a large immigrant population. The 
premises have an adequately sized reception area and two consulting rooms. The list 
size is approximately 1200. There are three part time receptionists employed by the 
practice. A well woman nurse clinic is created once there are five female patients 
needing an appointment with a nurse. The opening hours of the practice are advertised 
on NHS choices as 9-11 and 16-18 four days a week, and 9-11 on Wednesdays. The 
practice has a paper-free patient notes policy and is wholly computerised. I visit the 
practice on nine occasions, over the course of two weeks. 
Recruitment 
The recruitment process is relatively straightforward. I visit the practice in person 
initially and leave my details along with an information sheet with the receptionist as 
the GP is not at the surgery at the time of my visit. I then phone back the next day and 
ask to speak to the GP. The GP says ‘oh you’re the nice lady who visited yesterday. Yes 
please I would welcome the opportunity to have a moan about QOF and just to show 
you that we are not all bad.’ I then book in to begin the field work the following week 
and to arrive at 9 a.m. on a Monday when the practice opens. 
Findings 
The following findings are presented as an ethnographically-informed narrative formed 
from the summary of key field notes and transcripts of interviews (presented in italics) 






The Start of Fieldwork 
I arrive at 9 a.m. when the practice opens. The GP has not arrived yet and there are two 
patients waiting. I sit in the reception area and the patients grumble that the GP is 
always late and that one of the patients was once seen at 1130 when they had a 9 a.m. 
appointment booked. This immediately suggests to me that the quality of care within 
this practice is not of the highest standard. 
Receptionist 1 is at the desk which is placed behind glass and metal bars. There are 
various new patient information and health promotion leaflets displayed in the waiting 
area. The ‘phone is ringing incessantly and I note that the receptionist remains calm 
and polite. 
The GP phones in to ask the receptionist if I am there and instructs her to show me to 
the treatment room so that I can work from there. She does so very politely, but says 
that she is not sure why I am there. I explain the purpose of my research to her. She 
explains that the GP is late due to being stuck in traffic. She then announces the same 
to the patients. There are now six in the waiting area. 
The treatment room clearly suffers from some wear and tear but appears well stocked 
with an up to date temperature record for the fridge. There are various policy and 
procedure folders, including child protection and staff protocols. 
The GP arrives at 1040 and comes into the treatment room to begin a discussion with 
me. The GP is not happy for me to record our conversations, as they are sensitive about 
their voice, which has been affected by an operation to fix damage sustained through 
smoking. The doctor agrees to me taking notes throughout. The conversation begins 






increasing you will see. I set up nurse clinics in response to patient demand, but they 
had high DNA rates and the nurses demand a higher remuneration that the practice 
can afford. Our disease prevalence levels have also gone down, which is where our 
QOF suffers.’ 
The GP gives me open access to the practice’s patient data on EMIS, I explain that my 
research does not involve looking at patient records. The doctor asks again why I am 
studying his practice, as their QOF scores are ‘not that bad and the health authority 
knows the challenges I face.  I am over 60 now and the surgery is all I have left so I am 
facing the challenge of engaging with QOF, otherwise I’ll die.’ This suggest a forced 
requirement to engage with top down mandates, lest face closure. The GP talks to me 
for another ten minutes, records the fridge temperature, and then begins to see patients 
ten minutes after that. I note that the first patient has been waiting for over two hours 
to be seen. The three telephone lines are manned by just one receptionist and the 
‘phones appear to be constantly ringing. 
The View from Reception 
There are three part time receptionists, covering working hours of 830-1900, five days 
a week. I interview receptionist 1 who has been working at the practice for five years, 
we are sitting behind reception during the interview. The receptionist describes the 
appointment booking system. Patients ring in or book in person and are always able to 
get an appointment within 48 hours. However, the system of five patients needing the 
well woman clinic before a nurse clinic is booked in, does mean that patients have to 
sometimes wait for a considerable length of time for smear test, particularly as these 






The discussion then moves to QOF. The receptionist reports the following: 
‘The low QOF scores have a lot to do with the GP not knowing. There was also a lot 
of confusion about how things should be coded and PCT guidance has been notoriously 
unclear. I now inform the GP of the correct codes to use any time any new guidance 
comes in. However, the GP is not very good with computers and that was the main 
problem with QOF that things weren’t being inputted or coded adequately on the 
system. It’s not that the GP doesn’t do the work. Generally, when I used to see the 
notes, I used to see that the GP does lots of good stuff during the consultation. We had 
to persuade the GP to go paperless, as we were scanning things in anyway. The doctor 
was worried about the computers and where the information was going, that we were 
being scrutinised in some way. But now we moved to a paperless record a year ago 
and everything is so much more efficient. I don’t think the doctor minds it so much now 
either, but does need a lot of help with IT still, and that often takes us away from our 
jobs and we get behind, being called in after most consultations.’ 
The doctor’s concerns here suggest a theme of Poor Adaptation to Change, 
demonstrated by anxieties around a paperless IT led data recording environment and 
the lack of IT capability to fully embrace change. Similarly, a worry of being under 
close scrutiny points towards the theme presented within the literature review of 
Surveillance as a Threat to Professionalism, particularly in the form of remote data 
monitoring, with little sense of ‘on the ground’ ownership over one’s data and how it 
is then utilised and by whom. Yet, most significantly, the quote above links to previous 
studies which suggested that a solid organisational infrastructure is the key to QOF’s 
success and this can be encapsulated in the theme of The Role of Organisational 






infrastructure and staff resource is a notable barrier in this practice to achieving 
improved QOF scores. 
I note that the receptionist reports a number of times that she really enjoys her job, due 
to the rapport she has with the patients, most of whom she knows by name. I notice that 
patients coming in rarely have to give their names. One patient says that they cannot 
wait any longer to see the GP and request a repeat prescription. I am surprised that they 
are not annoyed, as I would be, there appears to be a learned helplessness around the 
GP’s apparent poor timekeeping. However, there is a steady stream of patients and 
doctor appears to be seeing patient swiftly. The receptionist says that last month’s ‘flu 
clinics were exceptionally busy and the doctor worked all day with no nurse support. 
Each day I arrive to conduct my field work, I am warmly welcomed by the 
receptionists. I also note that they often start before they are due to come in for work. 
Often an hour or two earlier. My interview with receptionist 2 in a private consulting 
room also paints a picture of a satisfied member of staff. She started off as a volunteer, 
and was then offered a permanent position, in which she remained for the last six years. 
There was practice manager there at the time, but since they left three years ago, she 
reports that there is less tangible leadership and liaison with outside agencies. The 
practice has ‘become more insular.’ This suggests a salience of a potential theme of 
Poor Adaptation to Change, whereby changes in staff organisation have led the 
practice to somewhat cease to progress and engage externally. However, she continues 
to value the interaction with patients and ‘sense of community with the patients and 
team’ at the practice. 
The main challenge she notes is working with patients from many cultural backgrounds 






is good and they spend more time with patients who need it. I ask if this causes the 
clinic to run late, to which the receptionist responds ‘yes, most days. The younger 
generation has less patience with it overrunning, but our older patients really 
appreciate it. I don’t think it’s realistic that every patient’s problem will fit into a 
five/ten minute consultation and the doctor recognises this and won’t change their 
ways.’  
I ask receptionist 2 what it’s like working with the GP. She describes the doctor as ‘old 
school, so new policies for instance take ages to implement, even entering information 
on the system feels like such a drag sometimes, as the doctor is just not that good at 
computers.’ This suggests a theme of Poor Adaptation to Change, whereby the GP 
appears to struggle to undertake and implement new ways of working. I am told that 
even the doctor’s partner came into the practice last year, due to their concern with low 
QOF scores. The receptionists had to look through notes and input all the information 
on system themselves. Receptionist two reports that she is more confident that the 
doctor is entering more and more of their consultations on system, though they still 
have to keep checking, and that their QOF scores should improve.  
I notice that the GP communicates in an engaged manner with the receptionists and 
vice versa.  I get a sense that this small team play to their strengths and gel well together. 
 
The GP’s Perceptions 
I have a number of in depth discussion with the GP. Throughout my time at the practice, 
I feel like I am almost granted the privilege of an audience with the doctor and that they 






isolation day to day. I find the GP eloquent and seemingly dedicated to their work on 
an intellectual level. The interviews are loose and adaptive and I do away with the 
interview protocol during our talks. However, I also note down that this is a person 
coming to the end of their career, fatigued by three decades of working amongst a 
challenging patient community and by numerous ever-changing government mandates. 
A summary of interview findings provided mostly in the form of a narrative follows. 
We often discuss what the GP views as the erosion of professional values within 
general practice and medicine more broadly. The GP puts this down to patients using 
the internet to self-diagnose, as well as a prescriptive approach to general practice due 
to increased computerisation. However, the GP describes the benefits of the use of IT 
as the potential for more holistic care of the patient, greater application of meta-
analyses as an evidence-base for clinical practice and a gradual doing away with the 
‘false dichotomy’ between primary and secondary care. Whilst this can be seen as 
contributing to the theme directly stemming from the theoretical literature review of 
Surveillance as a Threat to Professionalism, the GP does paint a mixed picture. 
Whereby increased standardisation due to the use of IT systems appears to erode 
professional values from the GP’s perspective, the wider use of IT systems within 
general practice is seen as having the capacity to drive person-centred care, 
simultaneously facilitate access to a clinical evidence-base and also improve 
communication between primary and secondary care. Thus, the same tools which can 
be utilised for the surveillance of professionals, can also be used to benefit patient care. 
The concept of professionalism often features in our discussion. The GP sees the 
introduction of free markets under Thatcher as having eroded the value of primary care. 






lead to improvements in quality in the interest of choice. Professionalism and values 
are described by the GP as being multi-factorial, in terms of how they are understood 
and the expectations various stakeholders place on them. QOF demands specificity and 
thus cannot define value, especially not in generalist medicine.  
However, the GP sees QOF as playing an important role in preventative medicine and 
attaining a universal quality improvement, though quality of care will always remain 
difficult to measure. According to the GP, QOF needs to be adaptive and as money is 
the driving force, the values of the GP practice will impact on the level of their 
engagement with the scheme. ‘This comes back to the conscience of the GP’, says the 
doctor during one of our interviews, ‘medicine was always the best profession for me, 
but I feel like I am being policed, money is not my motivating factor, but giving back to 
society flourishes me every day. On top of that, I am not the youngest of people, and 
my work keeps my brain working.’ This can again be viewed within the context of a 
theme of Surveillance as a Threat to Professionalism. 
The findings of this case can therefore be summarised through the following themes: 
Theme 1: Surveillance as a Threat to Professionalism 
Theme 2: The Role of Organisational Infrastructure in QOF Performance 










5.3 Case Study 3  
The Practice 
The practice is a single-handed inner city surgery. It is a low QOF-scoring practice 
studied at the point of closure. With a small patient list size of 1200, the practice is 
staffed by a single-handed GP above retirement age, who trained abroad, a practice 
nurse providing two sessions a week, and a reception team of four part-timers. The GP 
has almost 50 years of medical experience and has been based at this practice for 25 
years, with one of the receptionists working at the practice for 12. The patient 
population is ethnically diverse, often with English not being the patients’ first 
language. 
The practice is based in a run-down shopping precinct, within a rough inner London 
housing estate.  It operates from a small shop-front premises, consisting of a waiting 
area with a reception and two clinical rooms. It conforms to the stereotype of a ‘lock 
up shop’ with a metal shutter rolled down, closing off the frontage for much of the day. 
The NHS Choices website indicates that the practice is open Monday to Friday for three 
hours from the late morning, closed for three hours in the middle of the day, then open 
for a further two hours in the late afternoon. This is a total of 25 hours in which patients 
can be seen by clinicians during the practice’s working week.  
 
Recruitment  
Despite best attempts at following protocol on my part, the recruitment process is fairly 






presentation of this case that the theme of Organisational Chaos and Poor 
Performance features highly within it. Notes are kept during the recruitment, giving 
an insight into the day-to-day functioning of the practice. The practice at recruitment 
is still an active NHS GP surgery is difficult to access by ‘phone. Nine out of ten 
attempts during the opening times indicated by the NHS Choices website on three 
separate days, over a two-week period, meet with an engaged signal; the one time I do 
get through over the ‘phone, I am put on hold for 14 minutes, and so I hang up. I am 
not calling a bypass number, but the same telephone number patients use to contact 
their GP practice. The recruitment process at this stage therefore mirrors the limited 
patient access to the surgery to a large extent. The field notes at this stage act as 
evidence for my frustration: 
‘Trying recruitment process yet again! Sense of wasting time, but learning about 
patients’ experiences of trying in vain to book an appointment with their GP’ 
(Recruitment field note no. 2, pg. 1). 
It becomes apparent, that arriving at the practice in person may be a more successful 
form of getting the team interested in participating in this study. After discussion with 
the PhD supervisor, it is decided that being a GP, he may have more success in 
approaching a seemingly elusive colleague. This strategy pays off. It is the middle of 
the working day, but the practice’s shutters are down. However, the single-handed GP 
is at the practice. Visiting requires a forceful knock on the shutters, then heaving up the 
shutter yourself before being able to open the front door. After me explaining the 
purpose of the study, it becomes clear that the GP is interested in taking part. The 
feedback received from the PhD supervisor about this exchange, is that the GP at the 






prior to me visiting the practice, it become apparent that a theme of 
Victimhood/Blaming as Response to QOF Surveillance may be particularly salient 
to this case. This meeting takes place just before I am due to start maternity leave, and 
the GP is informed that they will be contacted in a few months. 
Practice Visit 1 
A few months later, unable to get through over the ‘phone to arrange my visit in 
advance, I visit the practice for the first time with my young baby, in order to confirm 
the practice’s readiness to take part in the study. I find the practice team in a state of 
panic and disarray – it happens to be the day they are closing their doors to the public. 
The practice team reports that, after an apparent threat from the PCT, that the practice 
would be forcibly closed due to their continuously low QOF scores and so the GP 
instead has chosen to retire.  Here are the notes from this visit that were written a few 
hours later: 
‘Initially my unexpected visit seems unwelcome. I am left outside the practice for a few 
minutes, as the receptionist and GP discuss whether or not I should be let in. On 
entering the practice, I see a small reception, with mismatched furniture, and slightly 
cluttered with old leaflets and local out of date magazines. The reception area is in a 
visible state of disarray, with scattered loose paperwork. The staff appear stressed and 
overworked. Three receptionists explain to me that they are taking turns to make 
‘phone calls to patients about the closure of the practice. There is a last minute 
scramble to enter smoking cessation QOF data for patients on the asthma register onto 
the inpractice system. This seems to me a futile effort, as the practice is closing. The 
doctor begins to prompt their staff to tell me in her words “how badly they have been 






the GP’s statements “tell her how you’ve suffered from stress and anxiety because of 
the way you have been treated by the PCT”, “tell her that you ‘phone patients all day 
to get them to come in for reviews, but they just don’t want to” etc.’ (FN pg. 9). 
It is worth noting at this stage, that this is representative of what I felt was the GP’s 
communication style with their staff – almost one of ‘putting words in one’s mouth’. 
A later encounter described below ‘Interview with practice receptionist’, shows that 
although seemingly the GP asks for their staff to feed back about QOF and PCT 
monitoring, this is often done through leading or closed statements, such as the ones I 
noted in my field notes above. The closed statements impose the GP’s sense of reality 
– the practice as the innocent victim of PCT QOF monitoring. This again brings out the 
powerfully overarching theme of Victimhood/Blaming as Response to QOF 
Surveillance. 
 A young reception staff member tells me that this has been a very stressful time. I am 
asked to take a seat, and despite trying to communicate the fact that the purpose of my 
brief visit was to simply ask for their agreement to taking part in my study before 
submitting my ethics and R&D applications, I am there for just short of two hours 
(luckily my baby remains fast asleep!).  For the duration of my visit I feel like a 
counsellor. The conversation is very one way with the GP largely talking at me – off 
loading the events leading up to the practice being closed. The GP describes PCT 
representatives as rude and at times aggressive, often with encounters at the practice 
escalating to shouting. The GP is full of praise for and verbally supportive of their staff 
and how they have coped with the upheaval. The GP talks about the impact recent 






GP is close to tears when discussing their close relationship with their patients – ‘I feel 
most sorry for the patients, some have been coming to me for 20 years’. 
The GP is adamant that they want to participate in my study and want their story 
published ‘so that others can know what the PCT has done to me’. The GP verbally 
nominates me as the person who will get their story heard. I feel some pressure with 
such a task being handed to me without discussion. The GP reiterates a number of times 
that ‘they told me QOF was voluntary, so how can they close me down?’ I am given 
two non-NHS email addresses, one for the receptionist, and one for the GP. They assure 
me that they will be in touch, and ask for assurance of the amount of money they would 
be paid for research participation. The GP also mentions that they have considered 
going into research as a new career choice and that perhaps I could facilitate this for 
them. The amount of ideas proposed to me during this meeting feels highly chaotic. 
This chaos is reflected further in the surroundings, in keeping with an overarching 
theme of Organisational Chaos and Poor Performance: 
‘Looking around the practice towards the end of my visit, having conducted infection 
control audits in the past, I am aware of a number of issues, particularly around the 
level of clutter in the two small clinical rooms. There is a stack of magazines in the 
toilet, along with a filing cabinet. I leave the practice feeling rather drained, but at the 
same time aware of having visited at a key, fascinating moment in the practice’s 
history. The encounter brings a new dimension to my case studies – what happens when 
QOF is used as a regulatory tool to close down a practice – the stick rather than the 
carrot – and how the practice reacts. This is a unique insight into how a team reacts to 






At this stage, I note down the lack of clarity about R&D permissions. This is discussed 
at supervision and since the GP is retired and no longer an employee of the PCT, a 
research protocol amendment is submitted to the Ethics Committee instead. As may 
become apparent throughout this case study, the research process almost shifts away 
from an organisational study. Due to the fragmented nature of this particular practice, 
only standalone elements can be explored, and a picture of how the practice functioned 
as a whole prior to closure can only be built up from retrospective accounts. 
Furthermore, the case study is biased towards the responses of the practice’s GP who 
contributed the most data to this case study and who acted as a link to former staff 
members. 
 
The Shift from Recruitment to Participation 
The stage at which recruitment becomes participation is blurred. Despite seemingly 
opening up to me, for the next four months the GP remains elusive and hard to get in 
contact with. I send six emails to both the addresses given to me and receive no 
response. The study supervisor decides to pay the former practice premises a visit. 
These are the notes taken to record my supervisor’s feedback: 
‘Behind the shutters, a flickering light was seen. There was one young girl unable to 
speak very much English, seemingly doing some work for the GP. The GP welcomes 
the supervisor warmly, confirms that they are still keen to take part in the study and 
would like to go out for dinner – study supervisor, GP and myself at some point. The 






upcoming event that they would like me to attend. There is still a sense of the GP feeling 
victimised at the hands of the PCT.’ (FN 2 pg. 3). 
This verbal commitment to the study is in conflict with my lack of ability to contact the 
GP post this encounter. I leave a number of voicemail messages over the next few 
weeks, on both the GP’s personal mobile and the practice answering machine. Finally, 
I get a call back consisting of praise for my study, which will bring to light ‘the nasty 
work of the PCT’ (FN 3, pg. 1) and an invitation to the aforementioned event. After 
trying to gauge some details of the event, I am left with simply the name of the private 
hospital where this event will take place. I am then sent on a time-consuming journey 
of trying to locate the event details from this hospital. This lack of clarity around 
commitment to the study and inability to organise meetings in a straightforward 
manner, is to an extent quite tiring to me as a researcher. This leads me to reflect on the 
experiences patients could potentially have had during clinical consultations with a GP 
who is appears unable to specify clear step by step instructions from the outset. The 
amount of chaos here is astounding, repeatedly contributing to the important theme of 
Organisational Chaos and Poor Performance, whereby the inability of the GP to 
present ideas in an organised manner likely impacted detrimentally on the performance 
of the practice both organisationally and in terms of patient care. 
When I finally identify the meeting place and time, it is only on the actual day of the 
evening lecture that I receive confirmation from the GP by telephone that we will be 
meeting. There is a lot of concern about whether or not I will be able to find a parking 
space, which takes up almost 10 minutes of the conversation. Despite understanding 
the GP’s good intention to make me feel looked after, and whilst grateful for the 






underpin my interactions with the doctor – a sort of exhaustion from the chaos and lack 
of clarity about commitment to participating, and at the same time the GP almost 
attempting to exercise control over what I do. These feelings are further compounded 
by a sense of pathos which grows from the time of the meeting and interview at the 
evening lecture. This encounter will now be described in the following section. It is at 
this point that the GP signs a consent form to participate in the study – they are also 
happy for retrospective data to be included in the research. 
 
Evening Lecture – First Recorded Interview 
We meet prior to a lecture at a private hospital, of which the aim appears to be to 
encourage GPs to refer privately to the hospital’s specialists. On entering the hospital 
itself, I notice that there are security guards everywhere, presumably awaiting the 
arrival of a VIP patient. I also note that the main lecture guests are very elderly GPs, 
who discuss their excitement about the free food on offer amongst themselves. The 
event is almost farcical, in that I wonder if the hard sell put on by the hospital’s 
consultants is actually aimed at the wrong audience. The GP also mentions four times 
that the free pens given out at these events never seem to run out, and so the GP goes 
about picking up the free pens off other peoples’ chairs. The food is indeed delicious, 
topped off with an intricate selection of desserts. The lecture room has a clean, slightly 
regal feel with commissioned art work.  I am not surprised that NHS GPs are seduced 






The interview begins with a discussion about the how computers are a threat to patient-
centred care, by distracting the clinician away from the patient to interacting more with 
their PC: 
‘Not everyone who is not good at the computer is not treating their patients well’ 
‘There are two ways to do medicine, one is the communication with the computer, one 
is the communication with the patient. The older doctors are more trained to 
communicate with the patient, the computer is a bit behind. The newer doctors have 
more orientation to the computer, they’re computer literate and they’re more thinking 
of the computer than of the patient. (…) Therefore I don’t think the QOF is very relevant 
to the standard of the treatment.’ 
Here it becomes clear that the GP views high QOF achievement as running counter to 
patient-centred care. The GP presents themselves as being motivated by patient need 
and, in the excerpts below, treatment. This contributes to a theme of Patient-centred 
Care as Justification of Poor QOF Performance, whereby the GP uses patient-
centred discourses as a smokescreen for what was so clearly visible at the point of 
closure - a poor performing general practice. 
The GP produces a document they had written, hoping to get it published through me, 
highlighting the key reasons why their practice’s QOF points were in the 700s. There 
are a number of grammatical and spelling errors throughout the document. This 
production of documents becomes one of the ways of communicating a sense of 
victimhood at the hands of a PCT which didn’t understand the practice’s unique 
circumstances. The reasons for the low QOF scores highlighted by the GP were listed 






 Timing of the QOF 
 Practice boundaries 
 Change of computer 
 Links  between our (inpractice system) computer and the hospital labaratory 
(sic) 
 Contact with (inpractice system) head office 
 Hybrid of patients 
 Poor compliance 
 Demands of the PCT 
 Cytology and Immunisations 
 Returning Medical records to PCT. 
The GP presenting themselves as a victim in the face of the PCT’s interventions and 
sanctions again promotes the theme of Victimhood/Blaming as Response to QOF 
Surveillance. It could be argued that this response is perhaps the GP’s defence 
mechanism against admitting the active part they played in the poor performance of 
their general practice. This ties in to the GP viewing themselves as being at the mercy 
of the demands of their challenging patient population, and their sense of the apparent 
lack of PCT understanding of this. The GP’s clear construction of the PCT as a 
menacing unjust force, does somewhat detract from having to face and resolve the 
chaos of their own clinical and organisational practices, which even to me as an 
observer does at times appear unsurmountable. And here, and not for the first time, I 
feel as though the closure imposed upon the practice is the only real solution. 
Furthermore, as we wait for the lecture to start, the GP presents themselves as a patient-






on the management. I like to see patients getting better. Treatment is what I am trained 
for. It’s my profession and my motivation. This is what medicine is. Learning medicine 
is so long and it’s a dedication to medicine.’ and ‘I would say, having done half a 
century of medicine, that treating patients is the power, it’s the dedication.’ It is also 
apparent that these data lend themselves well to the overarching theme of Patient-
Centred Care as Justification of Poor QOF Performance, with the GP continuously 
citing their professional values as their key motivator in care delivery. Delivery which 
was so visibly below par. 
In addition the GP clearly views high QOF achievement as the result of data 
manipulation: 
‘Those who achieve high scores on QOF, I think this is more to do with the data entry, 
so manipulating the data, I don’t think colleagues are able to achieve any more than 
800. You see they employ data summarisers and they move the figures too.  And there 
is another thing, they take the patient out, the one who is not complying. Sorry you have 
to join another GP. If you are an honest worker I don’t think you should be achieving 
more than 850. 850 is honest, the rest is data manipulation.’ 
The interview is stops as more and more lecture guests arrive and the speakers 
themselves start arriving. 
These potential barriers to achieving high QOF scores listed by the GP in the document 
I have been given are not surprising in light of the literature review, and are often cited 
by GP media to highlight the limitations of QOF’s one size fits all approach, not 
allowing for variations in practices in disadvantaged areas for instance. However, it is 






a very similar catchment area, are not on the consistent low QOF scorers list used to 
identify the study’s potential participants. It could be argued, therefore, that this 
practice’s underperformance was linked to factors other than the external ones cited. 
The GP gives also me some information about their private life; indeed we begin to 
talk almost as friends. They have never married or had children, and live in a small 
bedsit, presently with no hot water or heating. We are meeting at the end of Winter. 
These snippets of information are delivered in a factual way, seemingly not with the 
aim of inspiring pathos. However, I cannot help but feel worried to some extent about 
the GP’s lack of a support network. I also reflect about how the GP’s team stayed rather 
loyal to the practice, and I wonder if this sense of almost feeling sorry for the GP that 
they promote by describing their rather difficult circumstance, is what contributes to 
this loyalty. This is further compounded by the GP presenting themselves as a victim – 
I wonder at this stage if this victimhood has become an adaptive mechanism leading to 
secondary gain – the way in which the GP has navigated their way through their 
working life.  
 
Another Time-Lapse – Concern for GP 
Despite leaving telephone messages to meet up with the GP for follow-up interviews, 
I get nowhere. I begin to be concerned for the GP, particularly in light of them 
seemingly being on their own. The study supervisor, also concerned, decides to visit 
the practice premises on his way to a meeting. Although he does not find the doctor 
present at the practice, he speaks to the shopkeeper next door. The shopkeeper also 






next in at the practice. When the shopkeeper rings us to say that the GP has returned 
after a couple of weeks away, I make my way down to the practice premises. 
 
Practice Visit 2 – Second Recorded Interview 
I take the opportunity to conduct the second interview with the GP. The practice now 
has a Word processed sign attached with blu tack to the outside window with the words 
‘no longer an NHS practice, private appointments offered’. The juxtaposition of private 
healthcare provision with the backdrop of the practice’s setting and even the poor 
quality of this sign is almost farcical and again contributes strongly to the theme of 
Organisational Chaos and Poor Performance. 
Throughout this visit, despite saying ‘no’ to tea, I am served a cup of tea and feel 
obliged to drink it. I am also repeatedly offered biscuits, despite turning them down. 
This sounds rather ungrateful, but the overwhelming feeling is not one of warm 
hospitality, but rather of being controlled. The interview itself centres on the PCT visit 
which led to the practice closing its doors and the GP retiring. The GP questions the 
ethics surrounding the methods the PCT used in getting the GP to conform to their 
mandate: 
‘it was the actual investigation meeting, not the pre-investigation meeting like they 
said, so that was a bit of harassment (…) this is absolutely ethically, legally wrong (..) 
and they wanted to read the notes….actually if you ask me too much I might start 
crying…how can you come and read the notes. So the medical defence person who was 
there, the legal representative, said we’ve got to anonymise the notes before you read 






notes to be read by a panel of three people…and then I got rather upset and the LMC 
person said, look they are harassing small practices anyway…if that’s the case then 
they are going to close me down anyway and if you don’t resign through the LMC, we 
will report you to the GMC and get you struck off. This is bullying or blackmail.’ 
I ask whether there was a particular reason for this intervention and the response 
appears to be one of futile resistance in light of inevitable closure: 
‘It was all QOF…but when we gave them the reasons (for QOF scores) they didn’t 
believe us. I thought that if they went through notes that would give them a reason to 
complain and take me to the GMC, and the LMC said that that would be more hassle 
for you, so you should retire. When I said I would retire, they said put the resignation 
in today by 5 o’clock, so I put my resignation in, but I won’t resign until the financial 
year finishes. OK they said, but then we will come and monitor you until the financial 
year finishes. And I said OK then come monitor me.’ 
I ask the GP if it would be OK to interview some of their former staff members. The 
GP suggests two former receptionists and is insistent that they are interviewed at the 
practice premises with the GP present. The GP telephones the former receptionists and 
gives me their contact details with their permission, as well as booking one interview 
there and then.  
Despite the GP being very keen to meet with us for dinner, I am unable to pin down 
the details of when and where to meet. I find this frustrating, and in the vein of previous 
encounters, the study supervisor and I do not know until the last minute, whether the 








The dinner takes place between the GP, myself and the study supervisor. It is a very 
pleasant evening, and the GP puts tremendous effort into making us feel at home, and 
choosing meals off the menu on our behalf. I take just a few key field-notes. Much of 
the conversation reiterates what was already discussed in previous interviews. 
We discuss the beginnings of the GP’s career.  It turns out that for 2 years, the GP not 
only saw patients in general practice, but also worked on-call shifts 7 nights a week. 
These are colloquially known as the ‘red-eye’ shifts in the GP community.  Then for a 
further 7 years, this continued for 5 nights a week to supplement their GP income. I 
raise the obvious question about when the GP actually slept. Their working day 
consisted of going to morning surgery straight after the night shift, and then sleeping 
in the afternoon before evening surgery – ‘you could sleep at work’  I am told. 
Naturally, the study supervisor and I are shocked at this exhausting working routine – 
one that would not be allowed today under the European Working Time Directive, 
because of concerns about the standards of patient care and risk to the patient. 
At one stage in the evening, a slightly inebriated party strike up a conversation with us. 
On learning that the GP has practiced for almost half a century, they cheer and clap. 
They also take turns to hug and congratulate the GP. It strikes me that it is these kinds 
of privileges which come with the social standing of a doctor that the GP thrived on 
throughout their career. This public reception is seemingly at odds with the following 
revelation: 






GP: In those days being a GP was the easy option. You wrote prescriptions and did 
nothing else.’ 
Late into the evening, as we are getting ready to go home, the GP produces a further 6 
page document that they would like published about their experiences of being 
monitored by the PCT. The GP insists on reading this document out loud to us. The GP 
seems oblivious to our social signals around being ready to go home. On the other hand, 
I have a sense of loyalty to listen to the GPs story, who is clearly in need of a receptive 
audience. When the GP asks us to take turns to read out the document on their behalf 
(which is a rather tedious and laborious task to be asked to undertake during dinner in 
a restaurant), it appears that listening to their words being read out by someone else, 
acts almost as a therapeutic exercise, with the GP reflecting intently on their story. The 
story is heartfelt and is written from the first person and elaborates on some of the 
challenges the GP has face in light of the PCT inspectorial regime, which is presented 
as not being sensitive to the demands of the day to day life of an inner city GP poses, 
particularly in terms of the diverse and transient practice population. 
This is just one of the occasions during which the GP emphasises not wanting their data 
to be anonymised for the purpose of my study – rather they want their story to be fully 
attributable in the hope that it can reveal the extent of their suffering at the hands of the 
PCT. This leaves me in a predicament, whereby I have developed a sense of pathos for 
the GP and a desire to protect them, and I am aware that any attributable data may be 
harmful to their professional standing, let alone their pending tribunal case against the 
PCT. The study supervisor voices this latter concern at the dinner, and the GP appears 






When we finally leave the restaurant, the GP asks me to accompany them in the cab 
back to their practice premises. The GP will stay there overnight, due to having no 
heating at their home. They want me to help them bring down the shutters at the 
premises, so that they are safe overnight. I get a real sense of the vulnerability of the 
GP and a desire to protect them, especially considering the trust put in me at that 
moment.  
 
Practice Visit 3 – Interview with Former Receptionist 
When I ‘phone up the receptionist to remind her of our meeting at the GP’s premises, 
she asks if the GP will be present. I answer yes, and the receptionist then says that there 
are things she doesn’t agree with the GP with and feels concerned that she might not 
be able to say them openly. We come to an arrangement, whereby if the receptionist 
feels she hasn’t been able to speak openly, I will follow her up with a ‘phone call after 
the interview. 
When I arrive at the practice to conduct the interview the shutters are up and the 
receptionist is present. She asked the shopkeeper for the keys to get into the practice as 
the GP is late. In light of the receptionist’s concerns about the GP being present for the 
interview, we begin before the GP arrives.  Whilst interviewing the receptionist, the 
strength of the ethnographic method becomes apparent. From the perspective of the 
former receptionist, many of the shortcomings in the way the practice operated are 
highlighted, again clearly contributing to a significant theme of Organisational Chaos 






The receptionist, who joined the practice after being ‘head hunted’ by the practice’s 
GP, after the practice she had worked for as a receptionist for 20 years had been shut 
down by the PCT, begins to tell me her story. I have kept the interview transcript here 
in its entirety, as it provides a particularly illuminating normative voice to the findings 
of the case so far. The interview data clearly points to the key theme of Organisational 
Chaos and Poor Performance throughout. 
‘Initially I started working four hours a week, but ended with having to show most of 
them how to put Read codes on, to put the summarisation on – these were the things 
that weren’t being done. They were working hard, but weren’t getting nowhere, 
because what they were asked to do (by the PCT) weren’t getting done. That’s why 
their targets were low and the doctor never understood that. I mean there was only one 
person who could do prescriptions, I mean you can’t have that in a surgery, you’ve got 
to have a backup. Because if you come in here on a Monday and that person is ill, 
you’ve got to wait for the doctor to do it. 
I think the doctor basically tried to run it herself, thinking they were doing good, but 
basically not understanding that this is not running right. The PCT picked up on it. 
They were tough, but the doctor couldn’t understand what was happening to a large 
extent. I mean we had one poor receptionist phoning up the same people asking “do 
you smoke?” I said they are going to get annoyed as you are phoning up the same 
people every day asking the same thing. It’s not going to change the number, once it’s 
on it’s on. In QOF only one thing counts regardless of whether you put it on once or 
twenty times. No one had shown them. 







I think it was a bit of both. They should have been sent for training. As far as the doctor 
was aware, as long as they were being polite to patients that was enough, but it’s not. 
I: How did it feel coming here to work? 
(Sigh) I didn’t even know if I would stay at the beginning, it was a culture shock, ‘cause 
I thought “how haven’t they been closed?”, cause they didn’t have a clue, nor could 
the nurse understand. 
I: Do you think it’s a case of not embracing change? 
Yes. Don’t get me wrong the doctor was fantastic with the patients – they’d have the 
patient in there for an hour, but that ain’t how it runs on the National Health, ‘cause 
you’ve got all the other patients sitting here getting worked up. 
In recognition of the theme of Patient-Centred Care as Justification of Poor QOF 
Performance, I ask the following, which reveals a clear lack of patient-centred care in 
practice: 
I: So was the doctor all about being patient-centred and building relationships? Did 
the nurse say anything about the level of clinical care? 
It wasn’t good ‘cause they used the same room and if the doctor was in there, the nurse 
couldn’t be in there. And where we kept things up to date (in previous practice), the 
speculums, the imms – the nurse couldn’t find any smears or the imms has run out or 
they was out of date. So things weren’t kept ticking over. 
Reception was all about answering the ‘phone, getting the notes out, asking the patient 






I: Quite old school? 
The patients got what they wanted...they were quite difficult...I used to say that the 
patient don’t tell you what to do, you tell the patient...a cold isn’t an emergency...there 
was no boundaries...they’d come and scream and shout at you. 
And the doctor is terrible with time-keeping...like they might not get there until a few 
hours in.’ 
Illustrative of this, at this point the doctor arrives (half an hour late). The discussion 
shifts towards the receptionist trying to persuade the GP to let go of the tribunal case. 
R: ‘The government had said that they wanted all single-handed practices to go so you 
either had to double up with someone or you went and they made sure that you went. 
GP: They should have been honest and phased them out instead. 
R: They got rid of all the older ones first, because that way you can say “we’re not 
closing them down, it’s retirement”. 
GP: Did you tell her about the day they came? They said it was pre-investigation and 
it was investigation. 
R: It was bad, because they were supposed to have told the doctor why they were 
coming, but they didn’t and wanted to start that day...it was intimidating...they were 
looking for stupid things’. 
Throughout the interview the doctor keeps interrupting. The GP mentions that the PCT 
used to intentionally calculate the targets lower in order to close the practice down and 






becoming increasingly passionate in sharing their views, which yet again tie in with the 
theme of Victimhood/Blaming as Response to QOF Surveillance: 
R: ‘I would even drop the tribunal case. They would make sure they win. 
GP: You may be right, they may win, but it’s a point for me to raise. 
R: But it’s a point for you to have a bloody stroke over. 
GP: But then if I don’t go to the tribunal, I’ll still be angry.’ 
At this point the GP leaves to make food for us.  
R: ‘The GP just won’t listen, ‘cause they are just not going to win their case. There 
were genuine reasons for the PCT’s action, I’m not saying in the way they did it, but 
actual patient care, so anyone who hasn’t been in for five or six years call them in and 
if they’ve left the country then take them off the list. But it’s a “catch 22” ‘cause then 
your payments go down, but if you get your QOF points, you get your money back. 
R: (challenging population) so it became an excuse, but other doctors nearby used to 
hit their targets. 
R: The GP didn’t have a good team – they sent one member of staff to Read code 
meetings, but she didn’t bring anything back...one of you had to be there totally doing 
the figures and we didn’t have the space. You couldn’t concentrate as there’d be 
patients banging on the window if they saw your back turned. 
R: The GP was scared of patients. And the doctor is not 100% themselves, you can see 
that and that was the way the doctor was when they were working.’ 






R: ‘It’s ‘cause they don’t get rid of anything’. 
The GP returns. Despite the receptionist saying that she is not hungry and me saying 
that I do not want another drink, we are served food and poured drinks. I mention the 
mouse, the GP says that they have not had the heart to sort this out, and then it is 
revealed that the GP owns another house nearby, where they wanted to transfer the 
paperwork from the practice premises, but the builders working on that house ran away 
with the money ‘that’s why I am stuck here’. 
Indeed, the sense of victimhood underpins much of the data gathered during the field-
work with this practice. The practice’s low QOF scores are justified by the GP on the 
basis of external factors such as problems intrinsic to QOF itself and the PCT’s inability 
to understand the practice’s unique position in terms of their challenging patient 
population. Indeed, I do not recall at any point the GP conceptualising any changes 
which could have been made to the practice’s ways of working in order to attain higher 
QOF scores as potential improvements. There is also no apparent reflection about how 
systems or clinical consultations within the practice can be improved to raise the 
standard of patient care. ‘So these are outside factors, nothing to do with the level of 
patient care’ (GP, Interview 1). The interview with the former receptionist, however, 
reveals a GP seriously struggling to adapt to the changes brought about by QOF 
surveillance, presenting continued, but futile, resistance in the face of the new QOF 
regime. The GP becomes increasingly preoccupied with their battle against the PCT. 
I am presently in the process of booking an interview with another receptionist. The 
GP is insisting I conduct the interview with them present at the practice’s former 
premises, citing the receptionist’s fragility as a result of the PCT’s actions. I am 






speak freely about the practice. This interview does not take place as I am unable to 
make contact after three failed attempts. 
 
Case Themes  
The findings of this case can therefore be summarised through the following themes: 
Theme 1: Victimhood/Blaming as Response to QOF Surveillance 
Theme 2: Patient-Centred Care as Justification of Poor QOF Performance 

















5.4 Case Study 4 
The Practice 
The practice is a single-handed urban practice based in a run-down converted house on 
a residential road in an area of low-socio economic status, high unemployment rates 
and a high non-English-speaking immigrant population. The list size is about 2000, 
with around 500 of those being investigated as ‘ghost’ patients at the time of my visits. 
The premises are cramped, with a small reception area, in need of internal decoration. 
The patients in the reception area are separated from the receptionists by toughened 
glass and metal bars. The receptionists’ desk is surrounded by paper patient notes, 
strewn with piles of documentation, notices from the PCT on display, along with hand-
written post it notes. The GP consulting room is downstairs next to the reception desk, 
separated by a thin stud wall, which does not offer sufficient privacy, as the 
consultations can often be heard in the reception area and vice versa. Up a steep 
carpeted staircase, there are three consulting rooms, two of which are out of use and 
locked with a heavy duty padlock, and one is used for the healthcare assistant clinic. 
The dated WC has no toilet seat or hot water.  
The practice team is small, consisting of the lead GP and two receptionists employed 
full time, one of which is also the healthcare assistant and stop smoking advisor for the 
practice. A nurse clinic, provided by a visiting nurse, takes place fortnightly. Of 
particular interest in this practice, is the lack of involvement of the GP in the research 
process, who remains elusive throughout and, despite my efforts, I am unable to 






The practice is open for two one and a half hour long clinics five days a week, with 
emergencies and home visits taking place after each clinic. 
 
The Recruitment 
The recruitment of this practice to the project is particularly challenging. I am able to 
access the practice through a former senior nurse colleague, who had previously 
conducted work for the practice to improve their cervical screening rates. In the local 
area, this senior nurse is seen as one of the few ‘outsiders’ that the GP trusts. The GP 
is not outwardly involved in the recruitment process and I liaise with the 
receptionist/HCA throughout, who agrees to me conducting my research. At my 
preliminary visits, the GP, whose understanding of the English language appears poor, 
appears confused about the purpose of my visit, but agrees on the basis of me being 
sent by my former colleague. Although I am explicit about my reasons for the visit and 
present the GP with the consent form and information sheet, only a loose understanding 
of why I am there remains throughout my time at the practice and continues to centre 
around the notion of my former colleague simply having sent me. My 8 visits in total, 
over the course of three months, are always agreed in advance with the 
receptionist/HCA and not the GP. 
 
Findings 
The following results are presented as an ethnographically-informed narrative formed 
from the summary of key field notes and transcripts of interviews (presented in italics) 






On the first day I begin gathering data at the practice, I am informed by the receptionists 
that they had undergone a recent QOF inspection visit, of which they are anxiously 
awaiting the results. This is the first visit in the last three years, and there is a sense that 
the visit may have been the result of their poor QOF scores. The inspector is described 
as ‘unfriendly’ and ‘disengaged’, having reportedly sat upstairs looking at patient 
notes. The receptionists state that they think this is a way the PCT will cut their income. 
They do not trust QMAS, as they can see patients on their cancer register for example, 
but the coding used is not being picked up. They had previously asked the PCT how to 
code diseases and were told to contact their system manager, but are unaware who that 
is. 
Receptionist/HCA states: ‘We think we are doing it right, and are really trying, and the 
next thing you know we get told off, and don’t get our money and it’s really frustrating 
with all the work we’re putting in’. 
I am seated in the reception area and warmly welcomed. My visits often consist of 
friendly conversation about children and holidays. However, despite this, I get a sense 
of how industrious the receptionists are. They also work very well together as a team 
and have been doing so for over ten years. For instance, when one receptionist is 
speaking to a patient for an extended period of time, I observe the second pick up the 
phone five times in ten minutes with enthusiasm. Both of the receptionists appear to 
know the patients phoning in and visiting the practice very well.  
I note that the receptionists have a large workload. One is not only a receptionist, but 
also a trained interpreter who often gets called into the consultations, the QOF lead, 
smoking cessation advisor and HCA (receptionist 1). Her workload has grown since 






lack of demand. Though receptionist 2 states ‘ha it was only because the GP didn’t 
want to cough up the cash.’ Receptionist 2 has been with the practice for 27 years. 
I note the loyalty to the practice in terms of length of service and ask ‘why have you 
worked here for so long? The doctor must be nice to work for.’ At this point both of 
the receptionists roll their eyes ad say that it is much more to do with the convenience 
and the practice being local to them. They also say that they would ‘feel bad for leaving 
the patients with the doctor, we keep things ticking over at least and translate if needs 
be.’ Both receptionists report how they like to get to know their patients, particularly 
seeing them have children. The patient group is reported to be stable, not transient. 
I am informed that there had previously been a partner at the practice, who left a few 
years ago for the new health centre down the road. I ask if the parting of ways was 
amicable. The receptionists say that this is never mentioned, as if the other doctor never 
worked here. This contributes to a theme of Organisational Disengagement, where 
potential organisational challenges are not discussed openly and almost ‘swept under 
the carpet’. 
The receptionists discuss the heaviness of their workload repeatedly. Currently, the 
PCT is undertaking a list cleansing exercise, whereby the receptionists are having to 
prepare 500 sets of notes of patients who hadn’t seen the GP in the preceding nine 
months to be submitted for checking. This is proving challenging with the other day-
to-day demands of the practice. I am also shown the pile of solicitors requests for 
patient information, some going back a five months, which are described as a struggle 






The main barrier to coping with workload is reported to be the GP calling in at least 
one receptionist into almost every appointment, mainly to help with the computer and 
the printing of prescription scripts. I observe this to be the case. I am shocked that the 
GP uses a bicycle horn to call in the receptionists. I note this to be demeaning and 
disrespectful. 
I ask what types of issues the GP has with IT. Receptionist 1 reports that the GP does 
not like change and when advised how to enter QOF data on system the GP ‘just doesn’t 
listen to me, it’s so annoying, I have told the GP so many times what to do, I give up 
now and just do it myself’. Another example given to illustrate the GP not liking change 
is that the receptionists have often suggested the upstairs rooms are rented out for extra 
income, but this is not welcomed by the GP, who ‘likes being a single-hander and 
doesn’t like anyone interfering apparently’. 
Receptionist 2 says that they often have to manage patients who keep returning to see 
the GP at reception. I ask if this is to do with the rapport and trust the patients have 
built up towards the GP. The receptionist answers by saying ‘well they often go to A&E 
to seek a second opinion after the GP has seen them.’ I am slightly perturbed when an 
example is given of a mother coming in five times to see the GP in five weeks worried 
about her child. The GP is reported by the receptionists as telling the mother that if she 
comes back again, they will have to treat her head. This further contributes to the theme 
of Organisational Disengagement, in the sense of the GP seemingly failing to engage 
with the most basic service that his practice is meant to provide – clinical care to its 
patients. 
Receptionist 1 states that she is considering of studying medicine as she has built up so 






Staff Resentment that perhaps the GP is viewed by receptionist 1 as not having the 
skillset required to be rewarded with a position of professional power. I do note down 
that this receptionist often gives patients clinical advice over the phone, regarding their 
symptoms and medication. This is not the GP’s advice read out over the phone, but her 
own advice. With my very limited medical knowledge, I am aware that some of the 
advice is somewhat dubious. For instance, she refers for blood tests without acting on 
the advice of the GP and tells patients over the ‘phone to attend A&E instead of booking 
an emergency appointment with the GP. The receptionist often talks to the patients over 
the phone in her native language, which removes any transparency from the 
conversation. On the other hand, the four occasions I witness the receptionists going 
into the doctor’s room to clarify the advice to give to a patient, I describe as ‘hard work’ 
due to the language barrier and communication issues between them and the GP. Some 
of the exchanges consist of raised voices and a sense of tension and competing agendas, 
it is unclear what those agendas are as I am unable to understand the doctor’s voice 
whilst hearing it from the reception area. 
At a later visit two weeks into the fieldwork, I observe receptionist 2 trying to get 
through some of the solicitors’ requests. I ask about the list cleansing exercise, and only 
patients with names beginning with ‘A’ have been completed. There is also a bowel 
screening campaign taking place, with letters being sent to patients reminding them to 
return their kits. The ‘phone seems to ring incessantly. Furthermore, receptionist 1 is 
working on an audit exercise for next year’s QOF. The report from the PCT inspection 
visit has not yet been returned as the inspector is now off on long term sick leave. 
Receptionist 1 is also completing an audit requested by the medicines management 






describes as the GP’s overprescribing of the supplement drink. These numerous audits 
and data collation exercises appear to place a large burden on the receptionists in terms 
of their limited resources of time and capacity to care them all out simultaneously and 
in a timely fashion. Thus, this can be conceptualised within an overarching theme of 
The Burden of Performance Capture, whereby excessive demands for performance 
information capture becoming laborious and stressful, particularly when a practice 
lacks the organisational infrastructure to undertake them efficiently. 
The doctor calls in receptionist 1 with the bicycle horn to interpret during a 
consultation. When the horn sounds, both receptionists roll their eyes, unsurprisingly 
fitting in with the overarching theme of Staff Resentment at this bizarre practice. I can 
hear every patient consultation clearly when sitting at reception, as well as the 
exchanges between receptionist 1 and the GP, which I describe in my field notes as 
‘shouty’. The second time a receptionist is called in, she comes out the room stating ‘I 
don’t know what the GP is talking about, they don’t realise I have all this to do.’ I note 
that there appears to be a power struggle between the GP and receptionist 1 and a clear 
theme of Staff Resentment caused in part for a lack of recognition of the industry with 
which they undertake their seemingly huge workloads 
Both receptionists check after each one of the doctor’s consultations if QOF data have 
been inputted. I often hear ‘yet again he hasn’t done what I told him to do’ being 
uttered. I do spot that there are lots of yellow QOF reminder boxes popping up on the 
screen any time patient records are brought up at reception, in keeping with the theme 
of The Burden of Performance Capture within an under-resourced and highly 






I note that there are rarely more than two patients waiting in the reception area, the 
doctor sees a steady stream of patients. The receptionists print prescription scripts for 
patients at the end of a consultation as the GP is reported to be unable to use the printer. 
The ‘phone is answered efficiently and no call is left to ring out. A large amount of the 
‘phone traffic is created by the booking system, whereby patients have to ring in on the 
day they want to be seen to book their appointment. A considerable amount of patients 
are asked to ‘phone back the next day if they cannot be accommodated as an 
‘emergency’. I write ‘emergency’ in inverted commas, as I see the receptionists using 
this label simply to fit in as many patients as possible into the limited clinic time 
available and I question how many of those patients have emergency presentations, but 
rather have been phoning for a number of days unable to get an appointment. 
I record that there is a pleasant buzz around the reception area and a sense of 
community. Receptionist 2 states ‘this is what I love about working here, getting to 
know the patients, providing them with good customer service, how they come in to ask 
how my grandchildren are, I think I’d really miss that if I ever left. We are a little family 
here.’ This interview excerpt does counteract the theme of Staff Resentment, whereby 
the interactions of the receptionists with the patients are constructed by them as being 
a highly rewarding and motivating part of their work. 
The doctor often stops seeing patients at 1030 in the morning to deal with paperwork. 
At around 11 the doctor leaves without uttering a word to the front desk to carry out 
home visits. Receptionist 2 says ‘I remember when the clinic used to run until 13.30, 
now the doctor finishes two hours early and still complains. The GP only sees the 
patients, we do everything else here.’ This seeming lack of interest from the GP in the 






practice and a systems-wide approach to clinical effectiveness. This can be captured 
within a theme of Organisational Disengagement. This theme is further supported by 
receptionist 1 also mentioning  that she spoke to the GP asking for an asthma and COPD 
nurse, which was ‘desperately needed’ to achieve better QOF scores. ‘The GP as usual 
did nothing towards this, always leaves things until the last minute, then blames me 
when we don’t get the points. Makes me so angry.’ Again the theme of Staff 
Resentment features highly here and appears to be fuelled by the tensions between the 
GP and receptionist 1. 
At my last day of fieldwork, I make my fourth and final direct attempt at asking the GP 
for an interview. The GP comes into the reception area and I say ‘hello’. I ask the GP 
if we could take ten minutes today so that I can ask them about their opinions of QOF. 
The GP says that they are very busy today being on their own. There hasn’t been a day 
I have recorded when them being the sole clinician this hasn’t been the case! I am 
advised to ’speak to the girls’. Then the GP says that they will speak to my former 
senior nurse former colleague about this. I emphasise again that my research is separate 
for the nurse’s work at the practice. The GP says we shall book it in for another day. I 
say that this is my last day as my (now second in the course of this thesis!) baby is due 
any time now. The GP says let’s see how today goes. The GP slips out of the surgery 
without anyone noticing at the end of his session. I therefore do not get the chance to 
ever directly interview the GP during the course of the fieldwork at the practice. This 
notable absence of the GP voice contributes further to a sense of their Organisational 
Disengagement from the practice’s operations and any external input, such as in the 
form of research in this case. 






Theme 1: Organisational Disengagement 
Theme 2: The Burden of Performance Capture 






















5.5 Case Study 5  
The Practice 
This is a specialist group practice in a suburban area of large city, with a patient list 
size of approximately 1000, operating from two purpose built sites, specifically for 
patients with substance misuse issues and typically dual diagnosis and employing 
around 25 staff members. During the fieldwork at the practice I conduct over 30 formal 
interviews. 
The Recruitment Process 
The recruitment process is straightforward, this is due to the practice being keen to 
demonstrate the quality of care it provides outside the remit of QOF. I speak to the 
Business Partner during the recruitment process who immediately explains to me that 
the practice doesn’t achieve high QOF scores due to the chaotic nature of their practice 
population, rendering chronic disease management and treatment adherence 
particularly difficult. The Business Partner mentions that standard practices would 




I arrive to the practice on day 1 and am warmly greeted at reception. The ladies at 
reception have been informed of my arrival and the purpose of my visit. I begin the day 
with a meeting with the Practice Manager, who is also the Business Partner in the 






Business Partner moves the slot of the monthly QOF Practice Meeting so that I can 
attend during my time with the team. The Business Partner messages one of the 
receptionists to do so through the practice intranet. There is an immediate response 
from the receptionist of agreement. The timetable handed to me includes a series of 
interviews with key members of staff over the week of my visit, as well as the 
opportunity to join various meetings and observe areas of the two Practice sites, and I 
feel grateful that effort has been put into the organisation, allowing me to make the 
most of my visit. This sense of a well-managed arrival suggests that managerial features 
are implemented into the day-to-day running of the practice and the theme of 
Internalised Management Discourses is one that features highly throughout this case. 
At the end of the day, I note down how well-organised and thought out the preparation 
has been for my visit. A part of me asks whether this is controlling as almost a PR 
exercise, however, the initial meeting reveals that the Business Partner is genuinely 
interested in my research, and has a rather pastoral/mentoring approach to students. I 
am given ample opportunity to talk about my work. The Business Partner also 
expresses ‘I am proud of this Practice and what we have achieved, especially when we 
deal with such a challenging population and this is a great opportunity to show off, but 
also get somebody else’s opinion about our performance’. I note that there seems to be 
a clear level of transparency in how the practice operates and a level of respect towards 
me as a healthcare professional equal is expressed both through body language and the 
desire to get me on board with the practice’s vision. It feels as if Business Partner is 
really saying, ‘we may be low QOF scorers, but this is not a stigma, we are keen to 






The Business Partner begins by giving me an overview of the team meetings, which 
she organises. There is a training session every Thursday morning, often delivered by 
outside speakers. There are management meetings for the partners which take place 
once a month in the evenings, again supporting the salience of the theme Internalised 
Management Discourses. There is group supervision for both clinical and non-clinical 
staff once a month with an experienced psychotherapist. Based on staff feedback, the 
session was opened up to non-clinical staff six months ago. Individual 
psychotherapeutic supervision has been provided to the staff since the practice opened 
over ten years ago. Every week, there is also a clinical meeting, where patient cases are 
discussed in a team. Outside healthcare professionals, involved in the patients’ care, 
are invited to these meetings. Having worked in the field of mental health in the past, I 
note down the parallels here with multi-disciplinary working in mental health services 
and how the primary care practice recreated those models. When I raise this with the 
Business Partner, the Business Partner says ‘to an extent, and a number of our specialist 
nurses have a mental health background, however, we tend to review our meetings and 
activities regularly based on staff feedback and what works best for our patients’. This 
feedback, along with general feedback about the running of the practice, is gathered 
through anonymised forms, at meetings, informally and at appraisals. There is a 
comments box for patients at reception. 
At this first meeting, we then briefly discuss the patient population. Around 75% of 
patients are male. Initially, when the practice first opened the majority of patients were 
aged 25-35, but this has since shifted as they have a relatively stable patient population 
due to prescribing methadone. The practice, alongside the PCT, has designed QOF 2, 






designed to run alongside QOF and fit the needs of their patient population more 
closely. They had another version of QOF 2 previously, which was designed to reward 
certain aspects of setting up the practice, when it was first opening. Again, it becomes 
clear to me as researcher the extent to which the theme of Internalised Management 
Discourses is so closely illustrative of this practice. 
After this discussion, I am then shown around the building, given various door codes 
so I can move around freely, introduced to staff and shown fire exits. Again, the whole 
morning feels very organised and I feel welcomed. Some of the staff voice worries that 
they won’t know the answers to the questions I ask. There is a sense of power 
discrepancy in this statement, and seeing me as an authority figure. I try to reassure the 
staff that the questions are rather general about how the practice functions and nothing 
too personal. I jot down a number of times the words ‘welcoming’, ‘warm’ and ‘open’. 
The Business Partner then finds the counselling room, which is empty, in order to 
proceed with our interview. I note down that I find the Business Partner deeply 
passionate about her job and insightful. Indeed, it is a rarity for a general practice to 
have a business partner within it. The title itself appears to be taken from commercial 
public sector language and supports the theme of Internalised Management 
Discourses, which, according to the literature review, are firmly rooted within New 
Public Management – the introduction of private sector principles into the public sector. 
Some of the key excerpts from my interview with the Business Partner suggest a well-
supported practice team motivated by a patient-centred ethos, underpinned through 






‘I love my job. I really see myself as being able to make a difference to the lives of these 
patients. Whilst, I don’t directly treat them, I try to provide an oversight to the 
processes within the practice. I am constantly trying to make things better and easier 
to that we can deliver a service that really benefits our patients.’ 
‘QOF is just one small element of all the work that we do here. Yes, we are unlikely to 
ever achieve top QOF scores, but when QOF came out we saw it as an ideal way to 
prompt us to attend to the patients’ physical health, when that tended to get side-lined 
by mental health problems and addiction. Rightly so of course, but nonetheless QOF 
has really helped us to maintain an organised approach to chronic disease review for 
instance.’  
‘We are used to recording data and filling forms for our patients. In fact, QOF is 
actually not as labour intensive as some of the bureaucratic things we have to do. 
That’s why clinicians here has nominated admin time and we have admin staff that get 
through a hell of a lot of work to keep things running smoothly.’ 
‘I want my team to above all feel supported by one another. I don’t like a hierarchical 
way of working, I want the partners here to be approachable. At the end of the day 
each one of our roles has its own challenges, particularly due to the type of practice 
this is. And that’ why we have supervision too, to make sure that we are not carrying a 
burden when we don’t have to.’ (BM Int. 1). 
Post the interview, I go down to the reception area, where I am greeted by friendly 
receptionists who are interested in my research and where I am from and so on. I don’t 
sense any suspicion or defensiveness, rather a genuine interest. One of the Specialist 






appointments system, however, will see patients outside of a specific time slot, as long 
as they turn up on the day of their appointment. They always have one clinician seeing 
walk-ins and this is to build trust and increase engagement. I say that I will sit in the 
patient waiting area, which is met with cries of ‘are you sure?’ from the receptionists 
several times and ‘wouldn’t you rather sit away in the reception area?’ Then I am 
wished ‘good luck’! 
The waiting area is peaceful with only five patients coming and going within half an 
hour. It is a large area with a pop radio channel being played in the background. There 
is a range of leaflets displayed, including posters about health, mental health, drugs and 
alcohol. There is also a poster advertising an allotment owned by the practice asking 
for patient volunteers. There is also information about the service user involvement 
group at the practice (I note the mental health service jargon of ‘service user’, rather 
than the GP language of ‘patient participation’). The group holds various activities, 
including paint-balling, a basic English course, peer-mentoring course, drugs 
awareness etc. The vision statement of the group is clearly displayed and reads: 
‘to help change and support ourselves and others, through building confidence, and to 
make better services relating to drugs, alcohol and health.’ 
The suggestions box which the Business Partner referred to at our meeting earlier, is 
clearly displayed in the reception area. I get a sense that large efforts are made to 
include the patient voice in the organisation of the practice. 
There are three receptionists on duty, who give an impression of well-coordinated 
industry, interspersed with light gossip and laughter. There is a children’s play area and 






The appointments are displayed on a large screen in the waiting area, alongside 
information messages such as ‘do not consume alcohol in the waiting area’, although 
two cans of lager are clearly visible on the leaflet table. Another message displays 
details of how to access education and employment support services. A patient comes 
in to show his new-born daughter to the receptionists, who respond with coos and 
enthusiastic cries of congratulations. I note that there is a clear sense of community 
here for what is a relatively large practice. 
 
Ongoing Fieldwork Findings 
I begin the day with interviewing the Medical Administrator of the practice. Once I 
finish recording, she says to me ‘I would like you to know that I had a really bad time 
in my previous workplaces and coming here really saved me.’ This suggests that the 
practice has an intrinsic element of support between the staff and indicates the thematic 
salience of Supportive Working Practices. 
My subsequent interview with the Specialist Nurse, and also Partner at the practice, 
confirms this. The Nurse says ‘everyone works so well here. There is great 
management, so roles are clear, but they are also adapted if needed, to make sure that 
we support one another.’ (Specialist Nurse Int. 1). 
Furthermore, there is a strong element of clinical supervision within the practice, taken 
very much for the field of mental health services. Indeed, the Nurse explains that: ‘We 
have one to one clinical supervision once a month and on tap so there’s always help 
available, along with numerous professional meetings, so we know that there is always 






dealing with quite unique cases. Having the input of others, along with clinical 
colleagues from other disciplines, we can have a more rounded approach and make 
sure the patient gets the best care possible.’ (Specialist Nurse Int. 1). 
In line with this, I had noted previously that there is a scheme within the practice 
allowing receptionists to sit in patient consultations to get an idea of the interventions 
presently provided by the practice for specific patient groups. The receptionists tell me 
that this is also so they get a better idea of the workload and working practices of the 
clinicians. Similarly, clinicians and partners have also undertaken reception tasks and 
shadowing to build their awareness of work being conducted ‘front of house’. These 
empathy and understanding building shadowing practices also extend to wider services 
within the patient pathway. For example, I am told that a couple of GPs and 
receptionists have shadowed the pharmacist at the local rehabilitation centre. It is 
reported that this particular pharmacist is very much liked by the patients for giving 
them leeway if they are ever late for their methadone dose, instead of requesting they 
go through the frustration of having to be issued with another prescription. I note down 
that not only does the practice build empathy and role awareness through shadowing to 
build greater team cohesiveness, but also extends this understanding to other services 
along the patient pathway. There is a particular appreciation of patient-centred care 
within the practice, at all levels of the organisation. 
A number of further successful and patient-centric working practices are revealed in 
the course of the interview: ‘We hold longer consultations here, the sheer complexity 
of the patients that we treat here and the amount of information we have to gather and 
record, of which QOF is just a small part, can’t be squeezed into a five minute 






The theme of effective, yet patient centred care continues throughout the interview: 
‘We do have a young practice population so acute problems do tend to be managed in 
house. So we do at times practice a more acute medicine here. Our patients also trust 
us and often do not want to go to hospital. We sometimes do tend to see patients with 
their families. So we will see our patients’ children, who will be seen within half an 
hour, unlike in normal general practice when you are usually left waiting if acutely ill, 
that’s if you can even get an appointment and then you end up with a referral to A&E 
anyway. We do our best to manage our patients here to reduce their frustration and 
also prevent them from using A&E unnecessarily.’ (Specialist Nurse Int. 1). 
Within this person-centred approach, there appears to be a strong element of empathy 
and localism, along with a dedication to one’s work: 
‘For myself it’s that I am a local person, this is my town and this practice is not far 
from where I was born and brought up. I can see myself in many people that come here 
and by being ten fifteen years older than them I am aware that these problems weren’t 
just around and I feel a lot of empathy towards these people as I feel that that could 
have been me had I been born just a few years later. And people can change, no one is 
a lost cause.’ (Specialist Nurse Int. 1). 
And: 
‘The partnership was offered to me by (another GP partner) when they were planning 
to open the practice. A need was recognised within the PCT for specialist support for 
this population, so I was approached on the basis of my mental health nursing 
experience. And as someone with a lot of passion for this work, there was no way I was 






An excerpt from an interview carried out with one of the GP partners echoes this need-
focused approach closely: 
‘I have always been drawn to working with vulnerable populations, have always found 
this so much more rewarding that typical general practice. Had I not had the 
opportunity to establish a practice such as this, I may have well considered working as 
a prison GP or another role related to mental health perhaps. It’s just so rewarding 
knowing that you have the resources to offer help to those who have otherwise been let 
down throughout their lives.’ (GP 2 Int. 3). 
During the course of the fieldwork at the practice, I tried to get a sense of whether 
bureaucracy had encroached on their ability to deliver person-centred care. However, 
this did not appear to be the case. Rather, QOF was seen as a welcome addition to the 
range of tools used within the practice to improve the health of their patients, and 
participants seemed to embrace management discourses keenly: 
‘I have ten sessions a week of which one is dedicated to meetings, two to admin and the 
rest to clinical work. My admin sessions do tend to be completely dominated by QOF 
[laughs] and LES’ and DES’. But I do get the need for these things. I do have an interest 
in the new consortia and getting involved with PCT initiatives and hope to get involved 
in commissioning as I have an interest in strategic stuff. It is outside my comfort zone, 
so I am interested in what makes the cogs turn and the politics behind it. At the moment 
it is all the usual suspects putting themselves forward for these positions and I am 
hoping that I won’t be overshadowed by them and will have a chance to get involved.’ 






Furthermore, an adjunct to QOF to run in parallel with it, called QOF 2, has been 
developed with the PCT as a recognition that QOF did not best fit the needs of the 
practice’s population. ‘QOF 2 is a way to make sure that the targets we are working 
towards are tailored closely to our patients. Otherwise, it would be short-sighted to 
focus our energies and resources in areas that didn’t directly benefit our patients’ 
(Business Partner Int. 3) and ‘I think QOF2 was created because the PCT had listened 
to us and realised that we would be struggling to get points on the actual QOF.’ 
(Specialist Nurse Int. 2). Here the creation of QOF 2 supports theme of Strong Patient-
Centred Ethos, whereby QOF is adapted, tailored and utilised within the framework 
of person-centredness and recognising the unique needs of the practice’s patient 
population. 
After the interview, I continue to observe the reception area, whilst helping out with 
some electronic filing. The Clinical Support Worker is developing posters for an 
alcohol awareness week and is asking for the opinion of the receptionists. There is a 
sense of community with eggs from a colleague’s farm being sold at reception. 
Later on, whilst I sit in the staff room on my lunchbreak, the staff are very friendly and 
each one to enter the room engages in small talk with me. There also doesn’t appear to 
be any power asymmetry between the administrative staff and GP partner who enters 
the staff room and washes their tea mug and makes jokes with the rest of the team. I 
note that I would have trouble identifying any hierarchies within the team had I not 
been aware of their job titles. This is clearly in keeping with the theme of Supportive 
Working Practices and an ethos of team cohesion and egalitarianism. 
The practice operates from two sites, to allow ease of access for patients. Patients can 






demand (though this is flexible) and staff are rotated to man reception and work 
sessions there.  
I note that staff are very helpful and things get done quickly. For instance, just after I 
interviewed the Clinical Support Worker, they called the IT Officer to log me onto the 
PC whilst I was waiting for my next interview. The IT Officer appeared straightaway 
and resolved the issue immediately. The staff are also aware of when their interviews 
are and take a proactive engaged approach and phone reception to locate me before the 
interview is about to take place. 
The staff intranet holds all the clinical and organisational policies and protocols for the 
practice which are regularly reviewed and updated. All staff are aware of this, have 
access to it, and refer to regularly and actively using this information for guidance. I 
have a look at some of these policies and am impressed at how comprehensive, easy to 
read and accessible they are. I note that much time and effort is put into maintaining 
this database of guidance, of which the Business Partner is in charge. However, the 
staff mention that the policies are regularly circulated and they too have an input into 
their content and presentation. They say that they are at times faced with unique 
incidents, for instance ones consisting of violence and aggression from patients, and 
procedures are regularly updated drawing from the learning from those incidents, 
which is usually discussed formally at staff meetings, to enable them to deal with 
similar situations in the future in line with practice policy. This adaptive approach is 
highlighted by a number of excerpts from interviews with GP partners:  
‘We try to do our best to work around the patients. This helps them engage with us. We 






appointment. That’s why we often adapt our day to fit our patients and make sure that 
they get seen and treated.’ (GP 1 Int. 2). 
The theme of Supportive Working Practices comes across strongly here: 
‘Yes, we all work quite well together. I think that over the years we have tried so hard 
to engender a sense of understanding around how crucial each cog in the wheel is. I 
couldn’t do my job without the receptionists, the nurses. Goodness know I don’t have 
the management mind needed to do the work our (Business Partner) does.’ (GP 1 Int. 
3) 
‘We really value everyone’s input here, there are some great ideas and rarely do they 
come from the doctors. We can be quite fixed in our ways! That’s why the 
multidisciplinary meetings and various training we do give us a clearer view of what 
happens to the patient along the various pathways, and means we don’t work in 
isolation, which wouldn’t be beneficial to the patient or the practice for that matter.’ 
(GP 2 Int. 3). 
I attend a QOF and SLA (Service Level Agreement) meeting which is held at the 
practice every four weeks for two hours. Having attended similar meetings in the past 
which are usually highly bureaucratic and dry, I am struck by how skilfully patient-
centred this meeting is. Low and high QOF scores in various domains are discussed in 
the context of each patient. Possible explanations for the scores are given and 
interventions constructed from interactive multidisciplinary team feedback. The 
motivation behind this meeting appears to be solely the patient’s wellbeing rather than 
the achievement of high QOF scores. The staff seem highly engaged in the meeting, 






involved in the patient’s care, for instance dieticians and social workers. This again 
contributes to the overarching theme of Strong Patient-Centred Ethos. 
 
The Goodbye 
The team gather at reception at the end of my visit to say ‘goodbye’, with representation 
from junior and senior administrative and clinical staff, again suggesting a team 
cohesiveness with a horizontal task ethos. In the continued supportive spirit of the 
practice, I am given a card and chocolates, along with a gift for my yet to be born baby. 
At the end of the practice visit, I make the following note to myself: ‘going home feeling 
inspired by the cohesiveness and spirit of the team and the good work they do.’ 
The findings of this case can therefore be summarised through the following themes: 
Theme 1: Internalised Management Discourses 
Theme 2:  Strong Patient-Centred Ethos 












5.6 The Overarching Case 
The overarching themes of the study are presented here. Data have been synthesised 
and brought together under the umbrellas of the most salient themes common all 
participating practices. These are as follows: 
 
5.6.1 Theme 1: Perceptions of QOF 
As participants were asked directly about their perceptions of QOF, it is not surprising 
that this is one of the overarching themes of the study. However, what was interesting 
is that the perceptions of QOF and engagement with the framework varied across the 
practices. Case 5 saw QOF as a valuable addition to their pre-existing continuous 
quality improvement methodology. Case 2 had a relatively balanced view, though did 
perceive it to undermine notions of professional autonomy, particularly in the context 
of a challenging patient group. Case 3 had a clear dislike, verging on detestation, of the 
framework and perceived it to be a tool of surveillance, used punitively. This was 
unsurprising, as the practice was undergoing closure due to poor performance. The GP 
views within case 4 were not directly recorded, however, the input of the receptionists 
within the practice implied an engagement with it at the administrative end and a clear 
lack of participation with the framework clinically. Case 1 perceived QOF very much 
in the context of unwelcome top down monitoring and the increase of managerialisation 
resulting from it as a threat to clinical decision-making and autonomy, threatening 
values of patient-centeredness. Therefore, only one of the practices perceived QOF to 






their professional values. Overwhelmingly, the practices saw QOF as a limited lens 
through which to monitor and improve service quality.  
 
5.6.2 Theme 2: Role of Values 
Indeed, all practices studied, regularly voiced their alignment with professional values 
as drivers of their person-centred approach to care, at all layers of the organisation. The 
notable absence of the GP within Case 4 did not preclude the receptionists in this 
practice from expressing their support for patient-centeredness within their work. 
However, whilst these values were ever present in discourses around the limitations of 
QOF, the threat of managerialism, and general practice care quality, in three out of the 
four cases they did not translate into reality. Rather, values were used as rationale for 
both engaging (Case 5) and not engaging (Cases 1-4) with the framework, and as a 
smokescreen for continued poor performance. 
 
5.6.3 Theme 3: Responses to QOF Surveillance 
Three out of the five practices contextualised QOF monitoring as a tool of increasing 
government surveillance and managerial control through targets. The clinicians tended 
to be rather scathing of this climate, and saw it as further undermining their professional 
autonomy. Surveillance was also viewed in the context of increased computerisation 
and the reduction of practice performance to meaningless electronic indicators for the 
purpose of remote state control, disengaged from the day to day realities of general 
practice. However, resistance to surveillance proved difficult to sustain, with two of 






performance in light of mounting pressure from their PCTs. Notably, one practice 
which continued to resist the framework underwent closure during the course of this 
study and resistance to QOF proved futile (Case 3).  Clinically, one practice appeared 
to remain ignorant of QOF surveillance, due to a poor grasp of the framework (Case 
4). Lastly, within Case 5, the response to QOF surveillance was also thematically 
salient. QOF surveillance technologies were embraced as part of its pre-existing 
paradigm of applying evidence-based standards, templates and systematic ways of 
working to improving patient care.  
The descriptive account of the overarching themes presented here, will be analysed 
within the context of the literature in the theoretical discussion chapter which follows. 
First, a typology of the participating practices will be proposed. 
 
5.6.4 Typology of Persistent Low QOF Scorers 
To create a typology is to classify cases by certain commonalities or differences. Cases 
are grouped on the basis of attributes to create a meaningful classification. Typologies 
are therefore constructs dependent on the attributes that underpin them. These attributes 
are revealed throughout the research process and defined through empirical findings. 
Therefore, typologies are based on empirical investigations and provide meaningful 
statements about social reality. There is little systematic guidance as to how typologies 
should be constructed in social research, yet the notion of types has featured highly 
within it (Kluge, 2000). The process taken to create the typologies within this thesis is 






labels which emphasise performance have been rejected and those which encapsulate 
data have been used. 
The typology is as follows: 
Table 3: Case Typology 
Case Type 
1 Person-Centred Individualist 
2 Struggler 1 
3 Futile Resister 
4 Struggler 2 
5 Specialist Innovator 
 
The features of the typology are presented in the table below: 
Table 4: Typology Features 






Values as a 
Result of QOF 
Implementati
on of QOF 
Self-Directed 
Organisational 





Poor None No Change None 
Struggler 
 
Adequate None Failing attempt None 
Struggler 
 















Memorable types have been assigned to the practice cases, along with a clear summary 
of the qualitative assessment of the level of care they provide. To summarise the 
features of the cases further, the level of change of values as a result of QOF is 
presented. Similarly, the typology is ordered in line with the level of QOF 
implementation evident within the practice. Whether or not the practice changed 
organisationally as a result of QOF is also forms part of the typology. In sum, the 
typology summarises the type of change at practice level for the same stimulus.  
 
In the next chapter, the typology will be used to establish the findings of the thesis 
within the context of pre-existing and new theory. More broadly, the three themes 
presented in the overarching case, can be contextualised within a discussion of the 
limitations of QOF, and literature concerning professional values, managerialism & 

















6. THEORETICAL DISCUSSION 
The theoretical discussion will summarise the main findings of the study and compare 
these to pre-existing literature. Developments for existing theory will be proposed. The 
strengths and limitations of the study will be analysed and suggestions for future 
research made. 
Constructing a typology of low QOF scoring general practices has not previously been 
attempted. However, ‘archetypes’ of high performing sites in the States have been 
drawn up (Feifer et al., 2007). The authors of this study argue that the creation of 
typologies is a useful guide to understanding how practices interact with quality 
improvement. The typologies proposed by this thesis will be used throughout the 
theoretical discussion to facilitate understandings of the low QOF scoring practices and 
their responses to QOF. 
 
6.1 Limitations of QOF 
The typology proposed within the overarching case study, clearly highlights the 
shortcomings of QOF in capturing all facets of general practice quality. Two out of the 
five practices studied, from the perspective of a qualitative assessment, demonstrated 
excellent patient-centred care, which their QOF scores did not reflect. However, in 
ways that QOF can never truly capture, the remaining practices had intrinsic flaws with 
their organisational practices and knowledge of IT systems, problems with teamwork, 
and burnt-out GPs who were out of touch with recent professional guidance. They had 
evolved into chaotic organisations, unable to adapt to new practices, particularly in the 






quantitative measures and in terms of the core values described by Marshall (2009) - 
excellence as medical generalists and commitment to whole person care in practice. 
The Person-Centred Individualist practice’s single-handed GP was a pillar of their 
community, knowledgeable about their patients and their families. They spent time 
with patients during consultations and had adapted a number of organisational practices 
in response to patient feedback. This practice had a small dedicated and cohesive staff 
team, also familiar with most of their patients, which the GP claimed to want to protect 
from the burden of additional QOF workload. The framework was deemed to be largely 
meaningless according to the GP and did not facilitate capture of true quality, rather 
detracted from patient need through the imposition of bureaucratic indicators by PCT 
management. The findings for this case strongly chimed with the established discourses 
of performance monitoring undermining GP professionalism, whereby this practice’s 
lead was committed to self and peer regulation and took offence with a remote and 
intrusive regime.  
However, with an increased threat of sanctions from the PCT, this practice began a 
delayed implementation of QOF, with the GP taking a professional lead over this 
process, with both setting up the IT infrastructure and putting together various 
protocols for the practice. However, this did not signal an internalisation of the 
principles of managerialism, the discourse of the pointless and intrusive nature of QOF 
remained, with the GP citing their continued commitment to person-centred values as 
proof of their true resistance against the regime. Here, from the Foucauldian 
perspective of panopticism, QOF did not create obedient subjects with a new value 
framework, rather ones that gave a token nod to QOF in order to stave off an increase 






Therefore, this specific case clearly reinforces the previously explored dichotomy of 
patient-centred versus technology-centred care. Like quality, patient-centeredness is a 
complex and dynamic concept in itself. Certainly, there was an ethos of patient-
centeredness, revealed through a qualitative assessment of a sense of care conveyed by 
the GP to their patients within the practice that was not only talked about, but ‘felt’ by 
the participant observer. From comfortable clean surroundings and friendly sensitive 
receptionists with local knowledge, to the accessibility of the GP in the waiting area 
and bars to tie your dog to whilst at the practice, the patients were very much at the 
centre of the operations of the Person-Centred Individualist practice. There was a very 
strong sense of value-driven professionalism in this practice, which, in line with the 
principles of the Professional Standards Authority (2016), was demonstrated in how 
the doctor behaved towards others, rather than the self-serving individual focus of the 
status the role of being a doctor affords. QOF, as a measurement-based tool, cannot 
facilitate an understanding of some of these nuances of what it means to deliver quality 
care. This is in keeping with the wealth of literature reviewed in the background chapter 
(e.g. Kordowicz & Ashworth, 2013; Heath, 2009; Lester, 2008 etc.). 
In the case of the Specialist Innovator, the shortcomings of QOF as a general 
population-based tool were highlighted. This practice served a clinically specialist, 
chaotic patient population, rendering high achievement on QOF nigh on impossible. 
However, the attitude of this practice towards QOF was distinctly different from the 
Person-Centred Individualist. Here, QOF was embraced and a parallel QOF 2 was 
created with the involvement of the PCT to serve the needs of the practice population 






its patient-centred values and professional identity as a local innovator on behalf of 
vulnerable groups.  
This engagement is likely to have been influenced by the management discourses and 
principles which already featured highly within the day to day operations of the 
practice. For instance, the practice had a Business Partner, clear and flexible policies 
and procedures, numerous meetings, shadowing schemes and the like – all principles 
highly influenced private sector HR practices, and embraced in order to improve the 
organisation of the practice and delivery of patient care. This suggests that private 
sector principles which, as explored previously, are seen as being at odds with the 
public sector ethos, may in fact have a role to play in driving excellent organisational 
practices. Again, QOF was redundant in capturing quality of care in this case, which 
brings into question the alignment of QOF high performance with quality of care within 
public policy. 
However, as can be seen from the typology proposed by this thesis, the remaining three 
practices (Futile Resister and the two Strugglers) did in fact demonstrate poor quality 
care in line with their QOF scores. It can be argued, therefore, that QOF can highlight 
cases of poor performance and interventions can be designed accordingly. The 
uniqueness of these cases, however, is the extent to which they failed to implement 
QOF in any tangible form over a number of years, seemingly remaining immune to 
PCT interventions to improve their performance. Eventually, of course, this was 







Interestingly, these three practices, along with the Person-Centred Individualist, used 
the discourse of professional values and patient-centred care as a rationale for not fully 
engaging with QOF. This can imply, therefore, that constructs of professional values 
can be used as a smokescreen for poor performance. There is some evidence from pre-
existing ethnographic research that claims of professional clinical judgement are often 
used to normalise breaking rules (Dixon-Woods, 2010). To take this further, this 
process of legitimisation may not necessarily result in better more patient-centred care, 
but rather act as an excuse for not engaging with QOF. 
However, this wasn’t the case for the Person-Centred Individualist practice, where the 
single-handed GP appeared to be the embodiment of altruistic community-driven 
professionalism. The apparent on the surface similarities between the cases, be it as 
defined through QOF performance or value discourses, can detract from the day to day 
reality of the care the practices deliver. These findings therefore support a more 
qualitatively-driven approach to performance management in general practice, one 
which can uncover some of these subtle nuances and motivations of practices 
seemingly disengaged with quality improvement initiatives.  
Interestingly, in all of the cases studied as part of this thesis, holding values of patient-
centeredness was cited as the rationale for why the practices chose to reject QOF or 
underperformed on it. Though some practices demonstrated person-centred values in 
practice (Person-Centred Individualist, Specialist Innovator), others struggled to bridge 
the gap between their own rhetoric and reality of on-the ground care delivery within 
their practices (Futile Resister, Struggler 2). They perceived QOF to be at odds with 
the professional value of patient-centeredness that they held. It is, therefore, appropriate 






It appears that the Specialist Innovator in particular had employed a number of 
strategies to sustain person-centred care in the face of a policy and management culture 
of standardisation. Indeed, there was clear a culture within the practice of peer-support, 
providing the basis of local, creative approaches to delivering excellent care. The 
earlier literature review suggests that the opportunity for person-centredness may too 
often be undermined by the demands of externally mandated ‘quality’ programmes 
experienced as bureaucratic exercises which fail to acknowledge the complexities of 
delivering care within a patient-centred context and the intricate professional 
judgements this entails. Yet, within this practice the ‘bureaucratic’ apparatus was seen 
as aiding multi-faceted care excellence within individual patient consultations. 
However, the value of patient-centeredness, overwhelmingly recurrent within the 
thesis’ themes across the cases, has undergone some criticism. Stemming from 
Rogerian (1951) principles of person-centred therapy, the term ‘patient-centred’ 
initially appeared in the magazine “Future General Practitioner” and was presented as 
a holistic approach to care, with the patient in their totality, at the centre of decisions 
regarding their treatment (Howie et al., 2014). However, over time the notion of 
patient-centeredness became very much viewed as an inherent part of general practice, 
and this may have harmed the developed of partnership working between primary and 
secondary care sectors, with hospital doctors not being viewed as ‘people’ doctors. In 
addition, although patient-centred care is cited as a necessity in achieving high quality 
care, this drive may in itself prove problematic. It has been argued that true engagement 
with patients is tough, demanding work and hard to sustain in day-to-day practice 






Unlike QOF indicators, patient-centredness is difficult to define. Mead and Bower 
(2000) argued that whilst patient-centred care is increasingly regarded as imperative to 
high quality care, how it is defined and measured in terms of process and efficacy 
remains unclear. Yet, despite some of the ambiguities surrounding the definition of 
patient-centred care identified by Mead and Bower, some randomised controlled trials 
have been carried out (e.g. Kinmonth et al., 1998; Chenoweth, 2014), particularly 
around chronic disease management, comparing the effectiveness of patient-centred 
care with its non-patient-centred counterpart. The findings of these studies generally 
support the inclusion of person-centred dimensions within clinical care, suggesting that 
the concept can in fact be defined and operationalised within practice. 
Additionally, Mead and Bower propose that there are a number of dimensions to the 
concept – the biopsychosocial perspective, 'patient-as-person', sharing power and 
responsibility, therapeutic alliance, and 'doctor-as-person’. The practices studied 
proposed similar notions of person-centredness, whereby they described themselves as 
striving to provide the best care based on their individual patients’ needs and this was 
perceived by them as stemming from a long-term relationship with their patients and 
the wider community. Yet, there remains a question mark over how realistic it is to 
provide patient-centred care at all times. There is, of course, a power asymmetry 
between the doctor and patient in terms of knowledge and usually physical 
vulnerability at the point of consultation. For the doctor to consider all elements – 
popularly coined ‘biopsychosocial’ factors to capture the multifaceted nature of human 
behaviours - that contribute to the person who sits before them, and within the time-
constraints of a five minute consultation, is unlikely to be feasible. Whilst the 






the patient also expects the general practitioner to make quick and appropriate decisions 
regarding their care, drawing on their own professional knowledge and experience 
(Wen & Tucker, 2015). 
Howie and colleagues (2004) analyse some of the assumptions about core general 
practice values, including patient-centred care. ‘Patient-centeredness’ is presented as a 
multidimensional concept in their paper and is primarily concerned with the 
involvement of patients in their care. Yet, the paper also highlights whether the push 
for patient-centeredness may, paradoxically, ignore the very desires of the patients 
themselves. They cite other authors who have demonstrated that certain groups of 
patients, such as the elderly and more seriously ill, prefer clinician led care (McKinstry, 
2000; Savage & Armstrong, 1990). Naturally, a truly patient-centred approach would 
take account of these desires also, and not blindly push for patient involvement. Howie 
and colleagues conclude that the concept is hard to define, measure and deliver. This 
also led them to state, as discussed in the background chapters, that general practice 
quality in itself is a challenging construct.  
Indeed, the typology presented within this thesis is the researcher’s data-driven, but 
nonetheless personal and socially constructed (in keeping with the epistemological 
standpoint of this thesis), take on the level of quality offered by the practices studied - 
quality that in some cases QOF has not been able to capture, categorising two excellent 
practices as ‘poor-performers’. On the other hand, it could be argued, that QOF rightly 
highlighted the low performance of the practices in three out of the five cases. 
Nonetheless, only a qualitative study of this sort would elucidate the themes at play 






managerialist frameworks, in ways that QOF cannot. The next section of the discussion 
will focus on these very themes. 
 
6.2 Professional Values, Managerialism & Self-Regulation 
In line with Pettigrew’s ideas (1992), the Specialist Innovator Practice was receptive to 
QOF. Pettigrew argued that mixed teams which combine managerial as well as clinical 
and nursing staff, as in the case of the Specialist Practice, are more effective in 
progressing strategic change. The practice, therefore, had already embraced certain 
managerialist discourses, and therefore embraced QOF within its pre-existing 
paradigm. Notably, all of the other practices participating in this study, did not have a 
practice manager. It could be argued that an effective management infrastructure is 
required to perform well on QOF, particularly in light of the bureaucratic and 
administrative demands it makes on the practice. 
However, the other four participating practices all demonstrated the 
professionalism/managerialism tensions that abound in the literature reviewed in 
earlier chapters. Notably, there was a clear element of effective self-regulation within 
the Person-Centred individualist practice, outside of the bounds of managerialist 
frameworks, through regular meetings with peers within the locality, which likely 
contributed to the delivery of excellent care. Formal regulation such as QOF may well 
undermine subtle relationship-based self-regulation, which may be particularly 
dangerous in the field of risk management (Fischer & Ferlie, 2013), where more 
informal systems of regulation are crucial. The theme of self-regulation and reactions 






All of the practices were proud of their ability to self-regulate, with varied 
consequences. It appears that those who self-regulated, but along with seeking external 
professional regulation and guidance from colleagues and professional bodies (i.e. The 
Person-Centred Individualist – Case 1 and the Specialist Innovator – Case 5) provided 
excellent care.  In addition, the Specialist Innovator, embraced transparency, whereas 
the Person-Centred Individualist practice remained resistant to it until PCT intervention 
meant that adaptation had to take place.  The remaining poor performing practices were 
very much isolated from the normative relationship-based input of other professionals, 
which was no doubt enhanced by their single-handed status, and language barriers in 
two out of the three – the Strugglers.  
To place this in the context of a Foucauldian theoretical framework, one can relate the 
concept of professional relationship-based regulation to Foucault’s (2005 & 2010) 
ethics-oriented mode of governing the self. Foucault explored notions of formative and 
perverse notions of governmentality. Formative governmentality encapsulates 
subjective relational self-regulation. On the other hand, introducing a top-down 
surveillance-based framework for performance, leads to a perverse governmentality 
with unintended consequences. Parallels can be drawn here with high QOF 
performance being criticised for becoming an end to itself, rather than a means to an 
end (Heath et al., 2009). 
In this vein, the two excellently performing practices studied (The Person-Centred 
Individualist and The Specialist Innovator) held almost a meta-knowledge of the 
‘smoke and mirrors’ nature of a preoccupation of displaying good conduct through 
QOF.  They claimed that there is no point to either implementing (in the case of The 






Innovator) of QOF, as such organisational behaviour wouldn’t directly benefit patient 
care or uphold their professional values. Parallels can be drawn with the work of 
Roberts (2009), who argues that an excessive concern with producing displays of high 
performance distorts social practices detrimentally and restricts self-knowledge.  
The findings of this study also suggest that QOF did not alter the professional values 
of person-centred care held by the practice, regardless of whether those values were 
enacted in reality and went beyond smokescreen rhetoric. However, some 
commentators have noted that there are many complex layers to the relationship 
between managerialist modes and the medical profession. To present this relationship 
purely as a dichotomy is short-sighted. Indeed, the Specialist Innovator practice had 
established a pragmatic collaboration with the PCT, whereby they had created their 
own version of QOF to fit the practice’s own organisational paradigm. This allowed 
the practice to preserve their professional identity whilst working within the remits of 
new organisational modes (Reay & Hinings, 2009). Others have argued that the clear-
cut division between managers and clinicians is a fallacy, with clinicians increasingly 
appropriating managerial discourse into their work (Doolin, 2002).  
Indeed, in the case of the Specialist Innovator, their organisational model of clinical 
and non-clinical partners, seemed to be an indication of a hybridised way of working 
and a reflection of embracing management to ensure the effective growth of the 
practice. Within the Person-Centred Individualist practice, the single-handed GP was 
actively involved in a number of advisory and local Health Trust management bodies, 
again taking on board elements of leadership, but ones that chimed the GP’s 
professional values. It is of interest that the two practices which were qualitatively 






discourses, but in ways which fitted their own values of person-centred care. On the 
other hand, the Futile Resister and the Strugglers appeared to lack the tools and 
communication skills to meaningfully interact with and, to some extent, understand 
managerialist mandates. 
It can be proposed therefore, that top-down, remote approaches to engaging with 
consistently low QOF scoring GP practices with information technology performance 
management tools are unlikely to be successful without a recognition of values and 
local demand. ‘Buy in’ is likely to be achieved by recognising and embedding GPs’ 
professional values into the design and implementation of quality improvement 
frameworks. Additionally, local understanding of the practice is essential, as in the case 
of the local QOF version developed with the Specialist Innovator, and remote 
management is likely to isolate the practitioner.  
In contrast to some assumptions made in the background and literature review chapter, 
practices did not discuss financial motivators for engaging with QOF and a theme of 
financial incentives did not emerge from the data. Rather, the theme of patient-centred 
care within the scope of professional values remained salient throughout the study. Yet, 
it is also worth noting that as GP practices operate as small businesses, an outright 
rejection of financial gain over patient-centred care is thus an oversimplification. And 
indeed in order to survive and keep providing quality services to their patients, a GP 
practice must retain an income stream, which requires some conformity with state 
administration. Therefore, it would be of interest to explore how the low QOF scoring 
practices rationalise these conflicting values in the face of state bureaucracy.  
Indeed, the conflicts between normative values and forms of order and power have 






discussion will now focus on responses to QOF surveillance and the extent to which 
these may be mediated by pre-existing value paradigms within consistently ‘poor’ 
performing general practices. 
 
6.3 Responses to QOF and Surveillance 
Within the thesis’ background chapters, Checkland and Harrison’s (2010) qualitative 
study of the impact of QOF on practice organisation and service delivery was 
discussed. This discussion can now be expanded by drawing on the findings of the 
thesis. Unlike the participants of Checkland and Harrison’s study, four out of the five 
of the case studies had failed to implement the changes in infrastructure required to 
perform successfully on QOF. In some of the studied practices (Futile Resister and the 
Strugglers), there appeared to be an inability stemming from lack of management skills 
and a lack of technological knowledge, to adapt roles and processes to facilitate QOF. 
Interestingly, this lack of competency also reflected the lack of service and 
organisational quality within the practices.  
However, it is not so much that QOF captured the poor performance, rather it was the 
inability to implement a QOF reporting process which led to the practice’s low scores. 
The Specialist Innovator already had a strong IT infrastructure in place, a large team, 
and effective management, to which QOF, in the words of the practice’s business 
partner, ‘added an additional string to our bow’. With numerous tools in place in the 
practice designed to support holistic care of patients with mental health problems (e.g. 
the care planning approach), QOF was not only readily implemented, but also adapted 






‘recording data and form filling’ within the practice, QOF was not seen as labour 
intensive. Parallels can be drawn with the King’s Fund Report (2011) which suggested 
that a pre-existing IT infrastructure plays a part in QOF acceptance.  
Hence, QOF did not undermine the professional and managerial knowledge of the 
practice, and in some respects similarities can be drawn with Checkland and Harrison’s 
theme of general practices undergoing ‘no change’ and instead fitting QOF around 
current performance. Again, this raises questions whether engagement with QOF itself 
improves performance, or is it rather a ‘pay for reporting’ pre-existing performance 
scheme (Lester, 2008).  
Lastly, the Person-Centred Individualist practice did begin to implement the 
infrastructure required to improve QOF performance through increased reporting and 
computerisation. This finding is in line with Checkland and Harrison’s study, which 
argues that QOF implementation goes hand in hand with an improved technological 
and organisational infrastructure. Yet, contrary to Checkland and Harrison’s paper, 
which suggests that QOF becomes readily ingrained alongside practice re-organisation, 
dissent can be found within the cohort of England’s ‘poorest’ performing general 
practices. Simply through the reluctance of the Person-Centred Individualist, the 
improvement of the organisational infrastructure was delayed, as was the 
implementation of QOF.  
Most importantly, Checkland and Harrison conclude that general practices offer little 
resistance to surveillance, which is becoming increasingly normalised and accepted as 
a useful tool for quality capture and improvement. However, the findings of this thesis 






critical of increased monitoring and saw it as an undesirable threat to their professional 
autonomy. In fact, their resistance or reluctance to engage with the scheme was 
rationalised by the narrative of top down surveillance undermining patient-centred 
care. It clear here, that the study of the uniqueness of outliers has enabled a shift in 
understanding towards there being a range of response of general practices to QOF. 
On the other hand, the Specialist Innovator, a large practice with a highly influential 
in-house arm of management, had already internalised managerialist discourses as part 
of its professional identity. This lent itself well to the incorporation of QOF into their 
existing organisational and value paradigm. Thus, the findings of the thesis suggest that 
the cautionary concepts reviewed at the start of the thesis regarding the effects of top 
down surveillance on professional values taken from the seminal works of Freidson 
and Foucault should continue to be paid heed in today’s regulatory climate. 
However, the thesis findings do challenge the Foucauldian notion that surveillance 
creates obedient subjects with new self-identities. Despite mixed interactions with 
QOF, none of the practices studied in this thesis developed new self-defined identities 
on the basis of QOF. Instead, they either maintained effective self-regulation, or re-
emphasised their professional value-based identities as rationale for resisting the 
framework. Externally, the identity of the futile resister did change significantly, as the 
practice underwent closure, in part as a sanction for its poor QOF performance. It could 
be argued that the typology in itself has created new identities for the practices in the 
form of fixed labels. However, the typology was seen as a method of capturing pre-
existing and, at times, self-defined facets of a practice within a concise classification, 






In their study of responses to the system of ‘Choose and Book’, Greenhalgh and 
colleagues (2014) concluded that resistance of clinical professionals is an intricate 
concept, encompassing a number of complex facets. Therefore, purely behavioural 
interventions (of which QOF is one, as explained earlier in the thesis) are unlikely to 
achieve clinician engagement with the introduction of a top-down quality improvement 
scheme.  
The findings of this thesis suggest that the facets which play a significant part in GP 
resistance to such schemes are their deeply entrenched professional values. In a similar 
vein, Greenhalgh and colleagues’ study also supports the importance of an awareness 
of those values as informing the clinician’s notions of quality over potentially over-
simplistic numerical labels. The typology introduced above and which stemmed from 
the overarching case study, demonstrates the shortcomings in labelling low QOF 
scorers purely as ‘poor performers’. The typology presents a number of features which 
fall outside of the over-simplistic label of ‘poor-performer’.  
However, according to McDonald (2014), it should be noted that models of responses 
to quality improvement initiatives tend to assume rationality. Whilst a clear rational 
and thought out approach to the implementation of QOF was evident in two out of the 
five cases (Specialist Innovator and Person-Centred Individualist), the other three 
practices (Futile Resister and the Strugglers) remained rather chaotic in their response 
to QOF, torn between and sporadically reactive to, if at all, the day to day organisational 
demands of their practice.  
The concept of rationality can be linked to the role of professionalism in influencing 






collective rational professional response. Of course, notions of the collective voice tend 
to be products of the study of the majority. Therefore, it is hoped that this study was 
able to contribute to a greater understanding of the nature of some of the dynamics 
which may affect responses to QOF amongst low scorers and thus ‘non-rationality’ 
within a professional group.  
A further argument posed by McDonald concerns the need to understand ‘logics’ which 
guide values and behaviours and therefore responses to QOF. McDonald’s concept of 
‘logics’ easily lends itself to the professional/managerial dichotomy reinforced by the 
findings of the thesis. McDonald notes that ‘competing logics’ often co-exist. However, 
their opposing nature breeds forms of resistance to obstruct the dominance of a new 
logic. Certainly, in the case of the Futile Resister and the Person-Centred Individualist, 
the resistance towards QOF was clear, and according to the participants, was the direct 
result of the managerialist logic of QOF being at odds with the professionalism logic 
they held. Despite the same logics underpinning these practices’ resistance to QOF, 
both the quality of care they offered and resistance outcomes for the practices were 
strikingly different. The Futile Resister was a chaotic practice, failing to provide 
organised, timely patient care and lacking in sufficient resources, managerial capability 
and technological skills to adequately serve its practice population. The practice 
continued to resist the QOF regime, with only very superficial efforts made to 
demonstrate QOF implementation, used to fend off the PCT for as long as possible, 
rather than to improve the care or even more simply the recording of care for their 
patients. During the course of the fieldwork, the practice underwent closure.  
On the other hand, the Person-Centred Individualist practice’s single-handed GP self-






personalised, family-based approach to care, maintaining a status of a pillar of the 
community. This self-perception was very much aligned to the qualitative assessment 
of the practice; clearly, this practice provided a person-centred, caring approach, 
spending time with each patient and approaching their care holistically, within the 
context of local biopsychosocial knowledge. Indeed, as discussed previously, it may be 
easier to resist QOF as the sole senior figure in an organisational hierarchy, without the 
normative effects of a partnership or group (Campbell et al, 2009). Yet, as can be seen 
in the case of the Futile Resister and the Strugglers, a lack of normative influence in 
general practice can be detrimental to its performance and the quality of care it 
provides. This Person-Centred Individualist practice, however, eventually had to cave 
in to the demands of QOF surveillance. Increasing pressures from the PCT resulted in 
the QOF implementation infrastructure being put into place, notably the recruitment of 
a practice nurse and improved information technology, and the development of new 
ways of working was underway at the time of the study, nonetheless with the GP single-
hander continuing to maintain professional control over the initiative.  
However, it could be argued that the risk of closure in this otherwise excellently 
functioning practice was far less likely than in the case of the Futile Resister, not least 
because of its rural location far from alternative service provision, and the near to 
irreplaceable nature of the established local care it delivers. It appears that the 
organisational impact of QOF as described in the background chapters, would not be 
too dissimilar within the Person-Centred Individualist practice, albeit with some delay, 
due to initial resistance to the scheme, driven by the logic of professionalism. Yet, this 
thesis points to the need for an understanding beneath the layer of competing logics, in 






monitoring and quality improvement initiatives. In line with McDonald, more nuanced 
responses to managerial reforms within general practice need to be accommodated. 
Next, the implications for practice and future outlook will be appraised. 
 
6.4 Implications for Practice & Future Outlook 
Naturally, ‘quality’ will remain a complex problem and to drive its improvement data 
have to be ‘meaningful, accepted and acted on’ (Howe, Mathers & Steel, 2012). This 
thesis demonstrates that what lies at the core of high quality care is greater than that 
which can be captured through measurable indicators (Kordowicz & Ashworth, 2013). 
This is clearly one of the challenges for the new CCGs and NHS England. While it is 
claimed that by placing the GP at the centre of local decision making we can work 
towards true quality, it is simultaneously of great importance that a reductionist 
approach, despite easily lending itself to policy creation, does not overshadow the 
nuanced aspects of what it means to deliver quality in general practice. 
A further consideration for practice, evidently surrounds the need for performance 
management schemes not to undermine professional values, but rather be aligned to 
them. Parallels can be drawn here with Marshall’s (2005) claim that though financial 
incentives will continue to play an important role in quality improvement, their success 
will, however, only be maximised if the impact of financial incentives appeals to the  
intrinsic motivations and values of health professionals. This no doubt holds important 
implications for practice and could inform ‘quick wins’ for those designing incentive 






should belong to the scheme’s target audience and be aligned to their professional 
values.  
Furthermore, this study supports the calls of Kordowicz & Ashworth (2013) for the 
development of qualitative quality indicators primarily focusing on excellence and 
more clearly capturing the narrative of a primary care which so often goes the extra 
mile, and beyond. However, in a climate of austerity and resource limitation, it is 
unlikely that such a scheme will materialise presently. Nonetheless, Dixit (2003), 
suggests that empirical research should not make sweeping generalisations about the 
success or failure of incentive schemes. Instead, success or failure should be related to 
specific characteristics or domains, such as multiple dimensions and observability of 
inputs and outputs. Practitioners should look at the organisation as a whole. 
Throughout the course of the research, it became apparent that some of the low scoring 
practice participants not so much felt that the indicators themselves were problematic, 
rather the intrusive nature of QOF monitoring led to tensions. This again can be linked 
to Marshall’s argument that predominantly bureaucratic quality improvement 
frameworks are less likely to sustain the motivation and engagement of clinicians. 
Therefore, ‘tick box’ type schemes should only be concerned with technical and 
tangible aspects of care (e.g. recording smoking status), rather than the more complex 
less definable features of general practice (e.g. psychosocial elements of a 
consultation). In many ways QOF already holds some of these features. General 
practitioners are actively involved in the development of QOF indicators and, broadly, 
the indicators are concerned with measurable aspects of patient care (e.g. blood 
pressure readings, HbA1c levels etc.). Perhaps, the problem lies not so much with the 






general practice quality. As the findings of this thesis have demonstrated, labelling 
practices as ‘poor performing’ purely on the basis of their QOF scores, does not present 
a complete picture of the quality of care that a practice delivers, nor the intricacies of 
where their failures in performance may lie. 
In line with Chouliaraki and Fairclough’s (1999) work on clinical/managerialist 
hybrids, the low QOF scoring participants of the study which were qualitatively 
excellent performers, balanced managerialist demands against the imperatives of 
professionalism. This was achieved by blending applicable management discourse with 
a professional one to create hybrids. However, to add to Chouliaraki and Fairclough’s 
conceptualisation, a key feature of the hybrids observed in the study within the 
Specialist Innovator Practice was that they were constructed only by taking on 
managerialist facets which did not undermine pre-existing professional values. It can 
therefore be assumed that managerialist principles are not internalised, rather they are 
adapted to fit deeply rooted professional values.  
Yet, in line with the present Conservative government’s policy zeitgeist of strengthened 
clinical leadership for quality improvement, attempts at engaging GPs with clinical 
commissioning have been mixed. A review of the literature on the subject by Miller 
and others (2015) reveals a variation in clinical engagement with commissioning 
schemes. It appears that programmes which allow clinicians to retain their professional 
autonomy were more likely to result in greater engagement. The findings of the thesis 
support that – the participants of this study valued their professional independence.  
In some of the studied cases, professional autonomy was used as a justification for not 
making positive organisational changes within their practices, or improving the level 






professional normative mechanisms, such as engagement with local guidance and 
colleagues. The Person-Centred Individualist practice’s GP valued their autonomy 
whilst playing an active role in local professional membership organisations and 
keeping abreast of clinical research and guidance to implement this into their practice.  
Furthermore, a second parallel of this study with the work of Miller and colleagues is 
that the failure of organisational programmes to engage GPs leads to disengagement. 
Indeed, in four out of the five cases a lack of buy in or capability to implement QOF 
bred a clear disengagement with and, at times, a rejection of it. Writing about 
commissioning, Miller and colleagues highlight the importance of GP engagement in 
policy mandates in order to engender change and progress. To draw on an editorial by 
Howe, Mathers and Steel (2012), which claimed that organisational approaches 
underpinning quality of care are relatively simple, but may be undermined by 
regulatory demands, the findings presented within the thesis suggests that a return to 
the intrinsic values which truly motivate primary care staff, namely providing care 
focused around patient need, will go a long way towards engaging clinicians with 
quality improvement drives. The authors call for greater GP leadership within such an 
undertaking.  
Yet, there may be a number of constraints to GP leadership being enacted in reality. 
Martin and Waring (2013) argue that creating frontline leaders as a tool for improving 
service quality can prove problematic, as leaders within the NHS are often limited in 
their ability to enact their leadership roles. The study suggests that the key constraints 
general practitioners may face in management positions are pre-existing managerial 






likely that within a climate of financial cuts and austerity, the resources may not be 
available for GP leaders to enact their leadership goals. 
Martin and Waring indicate that leadership takes a more muted form in reality, through 
alignment with pre-established managerial relationships and mandates. This finding 
can be related to clinical/managerial hybridisation explored earlier in the thesis, 
whereby clinicians seek to maintain an element of professional autonomy by accepting 
the managerial discourses best aligned to their values. Therefore, to apply this to future 
outlook, the implications for practice may be that clinical commissioning must be 
driven by clinical patient-centred, rather than managerial considerations. Though it is 
also worth noting that the push for professional values must take into account facets 
traditionally considered to exist within the remit of management, primarily 
organisational and financial considerations, in order to make appropriate service 
decisions. However, these should be seen as the tool for achieving patient-centred care, 
rather than an end in itself. 
Within the theme of perceptions of OQF, a number of participants expressed not being 
adequately recognised or rewarded for their seemingly labour intensive QOF work. In 
line with Burgess & Ratto (2003), team-based financial rewards may be preferred to 
direct payment to the GP principal. This is particularly appropriate in contexts where 
co-operation is important for the outcome of the organisation or where only aggregate 
measures of performance are available – both of contexts being relevant to QOF. So as 
not to undermine intrinsic motivation, investing the financial rewards gained from 
better performance in creating an improved working environment (e.g. new equipment 






bonuses in organisations where workers have a strong intrinsic motivation. This may 
also create greater engagement for the practice team.  
The findings of this thesis support those of O’Donnell, Jabareen and Watt (2010), who 
discovered that post the introduction of QOF, practice nurses complained about the 
dramatic increase in workload and that their financial rewards had been less than 
expected, given the financial gains for practices. The two Strugglers, had made some 
attempts at implementing QOF in their practice, however often these attempts had been 
led by the administrative team, with little managerial oversight from the GP Principal. 
These two practices notably did not have a practice manager or a practice nurse. 
Therefore, attempts to carry out QOF work, were often chaotic and sporadic, fitted in 
around more pressing demands of administrative and reception tasks. The 
infrastructure required for high QOF performance (McShane & Mitchell, 2015) had 
not been put into place and managerial tools barely utilised.  
Despite this thesis presenting a view that rather sides with professional values and 
public sector altruism over market principles, a balanced view dictates that this should 
not preclude an openness to the application of traditionally private sector principles to 
achieve improvements within the healthcare sector. For instance, strategies and tools 
taken from the rather disparate information technology and manufacturing industries 
(e.g. PRINCE2, Lean etc.) have in some cases proven to be successful in raising 
healthcare service performance (e.g. Proudlove, Moxham & Boaden, 2008). This 
chimes well with Marshall’s (2009) calls for the NHS learning from industry to 
improve its organisational performance and to explore the usefulness of transferrable 
solutions, which have reaped rewards within the business and manufacturing sectors. 






feasibility studies need to be undertaken to make sure that these solutions are applicable 
and likely to be engaged with.  
Next the strengths and limitations of this study will be analysed. 
 
6.5 Strengths and Limitations of Study 
The key strength of the study was gaining unprecedented access to persistently low 
QOF scoring practices. Prior to this study, there were no known published attempts to 
qualitatively research how these practices operate. They were considered to be largely 
unapproachable and out of reach of external parties. Furthermore, such seemingly 
disengaged general practices seemed to create a challenge for policy makers and quality 
improvement initiatives. Applying an impartial, sensitive approach to the recruitment 
process, helped to engender a sense of trust, allowing me to absorb myself in the day 
to day life of the practices studied as a participant observer for a significant period of 
time. This no doubt allowed for rich data to be gathered, helping to form an in depth 
understanding of how practices labelled as ‘poor performing’ really function.  
The thesis also revealed the shortcomings surrounding the use of QOF to judge overall 
performance and define quality of care in general practice.  An ethnographically-
informed methodology allowed for rich reflections and analysis, rooted in an 
experience of a practice and its staff, along with a ‘triangulation’ of various sources of 
qualitative data to form in depth case studies.  
The methods used within the study do not hold generalisability to the wider population, 
as is the usual case with qualitative research, as was previously unpicked within the 






depth study of them naturally resulting in much variation. To argue generalisability 
would also detract from the aim of qualitative research, which is to elucidate the 
uniqueness of the phenomena studied. The goal of this PhD was to gain a greater 
understanding of ‘outlier’ general practices and therefore generalisability would not 
have been possible to achieve or even relevant.  
However, there is an element of transferability to the findings. Transferability refers to 
the degree to which the results of this thesis can be transferred beyond its bounds. 
Transferability implies that the findings of this study can be applied to similar settings. 
Clearly, the knowledge derived from this thesis, can shed light on general practice 
performance and responses to pay for performance schemes in future. In addition, it 
may have applicability to other healthcare settings, as well as helping to aid an 
understanding of the effectiveness, or lack of thereof, regulatory frameworks in the 
public sector more broadly. The thick description of the cases explored within this 
thesis enables future researchers to compare its findings with those they may see 
emerge in their own work.  
The key transferable findings centre around meanings of quality beyond the QOF, 
responses to QOF surveillance amongst ‘poor’ performing QOF practices and a greater 
understanding of some of the tensions between professionals and managerialist 
frameworks. These findings can be usefully applied by policy-makers and other 
contributors designing incentive schemes and proposals for their implementation. The 
findings may also be of interest to other GP sites struggling with a sense of top-down 
performance management seemingly undermining their sense of values. Other sites 
may indeed find parallels with some of the case studies presented in this thesis and how 






Whilst this study has enhanced previous theoretical models for understanding the 
responses of general practice professionals to top down government monitoring, it has 
failed to include the patients voice, which should be at the centre of engagement (and 
similarly disengagement if seen at odds with patient-centred values) with quality 
improvement schemes. Furthermore, the findings of the study may lack wider 
applicability to understanding what drives engagement with quality improvement 
initiatives, as it does not include data from practices which are engaged with the scheme 
with successful QOF outcomes. However, both of these issues could not be tackled 
within the time constraints of a PhD thesis. 
There are some limitations related to the construction of typologies, which were 
explored within the methods chapter. Typology in itself, as discussed previously, is not 
to be seen as a static entity rather than as a flexible starting point for understanding low 
QOF scorers. Furthermore, the typology can be adapted to fit other healthcare settings, 
which appear to resist quality improvement frameworks. It should also be noted, that 
‘low scoring’ is not a typology in itself and it is a reductionist label which doesn’t 
recognise the variation with seemingly ‘poor’ performance. The typology could 
usefully be applied to classifying healthcare organisations that do not respond to 
performance management frameworks. The typology promotes the understanding that 
values are unlikely to change as a result of quality improvement drives, regardless of 
the level of quality of care within their services. The typology could be utilised for 
designing tailored interventions to raise the quality of care within the practice, but also 
in recognising that interventions may not be deemed necessary, as ‘poor’ performers 
may provide excellent care beyond the scope of metrics. 






6.6 Suggestions for Future Research 
Notably, a study of patients’ perceptions of low QOF scoring practices would have 
enhanced the findings of this study and facilitated constructs of quality, patient-centred 
care from the user perspective and the extent to which QOF is an adequate capture 
mechanism for the definition of quality from the patient perspective. 
In terms of further research concerning the study’s participants, their subsequent QOF 
scores could be sourced, in order to see whether the participants managed to 
successfully shed their ‘poor performer’ label. The practices could then be re-visited to 
gauge what drove the changes in their QOF scores. The longitudinal nature of such 
additional research would add greater validity to the case constructions and resulting 
typologies. 
Moreover, engagement linked to values has consistently featured within the findings 
and analysis of this study. It has been seen that professionals can block change (Ferlie 
et al., 2005). No doubt, professional engagement with quality improvement initiatives 
and performance management is key to their feasibility and success. Marshall and 
Harrison (2005) note that there is much that we do not know about how best to use 
engagement through incentives to change the behaviour of health professionals. In 
particular, it is essential that we develop a deeper understanding of the relationship 
between incentivised and non-incentivised professional work. Therefore, value-based 
strategies to engage outliers both qualitatively and quantitatively could be evaluated. 
Whilst this study strongly suggests that an appeal to the professional values of the 
clinicians, in particular upholding patient-centred care, is key to their engagement with 
quality improvement, future qualitative research ought to be utilised to identify some 






it amongst primary care professionals. In a climate of increased ‘on the ground’ 
inspection with the rise of the CQC regulatory regime, in would be of interest to gauge 






















7: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This is the first time hard to reach QOF ‘poor’ performers and their responses to 
regulation have been studied through an ethnographically-informed research process. 
The methodology of this study facilitated an in depth understanding of low QOF 
scoring general practices, therefore achieving the primary objective of the study. It is 
now conceivable that GPs who do not prioritise achieving high QOF scores are able to 
remain outstanding holistic practitioners, central to preserving high quality care. This 
thesis is important in recognising the values driving ‘poor-performing’ general 
practices and some of the constructs surrounding their responses to QOF surveillance. 
General practice quality is multi-faceted, and QOF is a limited framework for defining 
it. This thesis has demonstrated ways in which low QOF scoring practices interact with 
performance management and how these interactions are influenced by professional 
values.  In order achieve greater engagement of outliers, performance management 
must appeal more directly to the values driving general practitioners and their teams.  
The study contributes to knowledge by attempting to reframe current understandings 
of responses to surveillance and by presenting a typology of persistently low QOF 
scoring general practices. To conclude the theoretical discussion, it is worth revisiting 
Foucault’s quote at the very beginning of this thesis: ‘The Panopticon is a marvellous 
machine which, whatever use one may wish to put it to, produces homogeneous effects 
of power’. The practices studied have taught us that far from being homogenous, the 
effects of power and top-down surveillance are varied and can only be fully understood 
beyond the realms of the ‘marvellous machine’. In the present era of GP-led 
commissioning, it is key that reductionist performance management tools do not 
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APPENDIX 1: FIRST PROJECT PROTOCOL 
 
Research Protocol  
 
1. Title  
 
Understanding General Practice Performance: An Ethnographic Study of General 
Practices with Low Quality and Outcomes Framework Scores  
 




The Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) is the dominant tool for measuring 
‘quality’ in general practice. There is some evidence that organisational culture, 
which may be more difficult to measure, impacts on performance and quality in 
healthcare. Some general practices have continued to have the lowest QOF scores 
nationally since the framework’s inception in 2004, suggesting that QOF may not be 
appropriate or relevant to these practices. It is therefore of particular interest to 
capture the attitudes to QOF within these practices and explore their organisational 




The key objective of this study is to gain a greater understanding of the general 
practices in England which have had the lowest QOF scores nationally over a five 
year period. This study is being conducted for the purpose of a doctoral thesis, 




Five practices will be selected purposively, based on location, from a cohort of 141 
general practices in England, scoring the lowest 10% of QOF scores nationally. These 
practices will be studied ethnographically, employing the methods of participant 
observation, one-to-one semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis. Data in 
the form of field notes, interview transcripts and practice documentation will be 




Overarching themes relating to organisational culture and concepts of quality and 
performance from the perspective of the participants, as well as from the 
ethnographies of the studied general practices, will be presented. These will be 








Findings increasing the understanding of low scoring QOF practices will be 
discussed. This study will add to the ongoing debates around the understanding of 
and methods for capturing quality in general practice, including the limitations of 
QOF as the dominant framework used for this purpose.  
 
3. Background  
 
Since its inception in 2004 as part of the General Medical Services Contract, the 
Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) has become the dominant model for 
monitoring the quality of primary care general practice services in England on a 'pay 
for performance' basis. Improving the quality of patient care within a targets 
framework has become a key preoccupation within health services (Elwyn & 
Hocking, 2000).  
 
A literature search of EMBASE and Medline electronic databases, using the search 
term ‘Quality and Outcomes Framework’ suggests that research in the field of 
primary care quality indicators focuses on practice performance on individual 
indicators (e.g. Ashworth et al, 2008). Furthermore characteristics of general practices 
in England are largely defined using quantitative methodology (e.g. Gabhain et al, 
2001). Although it is argued that targets significantly shape the way that healthcare is 
delivered in primary care (Rhydderch et al, 2004), it is also apparent from 
longitudinal studies in the field that some practices continue to underperform 
(Ashworth et al, 2010).  
 
Therefore a study of an exploratory nature would fill the gap of capturing the 
qualitative features of those poor performing practices. Low QOF scoring practices 
are of particular interest as their continued underperformance may indicate a lack of 
willingness to engage with QOF and an inappropriateness of the framework to the 
practice. Gaining a greater understanding of how these practices function as 
organisations may challenge the widely-accepted concepts of ‘quality’ and 
‘performance’ which drive policy and the quality improvement agenda in primary 
care.  
 
The link between how a practice functions organisationally and the quality of the 
service it delivers has been made within published literature. For instance Huntington 
and Gillam (2000) discuss the challenges limiting organisational features of general 
practices pose in nationwide quality improvement programmes. This connection 
between a practice’s organisational features and the level of its performance provides 
justification for this study’s central purpose of identifying the organisational culture 






Moreover there is a breadth of literature pointing to the limitations of target 
frameworks in identifying the problems which impede the performance of public 
services (e.g. Hood, 2006). As QOF is the dominant framework for capturing practice 
quality, it is of interest to ‘get under the skin’ of those practices to which QOF may 
not be appropriate, beyond the scope of measurable targets. It is also hoped that by 
gauging the organisational dynamics that limit the performance of practices, this 
study will contribute to the field of healthcare services research by identifying means 
of improving practice performance and therefore the quality of patient care.  
 
There has been an emergence of qualitative literature employing the ethnographic 
approach to the study of healthcare organisations and the impact of QOF on general 
practices (e.g. McDonald et al., 2009; Grant et al., 2009), but none attempting to gain 
a greater understanding of practices which have continued to underperform on QOF. 
The ethnographic approach with its roots in anthropological study of tribal cultures, is 
the chosen mode of elucidating the cultures specific to the QOF-defined tribe of ‘poor 
performing’ general practices.  
 
4. Statement of research questions/objectives  
 
Therefore the primary research objective borne from the review of literature is as 
follows:  
 
To gain a greater understanding of general practices which have had low Quality 
and Outcomes Framework scores over a five year period.  
 
The secondary objectives of the research are to explore the following:  
 
Do the low scoring general practices share a common organisational culture?  
 
Why do some practices continue to underperform on the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework?  
 
What do the low scoring general practices do well beyond the scope of the Quality 
and Outcomes Framework?  
 
How relevant is the quality improvement agenda to low scoring practices?  
 















Five general practices will be chosen from a cohort of 141 low QOF scoring 
practices. This cohort has been identified through a retrospective longitudinal analysis 
of publicly available national QOF outcome data since QOF’s inception in 2004, 
using both descriptive and inferential statistical methods. Indicator points 
achievement within the lowest performing 10% of practices nationally was used as a 
cut off point to define the sampling frame.  
 
The selection of five practices will be purposive on the basis of practice location, 
representing the North and South of England, as well as urban and rural settings. It 
has been decided that five practices will be chosen to increase the potential of 
transferability of findings to other general practice settings, yet also for the study to 
be completed within the time constraints of a PhD course.  
 
Within each practice, a purposive sample of staff members representing the range of 
general practice professions will be interviewed (i.e. GP, Nurse, Receptionist, 
Practice Manager etc.), until data saturation point is reached (i.e. no new information 
emerges). It is therefore envisaged that around 20 to 30 interviews will take place for 
all the participating practices. Minimal participant information will be collected, 




The lead GP within each practice will be approached by telephone in the first 
instance. They will then be provided with an information sheet if interested in the 
study and the lead GP will be given two weeks to decide whether or not to take part. 
If the lead GP agrees to include their practice in the study and has read and 
understood the content of the information sheet, written consent will be sought from 
them and an information sheet will be forwarded to them to be distributed to the 
practice staff.  
 
Written consent will be sought from the practice staff members at the first mutually 
agreed practice visit, which will take place at least two weeks from the staff receiving 








All practice staff will be able to opt out from the observation and/or interview 
elements of the study.  
The lead GP will be offered a £200 payment to the practice account as a 




The ethnographic tool of participant observation will be employed. The researcher 
will observe the day-to-day life of each practice (excluding patient consultations) 
over five days. These visits may or may not be consecutive, depending on 
convenience, as well as emerging data. The researcher will be making field notes 
throughout and will endeavour to take part in practice activities such as practice 
meetings, in order to embed themselves more fully in the daily reality of the practices 
being studied.  
 
The interviews will be semi-structured, with questions being exploratory in format, 
rather than leading. The ordering of the questions is flexible, to allow the schedule to 
be adapted to the participant and the direction of their responses. This also gives the 
interviewer the opportunity to explore themes emerging in the interview which were 
not previously considered.  
 
The participants will be interviewed for up to 45 minutes, in a private room within the 
practice, such as a consulting room when not in use.  
Interview questions have been formulated as a direct result of literature searches in 
the medical, medical sociology, healthcare management and organisational study 
fields, with a particular focus on factors which are thought to influence performance 
and engagement with quality improvement initiatives (see interview schedule Version 
1.0). The interview questions have been piloted with the following general practice 
professionals: two GPs male and female, one Healthcare Assistant, one Receptionist, 
one Nurse Practitioner, one Practice Manager. The feedback of these participants 
about the questions was incorporated into the final interview schedule.  
 
Emerging findings from the participant observation, as well as interviews, may need 
to be triangulated by sourcing practice documents, such as policies and guidelines. 
Patient notes will not be accessed.  
 
Data Analysis  
 
Data in the form of field-notes, interview transcripts and document content will be 
analysed using interpretive thematic analysis, with the aid of the software NVivo.  
 
Thematic analysis focuses on categorising, analysing and reporting themes within 
data. It is likely that a framework of analysis along the lines of the five phase model 
of thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) will be employed, using levels of coding 
in order to generate overarching themes with sub-themes. Thematic analysis is suited 
to the phenomenological aims of this study, namely its concern with increasing 
understanding of practice culture and the subjective experiences of key players within 







Member checking will be carried out by asking the participants to comment on the 
accuracy of the themes and amalgamating their feedback with the data. The resulting 
themes will be checked for inter-rater reliability by colleagues, using a sample of 




Throughout the study, the principles of reflexivity will be applied, in order to allow 
for the recognition of the existence and impact of researcher bias within the research 
process. Reflexivity can be defined as an awareness of the researcher’s own 
contribution to the construction of meanings and an acknowledgement of the 
impossibility of remaining impartial to one’s subject matter. It is an awareness of the 
dynamics between the researcher and the studied practices. Ways in which the 
researcher’s personal perspectives construct the research interpretation will be 
reflected upon.  
 
6. Ethical Considerations  
 
The principles of informed consent, confidentiality and the right to withdraw will be 
adhered to throughout the study. Written consent will be collected at the first visit to 
the practice prior to the data collection phase. Participant observation and interviews 
will not take place until consent to participate has been voiced by the participants. 
Contributions of those practice staff members not consenting to taking part in the 
participant observation element of the study will not be included in the thesis or any 
resulting publications.  
 
In order to preserve confidentiality and anonymity, no participant identifying details, 
other than designation, age and sex will be printed in the final thesis and any resulting 
publications. Contributions to the study will not be shared between the participants, 
nor will participation between the participating practices. Data will be stored in an 
anonymised fashion, whereby participant codes will be used rather than identifying 
details.  
 
It is in the interest in of the study to keep the research unobtrusive, so as to keep the 
situations observed as natural as possible. However some disruption to daily work 
with the researcher observing, asking questions and conducting interviews is 
unavoidable. However this disruption will be kept to a minimum, particularly in 
patient areas, so as not to affect the level of patient care. Patient consultations will not 
be observed. Any patient information linked to identifiable patients revealed through 
the course of the study will not be used in the research.  
 
The interview questions have been designed to be as neutral as possible so as not to 
cause the participant distress. In the event of misconduct or malpractice coming to 
light, this will be raised with the study’s supervisor in the first instance, who is bound 
by the General Medical Council’s Code of Conduct.  
 
It is likely that exists a stigma around being labelled a poor performing QOF practice, 
as well as a fear of reprisal from regulatory bodies. To counteract this, the research 






‘inspection feel’ about it. The researcher will explain their activity within the practice 
to participants regularly, revisit consent, and participants will be able to view all field 
notes if requested and give feedback on findings.  
 




May-July: Recruitment phase 
 
September-January: Practice visits for the purpose of data collection 
 




January-February: Data transcription 
 
March-June: Data analysis 
 
July-November: Results write-up 
 




January-February: Paper submission for publication 
 
March-August: PhD writing up 
 
August: Dissemination of findings/publications to participants 
 
14th August 2012- PhD Thesis Submission 
 
8. Benefits of the Study  
 
Low scoring QOF practices are a largely unstudied group and this study will add to 
the understanding of those general practices for which QOF may not be the most 
appropriate method of quality improvement. The study will explore the concepts of 
‘quality’ and ‘performance’ from the point of view of the low scoring practices. The 
study may contribute to knowledge by producing a typology of poor performing 
practices. Conversely, as QOF is the dominant framework for measuring 
performance, it is hoped that the what these ‘poor performing’ practices do well 
beyond the scope of QOF will be elucidated through qualitative enquiry.  
 
Through utilising the ethnographic approach, this study will contribute to current 
thinking about the usefulness of interdisciplinary organisational study to healthcare 
settings. By conceptualising the responses of the participating practices to quality 






managers of engaging ‘unenthusiastic’ general practices with such drives, thus 
offering greater opportunities for improving patient care.  
 
9. Resources and Costs  
 
This study is funded by the Department of Primary Care and Public Health Sciences, 
Division of Health and Social Care, School of Medicine, King’s College London. The 
researcher is in receipt of a three-year full-time departmental PhD studentship and has 
access to training and conferences and subsistence budgets earmarked for this study.  
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APPENDIX 2: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Study title  
 




My name is Maria Kordowicz and I am a PhD (doctoral) student at King’s College London 
with a background in Psychology. I would like to invite you and to take part in my PhD 
research study. Before you decide whether or not you would like to take part, you need to 
understand why I am conducting this research and what it would involve for you. Please take 
time to read the following information. Talk to others about the study if you wish. Ask me if 
there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide 
whether or not you wish to take part.  
 
What is the purpose of the study?  
 
The purpose of this study is to increase the understanding of ‘performance’ in general 
practice. Of particular relevance to this greater understanding is the exploration of how 
practices which have low Quality Outcomes Framework (QOF) scores perceive and respond 
to QOF, especially in light of QOF being merely a snapshot of good primary care.  
 
The key aims of this study are to learn about what your practice does well beyond the 
scope of QOF and the types of incentives and motivations that drive you and your 
colleagues at work. A more general aim of this study is to further the understanding of how 
general practices function as organisations.  
 
Why have I been invited?  
 
You have been invited because you are a GP or a team member of a general practice which 
has over the past five years been one of the 141 practices in England with the lowest 10% of 
QOF scores. As this may be an indication of the inappropriateness of QOF to your practice, it 
is particularly important to me to hear your views about QOF.  
I would also like to learn about the differences in how practices function nationally and am 
therefore recruiting urban and rural practices in the North and South of England. I hope to 
study 4-5 practices altogether.  
 
Do I have to take part?  
 
It is completely up to you if you decide to join the study. I will be asking you to sign a 
consent form at my first visit and this gives you options of whether you want to take part in 
the observation part of the study, be interviewed, or both.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part?  
 






work of your practice most likely on five separate occasions and I hope that this will take 
place with minimal interruption to your day. I am particularly interested in the things your 
practice does which are not captured by QOF, such as providing patient-centred care. During 
this time I will be making notes. I may also ask you questions and attend your practice 
meetings. If you have decided not to take part in the observation part of the study, I will not 
record any of your activities I may have observed.  
 
Additionally, I want to find out what your views are of QOF and about how your practice 
functions. I intend to do this through one-to-one interviews with individual practice staff 
members. It is totally up to you whether or not you would like to be interviewed.  
 
What will I have to do?  
 
As my research is an ethnographic study I will simply be observing what goes on in your 
practice day to day, so in this respect all you have to do is carry on about your day as you 
would usually and I hope to interrupt you as little as possible. I may however ask you 
questions to clarify situations which may be meaningful to me as a researcher. I may also ask 
to get involved in some of the work going on at your practice or to attend practice meetings 
or to have a look at certain practice documents. I am likely to be making notes, which you 
can always ask to see. I will not be sitting in during patient consultations.  
 
I will also be conducting interviews with those members of the staff team who would like to 
be interviewed. This would take up to 45 minutes, in a quiet private area of the practice, such 
as one of your consulting rooms and what we say would be recorded on a Dictaphone. I have 
designed the questions so that they are not too personal; they cover topics such as teamwork, 
your opinions of QOF and how your practice functions. But as everything you say will be 
kept confidential, I hope that you will feel able to speak openly.  
 
If you are the lead GP at the practice or the practice manager, I suggest that you introduce my 
study to your staff at your next practice meeting, or informally if you do not normally hold 
meetings, so that the team is aware of my visits. I would welcome the opportunity to speak at 
your practice meeting so that your team knows what taking part in this research study 
involves and so that I can introduce myself formally.  
 
Will I get paid for taking part?  
 
You will not be paid for taking part directly, however as a goodwill gesture a sum of £200 
will be paid to the practice at the end of my work at your practice as a reimbursement for lost 
time and interruption caused by the research.  
  
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?  
 
As taking part does not involve much beyond your usual working day, the risks of taking part 
are minimal. The main disadvantage is being disturbed at work, however I really intend to 
keep disruption minimal as possible as the point of the study is to observe your practice as it 







What are the possible benefits of taking part?  
 
I hope that it will be of interest to you to have the opportunity to discuss your experiences of 
working at your practice and exploring ideas about what affects the performance of your 
practice, as well as exploring how QOF affects your work day to day, if at all. Above all I 
want to give practices for which QOF may not be appropriate a ‘voice’ through my research.  
 
What happens when the research study stops?  
 
Once I leave your practice and have conducted all the interviews at your practice, I may 
contact you for further information before the PhD thesis is submitted at the end of 2012. I 
will share a synopsis of my findings with you either by email or letter, whichever you prefer. 
I hope to publish my findings in peer-reviewed journals. The name of your practice and the 
names of staff members will be kept confidential and will not therefore be used in the thesis 
or published.  
 
What if there is a problem?  
 
As this study is for the purpose of an academic PhD course, it is closely supervised and any 
problems are reviewed on a weekly basis with my supervisor, Dr Mark Ashworth, or 
immediately if necessary. The opportunity to complain through King’s College London 
procedures will be available to you. You may also withdraw your participation from the study 
at any time.  
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?  
 
Yes. Furthermore the name of your practice, its location or any identifying practice 
characteristics will be kept anonymous in the PhD thesis and any resulting publications. 
Similarly so will any identifying characteristics of individual members of staff from the 
practices. Data in the form of interview transcripts and field notes will also be coded so that 
only I and my supervisor can identify the source of the data. If participants are quoted 
verbatim in the thesis, any identifying phrases or words will be removed and the quote will be 
attributed to for example ‘nurse 1, practice 1’ in order to maintain confidentiality. Similarly 
data sourced from the practice will be kept confidential within that practice and between the 
practices I study. This means that I will not share any information you give me in confidence 
or research data pertaining to you or the practice you work at with your colleagues or with 
other practices taking part in the research.  
 
However in the unlikely possibility of misconduct coming to light through my research, I will 
report this to my supervisor in the first instance who will decide on the appropriate channels 
for dealing with the issue.  
 
If I come across any patient information in the course of my time at the practice, for example 
I may hear a discussion of patient cases at a practice meeting, this will not be recorded 








What will happen to the results of the research study?  
 
The results of the research study will be used first and foremost in the production of my PhD 
thesis. I also plan to publish peer-reviewed journal articles to disseminate my findings and 
present them at relevant conferences, whilst upholding the confidentiality of the study 
participants at all times.  
 
In keeping with King’s College London guidance, anonymised data will be stored for seven 
years after the study has finished.  
 
Who is organising and funding the research?  
 
The research is for my PhD course at the Department of Primary Care and Public Health 
Sciences, Division of Health and Social Care Research, School of Medicine, King’s College 
London. It is funded by a three year departmental studentship.  
 
Who has reviewed the study?  
 
My research proposal and the progress of the study are regularly reviewed by my supervisor, 
Dr Mark Ashworth and colleagues within the Department of Primary Care and Public Health 
Sciences at King’s College London.  
 
The study has received ethical approval with a favourable opinion from the National 
Research Ethics Service, Brighton West Research Ethics Committee [ref: 10/H1111/15].  
 
Further information and contact details:  
 
Please contact me with any questions at this stage and throughout the course of the study:  
 
Maria Kordowicz - PhD Student  
DEPARTMENT OF PRIMARY CARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH SCIENCES  
Division of Health and Social Care Research  
King's College London  
9th Floor Capital House  
42 Weston Street  
London SE1 3QD  
 
Telephone: 020 7848 8734  
Fax: 020 7848 6620  













If you have any concerns or comments that you feel need to be raised with my supervisor, his 
contact details are:  
 
Dr Mark Ashworth – Clinical Senior Lecturer  
DEPARTMENT OF PRIMARY CARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH SCIENCES  
Division of Health and Social Care Research  
King's College London  
9th Floor Capital House  
42 Weston Street  
London SE1 3QD  
 
Telephone: 020 7848 8673  








































APPENDIX 3 CONSENT FORM 
 
Study Name of practice:  Participant identification code:  
title: Understanding General Practice Performance 
Name of researcher:  Maria Kordowicz      
          
 Please tick box: 
 Yes No N/A 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information 
sheet dated 19.02.2010 [Version 1.0] for the above study. 
I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask 
questions and have had these answered satisfactorily. 
 
   
2. I am the lead GP for the practice I agree to my practice 
being included in the above study. 
 
   
3. I agree to take part in the observation part of the above 
study and for the use of non-attributable quotes of what I 
say in the study. 
 
   
4. I agree to be interviewed for the above study, for the 
interview to be voice recorded and for the use of non-
attributable quotes of what I say in the study. 
 
   
5. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I 
am free to withdraw my contributions from the study at any 
time without giving reason. 
 
   
 
Name of participant (please print):                                  
Job title:      Sex (please circle):  M/F  
Age:  
Signature:      Date:                
 
Name of person taking consent:                 
Signature:      Date:                            
 
 






APPENDIX 4: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
1. What in your opinion makes a good general practice? 
           1.1 How would you define good and bad quality of care?  
2. How would you describe the general practice you work in? 
           2.1 How does it function? 
2.1.1 What are the IT systems like? Is the administrative support adequate? 
How about the building itself? (Impact of single-handed status?) 
2.2 What kind of organisation is your practice?  
2.3 Would you say that it has a particular culture as an organisation? 
2.4 How well do the practice’s staff work as a team? 
2.5 What factors influence the quality of care provided in your practice? 
2.6 How closely do you work with other organisations? E.g. other practices, 
PCT, universities? 
2.7 How could the way the practice functions be improved, if at all? 
3. What influences the performance of your general practice? 
3.1 What are your practice’s aims/priorities? 
3.2 How is performance measured in your practice? 
3.3 What individual GP /staff characteristics, if any, are related to the quality of care 
provided at your practice?  
3.31 Do you feel that the practice being single-handed influences its quality in any 
way? 
4. What is working for this practice like? 
4.1 What are the employee benefits working for this practice? 
4.2 What provision is there for staff teaching and training? 
4.3 Do you dislike anything about working for this practice? 
5. What influences your performance at work? 
5.1 What motivates you to perform well? 
5.2 What guides your work/clinical practice? 






5.3 Are there any incentives formal or informal to reward work at the practice? What are 
they? 
6. What are your thoughts on the Quality and Outcomes Framework? 
6.1 How important is QOF at your practice, if at all? 
6.2 Does your work involve contributing to the QOF? If so, how? 
6.3 How has QOF affected your practice, if at all? 
6.4 What are your thoughts about the practice being paid for its performance in 
general/for meeting the QOF targets? 
6.5 To what extent does QOF capture the work of your practice?  
6.6 What affects your performance on the QOF? 
6.7 Are there any particular elements of QOF that are difficult for your practice to 
engage with? Why? 
6.8 How has your performance on the QOF affected your practice? How does it affect 
your practice if you do not do so well on the QOF? 
6.9 What would help your practice to increase its QOF scores? 
6.10 Do you think that QOF could be improved in any way, if at all? What other quality 
indicators would best capture the work you’re doing at your practice? 
7. How do you involve your patients in the life of the practice? 

















APPENDIX 5: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS MAPPED  
WITH SELECTED SUPPORTING LITERATURE 
 
1. What in your opinion makes a good general practice? 
           1.1 How would you define good and bad quality of care? (Campbell, 2000) 
2. How would you describe the general practice you work in? 
           2.1 How does it function? 
2.7.1 What are the IT systems like? Is the administrative support adequate? 
How about the building itself? (Impact of single-handed status?) 
(Westland et al., 1996; De Koning et al., 2005) 
2.8 What kind of organisation is your practice?  
2.9 Would you say that it has a particular culture as an organisation? (Schein, 2004; 
McDonald et al., 2007; Hann et al., 2007) 
2.10 How well do the practice’s staff work as a team? (Stevenson et al., 2003; 
Proudfoot et al., 2007; Wiener-Ogilvie, 2008) 
2.11 What factors influence the quality of care provided in your practice? 
2.12 How closely do you work with other organisations? E.g. other practices, PCT, 
universities? (Ferlie & Shortell, 2001) 
2.13 How could the way the practice functions be improved, if at all? (Huntington & 
Gillam, 2000) 
3. What influences the performance of your general practice? 
3.2 What are your practice’s aims/priorities? (Proudfoot et al., 2007) 
3.2 How is performance measured in your practice? 
3.3 What individual GP /staff characteristics, if any, are related to the quality of care 
provided at your practice? (Ashworth et al., 2010) 
3.31 Do you feel that the practice being single-handed influences its quality in any 
way? (Van den Hombergh et al., 2005) 
 
4. What is working for this practice like? 
4.1 What are the employee benefits working for this practice? 
4.2 What provision is there for staff teaching and training? 






5. What influences your performance at work? 
5.1 What motivates you to perform well? (McDonald et al., 2007) 
5.2 What guides your work/clinical practice? 
5.2.1 What role does professionalism play in your practice? 
5.3 Are there any incentives formal or informal to reward work at the practice? What are 
they? (Maclure, 1982; Campbell et al., 2009; Power, 1997) 
6. What are your thoughts on the Quality and Outcomes Framework? 
6.1 How important is QOF at your practice, if at all? (Grant et al., 2009; Rhydderch et 
al., 2004) 
6.2 Does your work involve contributing to the QOF? If so, how? (Grant et al., 2009) 
6.3 How has QOF affected your practice, if at all? (Gabhain et al., 2001) 
6.4 What are your thoughts about the practice being paid for its performance in 
general/for meeting the QOF targets? 
6.5 To what extent does QOF capture the work of your practice?  
6.6 What affects your performance on the QOF? (Keenan et al., 2009) 
6.7 Are there any particular elements of QOF that are difficult for your practice to 
engage with? Why? 
6.8 How has your performance on the QOF affected your practice? How does it affect 
your practice if you do not do so well on the QOF? 
6.9 What would help your practice to increase its QOF scores? 
 
6.10 Do you think that QOF could be improved in any way, if at all? What other quality 
indicators would best capture the work you’re doing at your practice? 
7. How do you involve your patients in the life of the practice? (Unger et al., 2000) 
8. And finally what in your opinion does your practice do well? 
 
Additional References: 
Campbell, S., Roland, M. & Buetow, S. (2000). Defining quality of care. Social Science & 
Medicine, 51(11), 1611-1625. 
Hann, M., Bower, P., Campbell, s., Marshall, M. & Reeves, D. (2007). The association 
between culture, climate and quality of care in primary health care teams. Family Practice. 






Schein, E. (2004). Organizational Culture and Leadership (3rd ed.). San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass. 
Stevenson, K., Baker, R., Farooqi, A., Sorrie, R. & Khunti, K. (2001). Features of primary 
health care teams associated with successful quality improvement of diabetes care: a 








































APPENDIX 7: EXAMPLE OF INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT 
 
I – Interviewer 
P – Participant 
 
I: So it’s started recording. 
P: OK 
I: So to begin with, because this is quite an unusual practice, could you tell me a bit about 
how you ended up working here, what draws  you to this particular area of work? 
P: Practice was opened in 2001 by the lead GP, who at that point was Dr. (name withheld), 
and I actually worked with Dr. (name withheld) in mainstream practice, we worked together 
for a few of years and he got the contract for setting up (practice name withheld) and asked if 
I would like to kind of help him and set up and open it. So there was myself, (GP name 
withheld), (specialist nurse prescriber name withheld) and two receptionists who joined on 
day one. And it went from there really.  
I guess what drew me was, well when I had... one - I thoroughly enjoyed working with (the 
GP name withheld), two – it was an opportunity to set something up from scratch for a client 
group that in (PCT name withheld) the majority of GPs were no longer willing to prescribe 
for. So we had probably about 95% of practice in (PCT name withheld) were not willing to 
prescribe methadone. (GP name withheld) had quite a few of them on his list in mainstream 
practice and obviously they’re a very vulnerable and fragile client group and most people see 
them as a nuisance in mainstream, so it was kind of putting the plans together for a green 
field PMS site for a practice specific for addictions. So we applied for the contract and got it. 
So the attraction for me really was setting up something from new. Actually setting up a 
practice from nothing to see what it would grow into and to provide the best service possible 
for a client group that were getting a very poor service to kind of try to work on their health 
needs and their addiction needs and set the service up to fit them and not to fit the system, if 
that makes sense? Because they weren’t fitting into the system. Because they don’t always 
turn up to their appointment on time, they don’t always want to be in the waiting room, they 
don’t ring and cancel their appointments. So we came very much from a different ethos to 
mainstream it was very much if you turn up on the same day we’ll still see you, because it 
was very important to keep them in treatment and build up a relationship. 
So it was kind of exciting – the challenge. So we started on day one, there was five of us and 
a zero list size. We got premises seven days before we were duet o open and we got the 
budget four weeks before we were due to open. (GP name withheld) went out to ad for staff 
on his own credit card, because we didn’t have a budget agreed, they just kept saying ‘it’ll be 
agreed, it’ll be agreed’, but we got to the point that I said ‘actually if we don’t ad for two 
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A: Quality and Outcomes Framework: smoke and mirrors? 
 
Mark Ashworth DM MRCP FRCGP Clinical Senior Lecturer 
Maria Kordowicz BSC (Hons) MRes MSc PhD Student 
Department of Primary Care and Public Health Sciences, King’s College London School of 
Medicine, London, UK 
 
ABSTRACT 
Since its inception in 2004 the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) has become 
embedded in the fabric of day-to-day general practice. Yet despite some of its tangible 
successes, the QOF’s vulnerability to gaming poses challenges to its applicability as the 
dominant quality improvement framework in primary care. This paper questions whether 
high QOF scores amount to better care or simply the illusory effects of better data recording. 
Suggestions for developing QOF are made in the light of its limitations as a public health 
improvement initiative. 
 
Keywords: exception reporting, gaming, general practice, primary care, quality improvement, 
Quality Outcomes Framework How this fits in with quality in primary care. 
 
How this fits in with quality in primary care 
 
What do we know? 
 
The Quality Outcomes Framework (QOF) is the largest pay-for-performance (P4P) quality 
improvement initiative in primary care in the UK. Since its inception in 2004, general practice 
QOF scores have continued to rise, indicating improvements in, for instance, the management 
of diabetes and control of cardiovascular risk factors in diabetic patients. 
 
What does this paper add? 
 
This paper explores the successes of the QOF, as well as its shortcomings as the dominant 
method for capturing quality in primary care, arguing that some of the QOF’s achievements 
may be illusory. The QOF’s vulnerability to data distortion and gaming is discussed and its 




The QOF has in many ways been a triumph. A triumph of hope, because hopes have been high 
about the potential of the QOF to promote the quality 
agenda in primary care; and a triumph of expectation, as this revolutionary change in working 
practices for primary care teams has been incorporated into the everyday routine of practice 
life. It is hard now to imagine consultations with patients and strategies for practice 
management without the ever present spectre of the QOF. Whether it is QOF ‘alerts’ 
(reminders) 
appearing unbidden on the computer screen during the consultation, motivational presentations 
about QOF targets within reach, or the more general acceptance in primary care that the QOF 






fabric of general practice. Yet to what extent do these apparent successes of the QOF merely 
represent a smokescreen masking the real picture within primary care? Despite its tangible 
successes, assumptions about the QOF’s power to capture and improve quality in primary care 
need to be revisited. 
 
Key successes of P4P 
 
The performance of primary care against the QOF proved to be far higher than was expected 
at the time the QOF was introduced.1 The Department of Health based calculations around pay 
on an expected QOF score of 750 at the end of the first year (2004–2005). In fact, the 8600 
general practices in England had amean QOF score of 958.7 (out of a maximum possible score 
of 1050 points) which represented 91.3% of available points.2 Two hundred and twenty-two 
(2.6%) of these practices achieved the maximum score. In spite of several annual revisions to 
the QOF, revising targets 
upwards and adding indicators, the 2008 to 2009 mean QOF score achievement was 954.2 of 
available points (the maximum is currently 1000 points) with 2.0% of practices achieving the 
maximum score.3  
 
Achievement of high QOF scores brought with it higher performance-related pay than 
expected. Higher pay and a sense of professional pride have translated into better morale for 
general practitioners (GPs).4 This, in turn, has offered some easing to the recruitment crisis of 
the early 2000s, when international recruitment drives in Europe seemed to be the only way of 
filling GP vacancies. 
 
These gains have also translated into public health gains, albeit on a rather piecemeal basis. 
The weighting of QOF points, since they reflect a pay deal for GPs, is driven by the assumed 
workload attached to achieving each indicator and not by the likely benefit to patients. Thus, 
for example, the indicator DM23 (at least 50% achievement of an HbA1c target of 7.0 or less 
for diabetics) is awarded 17 points whereas DM18 (influenza vaccination target of 85% for 
diabetics) merely attracts three points. Moreover, many of the public health indicators within 
the QOF such as blood pressure, cholesterol and HbA1c control were improving before the 
arrival of the QOF. Nevertheless, there has been evidence of public health gain, with substantial 
improvements in, for instance, the management of diabetes and control of cardiovascular risk 
factors in diabetic patients.5 
 
A further public health success has been the drive to reduce health inequalities. The differences 
in QOF achievement between deprived and prosperous areas have been small and, over time, 
there is evidence that these differences have diminished.6 The narrowing of target differences 
between rich and poor communities has been part of an overall trend of improved performance, 




There can be no doubt about the concrete improvements since the QOF was instituted in terms 
of overall quality improvement and ‘intermediate outcomes’ such as blood pressure and 
cholesterol control. However, the successes of QOF have been tempered by concerns that some 







One reason for questioning the success of P4P in its incarnation as QOF is that three technical 
features of  QOF may have diminished the reach of performance targets.  
 
First, the process of ‘exception reporting’ necessarily allows certain patients, deemed 
‘unsuitable’, to be excluded from the overall target for patients registered at the practice.8 
Patients may understandably be excluded if they are terminally ill or if they do not agree (after 
three written requests) to attend an appointment at the surgery for the management of their 
chronic disease. The overall exception reporting rate for 2008 to 2009 was 6.88% for indicators 
measuring an outcome and 1.70% for indicators measuring a process. So, on average, almost 
7% of patients in England are excluded from public health targets such as achievement of a 
serum cholesterol of < 5mmol/l.  
 
Second, the targets are not set at 100%. Again this is understandable given the practical 
difficulties of achieving clinical targets. These targets are rarely achieved in research trial 
conditions, let alone in routine practice, even with often large financial incentives to spur on 
the team. However, targets set at 70% for blood pressure control or cholesterol control in 
coronary heart disease (CHD6 and CHD8) exclude 30% of patients from these public health 
targets. Thus, in combination with exception reporting, targets set below 100% may shift the 
focus of the practice away from harder to reach patients, in exchange for more efficient 
achievement of results. 
 
Third, the prevalence of each of the 19 chronic diseases currently included in the QOF is not 
independently verified. A practice may simply have lacked vigour in building up their disease 
registers; patients who, for one reason or another, have not been coded or have been incorrectly 
coded will not be on the disease register. They will therefore be invisible to QOF targets and 
again the public health effectiveness of population targets will be further reduced.  
 
The success of the QOF may be tempered in other respects. Performance may have improved 
in domains covered by performance indicators but remain static in areas out of the spotlight, 
such as rheumatological and gastrointestinal disease. Increasingly, there are suggestions that 
performance against current criteria has now reached a ceiling and that other approaches are 
needed to coax further improvements out of primary care. 
 
Gaming and P4P 
 
The subject of gaming and manipulation of target achievement is controversial. Gaming is not 
unique to the QOF and is probably a feature of all P4P systems. The National Audit Office 
report on the 2004 contract for GPs suggested that QOF income could be inappropriately 
boosted by deliberately removing patients from disease registers or by increasing levels of 
exception reporting.9 Although all general practices are given an inspection-type visit annually 
by representatives from their primary care trust, this may be insufficient to detect evidence at 
case level of inappropriate exception reporting or exclusion from disease registers. 
 
Gaming may generate overlarge financial rewards in just a few practices. But how widespread 
a phenomenon is it? Some have suggested that gaming is endemic, but a more balanced 






Centre of Health Economics which concluded that practices could have treated 12.5% fewer 
patients without falling below upper QOF thresholds.10 This suggests that GPs have not taken 
the opportunity to produce a threshold gaming effect, whereby the quantity and quality of work 
can be reduced to the minimum needed to meet the target. In other words, GP practices had 
overshot targets to a much greater extent than the likely level of exception reporting.  
 
Better care or better recorded care 
 
Practices with more highly developed management infrastructures and a shared ethos of coding 
every possible QOF-related activity will inevitably have higher QOF scores at the end of the 
accounting year. Many apparent improvements in care amount to little more than increased 
conscientious coding. For example, a practice failing to reach the 90% target for retinopathy 
screening in diabetes (DM21) may find that this target is achievable simply by searching 
through scanned correspondence from the hospital diabetic clinic or local optometrist reported 
retinopathy findings. 
Practices may be making economic decisions based on workload, time and the type of 
professional needed to reach the target. On this basis, a practice may make one of three 
decisions. It may decide that it is not cost effective to chase the final QOF point (achieving the 
90% target for DM21 is worth five points) and remain below the top target. Or it may invest in 
additional 
data input staff to find and code missing clinical data. Or, and most expensively, it may invest 
in additional medical personnel to examine, say, an additional ten  diabetic patients in order to 
gain all five available QOF 
points. 
 
It is these pragmatic decisions, based on perceptions of workload and reward, that have resulted 
in some commentators describing the QOF as not so much a P4P system, but a ‘pay-for-
reporting’ system.11 Better recording undoubtedly results in higher QOF points but arguably 
may not represent better care. Equally, low scoring practices may be less skilled at 
handling large data volumes and may not necessarily be providing poorer care. The care 
provided by low scoring practices has not been evaluated in peer reviewed studies and we need 
research information on whether these practices do offer high quality care (which is 
inadequately recorded) or whether care falls below acceptable standards.  
 
The QOF can only measure a small proportion of all primary care or GP activity and it is 
possible that low scoring practices display excellence in other domains not captured by QOF, 
such as continuity of care, patient-centred consultation skills, diagnostic skills and the care of 
illnesses not included in the QOF.  
 
The QOF – fine tuning a force for good?  
 
Increasingly, proposals for strengthening the QOF are focusing on aligning the indicators and 
the associated QOF points with public health gains. Now that NICE has taken overall 
responsibility for QOF development, the expectation is that the QOF will develop along the 
lines of NICE guidelines and continue to favour clinical indicators with a strong evidence base.  
 






was ‘no relationship between pay and health gain’, at least for the eight public health and 
preventative interventions which were included in their study.12  This is perhaps unsurprising 
because the level of P4P financial reward was based on estimates of likely GP workload rather 
than on health gain for patients. However, if QOF continues to be generously funded, it has to 
be able to demonstrate that the money is well spent given that the opportunity costs of tying up 
healthcare funding in the QOF are considerable.  
 
Professionalism is one driver of quality which is in danger of being ignored by the QOF. And 
yet it is a sense of professionalism, the accumulation of a body of specialist knowledge and 
wisdom placed at the service of society, and a public service ethos which in the longer term 
probably motivate GPs more than a financially driven P4P system. It is hard to see how any 
P4P system could reward the components of professionalism, as expounded by Downie.13 
 
Finally, greater inclusion of feedback from patients in the overall spread of P4P indicators is 
being explored. Prior to 2008 to 2009, GPs simply gave out questionnaires to a selection of 
patients and ‘patient experience’ points were awarded on the basis of completed surveys and 
reflection on the results of these surveys. Since then a more rigorous approach has been  
adopted, with independent patient surveys conducted by polling organisations. GPs are now 
rewarded on the basis of responses to two questions about time taken to access an appropriate 
health professional (PE7 and PE8). The questions asked have been criticised as being politically 
driven; they do not ask about the consultation or perceived standards of care. Yet their inclusion 
does mark a new emphasis on rewarding GPs on the basis of patient feedback. One danger of 
this approach is the unintended consequence of less satisfied responses from patients in 
deprived communities which may result in more funding being directed toward practices 




So is the QOF all smoke and mirrors, or has it produced real improvements in patient care? We 
have discussed evidence of its successes in the management of long-term conditions and of 
improved financial rewards linked to GP workload. However, we have also shown that the 
QOF is not immune from gaming behaviours and the opportunity for data manipulation 
through, for instance, reporting as exceptions patients who are harder to engage. Bold 
statements about the QOF’s power to reduce health inequalities ignore the subtleties of 
organisational behaviour change in the face of financial rewards. There is no doubt that the 
underlying essence of good primary care lies in soft data and therefore is unlikely ever to be 
fully captured through P4P initiatives – rapport, interpersonal skills, continuity of care (passion 
and compassion, even!) to name but a few. Yet with greater patient involvement in the primary 
care agenda, there is likely to be a move beyond QOF based targets to targets based on 
indicators which hold meaning for the patient. The challenge will be to ensure that these new 
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B. ‘Smoke and Mirrors? Informatics Opportunities and Challenges of the Quality and 
Outcomes Framework’ 
 
Maria Kordowicz & Mark Ashworth 




This chapter presents the informatics opportunities of the Quality and Outcomes Framework 
(QOF), whilst exploring the challenges this ‘pay for performance’ (P4P) initiative poses for 
capturing the quality of primary care. The successes of QOF data systems are evaluated in light 
of QOF’s vulnerability to gaming and manipulation. Furthermore the limitations of QOF’s use 




 QOF has become has brought with it a wealth of previously unavailable informatics 
opportunities to primary care 
 These opportunities are not without their limitations, which are linked to QOFs 




QOF in many ways has been a triumph. It is hard now to imagine consultations with patients 
and strategies for day-to-day practice management without the ever-present spectre of QOF.  
Whether it is the QOF alerts appearing unbidden on the computer screen during patient 
consultations, motivational presentations about QOF targets within reach, or the widespread 
acceptance that QOF strengthens the public health role of general practice, it seems that QOF 
has succeeded in becoming part of the fabric of primary care.  
 
The framework has brought with it new and improved data structures with previously 
unavailable opportunities for the collection, retrieval and application of general practice and 
patient information, with assumed potential for reducing public health inequalities.  Yet there 
is a risk that the dominance of QOF informatics as the primary means of assessing general 
practice quality may lead to a misrepresentation of reality. Indeed behind the policy 
smokescreen of QOF performance being synonymous with the quality of care that a patient 
receives in general practice, lie questions surrounding the shortcomings of informatics 
produced within a P4P framework.  
 
QOF required the implementation of information management and technology systems which 
were fit for the purpose of monitoring the performance of all general practices in England.  The 
next section of this chapter discusses some features of this process. 
 
QOF informatics & systems 
 
Informatics in primary care is concerned with the management of data to enable specific 






The implementation of new data structures to capture the coding of QOF clinical indicators 
saw a move away from unorganised data at general practice level to data processed in context. 
In other words QOF brought with it the dawn of usable general practice information.  QOF can 
therefore be viewed not only as a quality improvement initiative, but also as a tool for 
optimising the use of primary care information. Five years have passed since its inception and 
today QOF holds data covering 99.7% of registered patients in England.1 
 
A challenge of a data integration process of this scale was to implement information 
management and technology systems that were fit for purpose. This is where the national 
Quality Management and Analysis System otherwise known as QMAS came in. The purpose 
of QMAS was to collate QOF data and run practice system updates three times a year and 
provide feedback to practices about their performance against national QOF targets upon which 
payments were based. The NHS Connecting for Health website boldly states that QMAS allows 
for practices to be paid ‘according to the quality of care they provide’. This suggests that high 
QOF scores are viewed as being synonymous with quality care, a concept that will be 
questioned later on in this chapter.2    
 
Such a complex system needed to be fully functional during its first year to avoid payment 
failures for GPs and it was perhaps risky to launch a computerised quality scoring structure 
which was simultaneously linked to payments in the first year of QOF. Had QMAS not 
translated quality points into payment accurately, QOF would have no doubt been rejected by 
GPs as an ineffective P4P scheme, resulting in a sizeable challenge to engage practices with 
the initiative beyond year one. In the year following QOF’s inception, GPs were consistently 
paid in line with the new GMS Contract rules. The integration of QMAS into primary care was 
hailed a success.  
 
A further information technology response following the introduction of QOF was the 
adaptation of in-practice systems and electronic patient records to allow for QMAS 
compatibility and more sensitive READ code searches year on year.  The resulting software 
now provides prompts for clinicians to gather QOF related data during a consultation and has 
helped to endorse the use of electronic templates for this purpose. It appears that this more 
methodical approach to patient consultations has been accepted by general practitioners and 
other primary care professionals.3 
 
This improved infrastructure for primary care informatics led to the creation of the largest 
national primary care database in the world. A discussion of the value and drawbacks of this in 
relation to research follows. 
 
QOF and research  
 
Publicly available QOF data have provided researchers with a wealth of information at their 
fingertips. Prior to QOF, researchers relied on the goodwill of an often limited group of 
practices open to taking part in research studies and as a result were faced with problems of 
selection bias and participant fatigue. However the use of QOF informatics as a research tool 
does have some drawbacks. 
 






Using routinely collated service audit data in research requires a thorough consideration of 
consent and confidentiality issues. QOF was designed solely for the purpose of monitoring care 
and identifying opportunities for service improvement by focusing financial incentives in a 
particular domain.  As QOF data are gathered purely for payment purposes, information about 
practice performance which is not linked to GMS contract financial rewards is omitted from 
the scheme. Researchers hoping to study GP consultation and diagnostic skills for instance will 
clearly have to look for data beyond those available through QOF. 
 
But it is not just qualitative data that are lacking, which is perhaps expected from a tool intended 
to measure performance.  For instance QOF informatics does not provide information about 
patient demographics such as sex and age within particular chronic disease groups. QOF data 
are presented in a way which does not allow for the modelling of relationships between the 
indicators across chronic disease domains, apart from smoking status and advice which can be 
viewed across all disease categories. The lack of a cross-tabulation function does not allow for 
chronic disease multimorbidity searching. One person who may have something to say about 
this is the patient who is called in for numerous reviews towards the end of the tax year, instead 
of a single coordinated person-centred consultation. Naturally this issue does go beyond QOF 
limitations in research use and has implications for public health disease prevalence studies.   
 
A further point concerns the research validity of QOF data. The prevalence of each of the 19 
chronic diseases currently included in the QOF is not independently verified. There is some 
evidence for instance of QOF coronary heart disease underreporting as compared to self-
reported census rates.4 As such, a practice may simply have lacked vigour and effective 
organisation in building up their disease registers. Patients who, for one reason or another, have 
not been coded or been incorrectly coded will not be on the disease register.  The practice of 
exception reporting which will be explored later, may exclude certain patients from the research 
sample again leading to selection bias. 
 
This brings to light another important implication for the usefulness of QOF informatics in 
representing practice performance - evidently there is an association between data recording 
approaches and practice performance on the QOF.  This poses a question as to whether high 
QOF performance merely represents the data recording skills of a practice, rather than the 
levels of care quality it offers.  
 
Better care or better recorded care? 
 
Practices with more highly developed management infrastructures and a shared ethos of coding 
every possible QOF related activity will inevitably have higher QOF scores at the end of the 
accounting year. Many apparent improvements in care amount to little more than increased 
conscientious coding. For example, a practice failing to reach the 90% target for retinopathy 
screening in diabetes (DM21) may find that this target is achievable simply by searching 
through scanned correspondence from the hospital diabetic clinic or local optometrist reporting 
retinopathy findings.  
 
In some senses, the practice may be making economic decisions based on workload, time and 
the type of professional needed to reach the target. On this basis, a practice may make one of 






is worth 5 points for achieving 90% target) and remain below the top target. Or it may invest 
in additional data input staff to find and code missing clinical data. Or, and most expensively, 
it may invest in additional medical personnel to examine, say, an additional ten diabetic patients 
in order to gain all five available QOF points.  
 
Better recording undoubtedly results in higher QOF points but arguably, may not represent 
better care. Equally, low scoring practices may be less skilled at handling large data volumes 
and not necessarily be providing poorer care.  It is possible that low scoring practices display 
other domains of excellence not captured by QOF, such as continuity of care, patient-centred 
consultation skills, diagnostic skills and the care of illnesses not included in the QOF.  It is the 
pragmatic organisational decisions of general practices, based on perceptions of workload and 
money, that have resulted in some commentators describing QOF not so much as a pay-for-
performance system, but a ‘pay-for-reporting’ system.5 This clear link between methods for 
data recording and QOF performance, coupled with financial incentives for achieving high 
QOF scores may render the scheme vulnerable to data manipulation or gaming.   
 
Gaming and P4P 
 
Within the political context of value for money and quality improvement as the main driving 
force behind health policy development, the QOF P4P system was seen both as a means to 
make primary care more accountable to the public and a tool to incentivise improved quality 
of care.  However the introduction of financial incentives into healthcare has led to concerns 
about the potential for P4P to motivate healthcare professionals to manipulate data in order to 
increase QOF scores and therefore financial rewards.6 Moreover the public availability of QOF 
data may lead to stigma resulting from scoring poorly on the QOF and inevitably produce a 
means of ranking of general practices. It has been argued that gaming behaviours are further 
motivated by attempts to avoid such stigma.7 
 
Hood8 describes three types of gaming presented in the table below with possible QOF 
applications: 
 








performance to just 
what the target requires 
Practices will still be rewarded financially for 
working to a certain percentage of the target, 
rather than meeting it for  100% of patients on a 
given register 
Exception reporting so as to reduce workload 
Ratchet Effect Underperformance to 
prevent target increase 
Targets are set nationally and underperformance 
in single practices is unlikely to influence the 




of reported results 
A spectrum running from selecting indicators 
for data entry which fit the target best, through 







The subject of gaming and manipulation of target achievement is controversial. Gaming is not 
unique to QOF and is probably a feature of all P4P systems. The National Audit Office report 
on the 2004 new contract for GPs suggested that QOF income could be inappropriately boosted 
by deliberately removing patients for whom GPs may perhaps miss QOF targets from disease 
registers or by increasing levels of exception reporting.9  In this vein it has been suggested that 
exception reporting although high in only a small proportion of practices, is the strongest 
predictor of practice achievement on the QOF.10 There may well be more kudos to achieving 
high QOF scores for a small number of patients, than in gaining average scores across a larger 
chronic disease register. 
 
On the other hand QOF provides financial incentives for increasing the number of patients 
recorded on a disease register, as QMAS adjusts payments on the basis of disease prevalence. 
This may encourage the inclusion of patients with clinical measures on the cusp of diagnostic 
criteria on a particular chronic disease register. Here gaming has direct implications for the 
quality of patient care, since it may put patients at risk of unnecessary disease monitoring and 
possibly unsuitable treatment interventions.    
 
Gaming may well generate overlarge financial rewards in just a few practices. But how 
widespread a phenomenon is it? Some have suggested that gaming is endemic but a more 
balanced perspective emerged from the Centre of Health Economics which concluded that 
practices could have treated 12.5% fewer patients without falling below upper QOF  
thresholds.11  This suggests that  GPs have not taken the opportunity to produce a threshold 
gaming effect, whereby the quantity and quality of work can be reduced to the minimum needed 
to meet the target. In other words, GP practices had overshot targets to a much larger extent 
than the likely level of exception reporting. Indeed figure 1 shows a decrease in exception 
reporting nationally, across the last four years of QOF data (exception reporting rates were not 
available through QMAS for the year 2004/05): 
 


















Nonetheless one of the challenges of QOF has been how to tackle the potential for gaming 
which is inherent in any P4P scheme. Although all general practices are given an inspection-
type visit annually by representatives from the Primary Care Trust, these may be insufficient 
to detect evidence at case level of inappropriate exception reporting or exclusion from disease 
register. Although inspection guidance makes a distinction between data manipulation due to 
error and by intention12, subtleties of the different levels of gaming may not be picked up and 
there is potential for errors to be labelled as QOF fraud. 
 
Inconsistencies in data entry between and within practices may be influenced by the lack of 
clear guidance around the methods for measuring and recording indicators, rather than 
fraudulent activity linked to financial motivations. For instance a blood pressure reading on a 
patient’s electronic notes may be the ‘best’ of three measurements taken in a consultation, the 
average of readings taken on separate occasions or even the reading that is closest to the target 
entered electronically from paper notes by the practice administrator. This is further 
compounded by the fact that target levels recommended by the GMS contract differ from those 
promoted by NICE and the British Hypertension Society. This has led some commentators to 
state that defining QOF targets without clear guidance is ‘largely meaningless’13.Therefore 
what can appear to be fraudulent data recording may simply be the result of clustering due to 
unclear methodological guidance.  It is unlikely that P4P will ever produce normally distributed 
epidemiological data, yet PCT assessors are advised to investigate clustering which appears 
not to be the result of ‘energetic treatment’.12 
 
The notion of the healthcare professional gaming data in order to achieve financial gain is likely 
to be an oversimplification. A number of studies have shown that unless external incentives 
such as payments for performance appeal to the professional values of the individual 
concerned, they paradoxically reduce performance14. Professionalism is one driver of quality 
which is in danger of being ignored by QOF.  And yet it is a sense of professionalism, the 
accumulation of a body of specialist knowledge and wisdom placed at the service of society, 
and a public service ethos which probably motivate GPs more in the long term that a financially 
driven P4P system. It is hard to see how any P4P system could reward the components of 
professionalism, as expounded by Downie.15  
 
However there can be no doubt that debates concerning gaming behaviours in general practice 
do not hold the same significance for patient care as the key question of whether or not QOF 
and QOF informatics have led to tangible improvements in the nation’s health. 
 
Illusory public health gains? 
 
There can be no doubt about the concrete improvements since QOF was instituted in terms of 
overall quality improvement and gains in ‘intermediate outcomes’ such as blood pressure and 
cholesterol control.  However, the successes of QOF have been tempered by concerns that some 
of the achievements captured through informatics might not be as substantial as they appear to 
be.  
 
The quality of primary care proved to be far higher than was expected at the time QOF was 






at the end of the first year (2004/5). In fact, the 8600 practices of England had a mean QOF 
score of 958.7 (out of a maximum possible score of 1050 points) which represented 91.3% of 
available points.1  Two hundred and twenty two (2.6%) of these practices achieved the 
maximum score. In spite of several annual revisions to the QOF, revising targets upwards and 
adding indicators, the 2008/9 mean QOF score achievement was 954.2 of available points (the 
maximum is currently 1000 points) with 2.0% of practices achieving the maximum score.1   
 
The graph below shows the change in QOF scores nationally since QOF’s introduction in 2004: 
 
Figure 2: QOF scores nationally 2004-2009 as a percentage of total points achieved out of the 
total available. 
 
These scoring gains have also translated into public health gains, albeit on a rather piecemeal 
basis. In an evaluation of QOF in its original incarnation, Fleetcroft et al however concluded 
that there was ‘no relationship between pay and health gain’, at least for the eight public health 
and preventative interventions which were included in their study.16 This is perhaps 
unsurprising because the level of P4P financial reward was based on estimates of likely GP 
workload rather than on health gain for patients. However, if QOF continues to be generously 
funded, it has to be able to demonstrate that it is money well spent and that the opportunity 
costs of tying up health care funding in QOF are considerable.  
 
The weighting of QOF points, since they reflect a pay deal for GPs, continues to be driven by 
the assumed workload attached to achieving each indicator and not the likely benefit to patients. 
Thus, for example, the indicator DM23 (50% achievement of an HbA1c target for diabetics of 
7.0 or less) is awarded 17 points whereas DM18 (influenza vaccination target of 85% for 
diabetics) merely attracts 3 points. Moreover, many of the public health indicators within QOF 
such as blood pressure, cholesterol and HbA1c control were improving before the arrival of 
QOF. Nevertheless, there has been evidence of public health gain with substantial 
improvements in, for instance, the management of diabetes and control of cardiovascular risk 


















A further public health success has been the drive to reduce health inequalities. The differences 
in QOF achievement between deprived and prosperous areas have been small and, over time, 
there is evidence that these differences have diminished.18 The narrowing of target differences 
between rich and poor communities has been part of an overall trend of improved performance 
with somewhat greater improvements seen in more deprived communities.19 
 
One reason for questioning the success of P4P in its incarnation as QOF is that three technical 
features of QOF may have diminished the reach of performance targets.  
 
Firstly, the process of ‘exception reporting’ necessarily allows certain patients, deemed 
‘unsuitable’, to be excluded from the overall target for patients registered at the practice. 
Patients may understandably be excluded if they are terminally ill or if they do not agree (after 
three written requests) to attend an appointment at the surgery for the management of their 
chronic disease. This suggests that non-attenders will be further excluded from drives to engage 
patients in public health improvement initiatives. They will therefore be invisible to QOF 
targets and the public health effectiveness of population targets will be reduced.  The overall 
exception reporting rate for 2008/9 was 6.88% for indicators measuring an outcome and 1.70% 
for indicators measuring a process. So, on average, almost 7% of patients in England are 
excluded from public health targets such as achievement of a serum cholesterol of <5mmol/L.  
 
Secondly, the targets are not set at 100%. Again this is understandable given the practical 
difficulties of achieving clinical targets. These targets are rarely achieved in research trial 
conditions, let alone in routine practice, even with often large financial incentives to spur on 
the team. However, targets set at 70% for blood pressure control or cholesterol control in 
coronary heart disease (CHD6 and CHD8) further exclude 30% of patients from these public 
health targets. Thus in combination with exception reporting, targets set below 100% may shift 
the focus of the practice away from harder to reach patients, in exchange for more efficient 
achievement of results. 
 
The success of QOF may be tempered in other respects. Performance may have improved in 
domains covered by performance indicators but remain static in areas out of the spotlight, such 
a rheumatological and gastrointestinal disease. Increasingly, the proposals for strengthening 
QOF are focussing on aligning the indicators and the associated QOF points with public health 
gains. Now that NICE has taken overall responsibility for QOF development, the expectation 
is that QOF will develop along the lines of NICE guidelines and favour cost-effective public 
health interventions where one of the costs to be considered may well be the cost of QOF points 
themselves. Yet, there are suggestions that performance has now reached a ceiling and that 
other approaches are needed to coax further improvements out of primary care.  
 
Another potential approach to quality improvement could be greater inclusion of feedback from 
patients in the overall spread of P4P indicators. Prior to 2008/9, GPs simply gave out 
questionnaires to a selection of patients and ‘patient experience’ points were awarded on the 
basis of completed surveys and reflection on the results of these surveys. Since then, a more 
rigorous approach has been adopted with independent patient surveys conducted by polling 
organisations. GPs are now rewarded on the basis of responses to two questions about time 






been criticised as being politically driven and not representative of patients’ needs; they do not 
ask about the consultation or perceived standards of care. One danger of this approach is the 
unintended consequence of less satisfied responses from patients in deprived communities 
which may result in more funding being directed toward practices serving populations with 
lower health care needs. Yet the inclusion of these indicators does mark the introduction of a 
certain sense of capturing the patient ‘voice’ within QOF informatics, albeit perhaps on a rather 




So is QOF all smoke and mirrors, or has it produced informatics opportunities which outweigh 
its limitations? There is no doubt that QOF has brought with it a coherent wealth of primary 
care data that was unobtainable prior to its inception. Data used to provide performance 
monitoring information for general practices can be set against targets determined by the GMS 
Contract and are now widely available. So too is information that contributes to identifying 
potential public health inequalities. However the key lies in recognising the limits of how QOF 
informatics can be used.  Bold statements about QOF’s power to raise and sustain the quality 
of patient care ignore the subtleties of gaming behaviours in the face of financial rewards.  
 
In addition informatics sourced from QOF represents only a snapshot of the day-to-day work 
of general practices in England. The underlying  essence of good primary care lies in subjective 
notions of rapport, interpersonal skills, compassion and professionalism to name but a few and 
therefore is unlikely ever to be fully captured through pay for performance initiatives.  QOF 
informatics may therefore have illusory effects that detract from grounding quality 
improvement in the reality of patient experience. Nonetheless when all is said and done, QOF 
has emerged as one part of a multifaceted approach to raise quality standards in primary care. 
It has its imperfections and flaws. Like all incentive schemes, it is prone to the law of 
unintended consequences. Yet overall, the practical application of QOF throughout UK 
primary care has risen above the shortcomings, and it has contributed to the drive to embed 
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C. Research governance: assailing a paper mountain 
 
Here is a personal view of the rigmarole I have been experiencing as a PhD student applying 
for local Research and Development (R&D) approval to conduct my relatively low-risk study. 
The very mention of ‘ethics’ and ‘R&D’ elicits sighs all round from the PhD office and this is 
not without good reason. I, for one, have found the application system complex, 
inconsistent and at times, rather discouraging.  
 
Since 2008, an online Integrated Research Application System (IRAS) has been in operation 
for the purpose of seeking ethical approval nationally and facilitating local research governance 
approval. The creation of IRAS followed a Department of Health advisory group report calling 
for a streamlined ethics application system (1). My first challenge on embarking on this 
supposedly simpler process was navigating my way around the National Research Ethics 
Service (NRES) website and its obvious penchant for acronyms.  
 
Once I knew my CAS from my SSA, I faced the 70-question ethics form. The nature of my 
research (a qualitative organisational study of low QOF scoring general practices) placed it at 
odds with the hypothetico-deductive format the form takes. Yet despite it being difficult to 
specify exactly what my exploratory research might involve from the outset, and finding the 
form inflexible at times, it rightly prompted me to reflect on the ethical implications of my 
work. Finding that local ethics committees were fully booked for a number of months ahead, I 
travelled 60 miles to attend the next available meeting. The experience of this meeting was 
very encouraging and I found the panel supportive. Approval without amendments was granted 
swiftly. So far, so good.  
 
But my excitement about starting fieldwork soon after was, in retrospect, rather naïve. NRES 
advises that researchers do not wait for ethical clearance to be approved before seeking local 
research governance approval through PCT R&D offices. However, the R&D requirement to 
identify a local collaborator at the GP practice research sites I would be visiting, left me in a 
chicken or egg predicament. Approaching GPs at this stage in the case of my study was 
synonymous with participant recruitment prior to gaining ethical approval to do so. 
Additionally, I felt that the label ‘local collaborator’ may hold burdensome connotations for 
GPs, whom it was already hard enough to persuade to take part in my project as research 
participants. 
 
At the time of writing I had applied to three PCT R&D offices. There was nothing ‘integrated’ 
about this experience. Each office required at least 10 different documents to be emailed 
through, in a variety of formats (pdf, xml, three large envelopes filled with old-fashioned 
paper). I was also asked to provide documentation which was not listed on the checklist, such 
as a financial breakdown of study funding arrangements. Some emails bounced back due to 
attachment size. At this point I was climbing a mountain of paperwork, which might have 
honed my administrative skills, but did little for my academic development as a postgraduate 
researcher. One could say that I was on the receiving end of what Haggerty (2) coined the 
‘ethics creep’. The unique skills required for negotiating the ethical complexities of researching 







Yet, most importantly, I believe that the research governance process lacks the transparency of 
the national ethical review. Information about who makes the decision about R&D approval is 
not made available to the researcher, and it is unclear on what grounds a decision is reached. 
Indeed, I have been faced with an unfavourable decision which I believe is not consistent with 
the checks stipulated in the Research Governance Framework for Health and Social Care (3). 
As justification, I was provided with an inaccurate statement of my study aims to support the 
decision of the office in question. There was no mention whether I could appeal. 
 
My experience is not atypical and raises issues such as the lack of research governance 
consistency and transparency. There is a clear requirement for a greater balance in addressing 
the needs of the research process, as well as of those being researched. Impeding health services 
research through excessive bureaucracy cannot be in the public interest. Just one suggestion 
for improving the IRAS online system would be an integrated function for 
uploading attachments and thus submitting the same documents to all R&D offices at the push 
of a button. At a time of financial austerity, this would no doubt be a time-saving and therefore 
cost-cutting solution. Furthermore, the composition of the panel behind the R&D decision and 
the criteria they use for evaluating applications should be made explicit to the researcher. 
Behind such changes should lie the ultimate goal of removing the frustrating bureaucratic 
burden faced by health service researchers, while endeavouring to maintain the highest ethical 
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D. Identifying poorly performing general practices in England: a longitudinal study using 
data from the Quality and Outcomes Framework  
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Objective: To determine the characteristics of general practices which perform poorly in terms 
of Quality and Outcome (QOF) performance indicators in England’s NHS.   
Method: Retrospective, four year longitudinal study, 2005 to 2008. Data were obtained from 
8515 practices (99% of practices in England) in year 1, 8264 (98%) in year 2, 8192 (98%) in 
year 3 and 8256 (99%) in year 4. Outcome measures: QOF performance scores; social 
deprivation (IMD-2007) and ethnicity from the 2001 national census; general practice 
characteristics. 
Results: We identified a cohort of 212 (2.7%) practices which remained in the lowest decile for 
total QOF scores in the four years following the introduction of the QOF. A total of 705,386 
patients were registered at these practices in year 4. These practices were more likely to be 
singlehanded (odds ratio [OR], 13.8), nontraining practices (OR, 3.9) and located in deprived 
areas (OR, 2.6; most  vs least deprived quintiles). General practitioners (GPs) in these practices 
were more often aged _65 years or more (OR, 7.3; mean GP age _65 years  vs <45 years), male 
(OR 2.0), UK qualified (OR 2.0) with small list sizes (OR 3.2; list size <1000  vs 1500–2000 
patients). We identified individual QOF indicators which were poorly achieved. The reported 
prevalence of most chronic diseases was lower in the poorly performing cohort. 
Conclusions: A small minority of practices have remained poor performers in terms 
ofmeasurable performance indicators over a four-year period. The strongest predictors of poor 
QOF performance were singlehanded and small practices, and practices staffed by elderly GPs.  
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In parallel with the increased adoption of performance indicators in health-care systems, there 
has been an expanding literature describing their role as incentives in pay-for-performance 
systems, for driving up overall quality standards and for justifying public investment in health.1 
The Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF), introduced in England in 2004, has been 
acclaimed in terms of demonstrating pre-existent levels  of high quality primary care, overall 
quality improvement and the reduction of health inequalities.1  Dissenting voices have raised 
concerns about ‘tick-box medicine’, the failure to value personal care and the lack of validated 
indicators measuring many of the essential functions of primary care such as early diagnosis 
and empathic care.2  Some chronic diseases have been omitted altogether from the indicators 
used.  
 
Evaluation of health-care systems in terms of performance indicators has generally focused on 
overall achievement rather than the poor performance of a few. This makes sense from a public 
health perspective since the population is better served by concentrating on raising the mean 
standard rather than concentrating on improving the performance of the outliers. General 






exclusive registration at one practice. If that practice is poorly performing, each of the patients 
registered at the practice lacks alternative access to higher quality primary care, short of 
registering with another practice. Most patients form a long term relationship with their practice 
and their own general practitioner (GP) which acts as a disincentive to change practices in 
search of higher quality standards.  
 
Although concerns have been raised about poor performance in individual practitioners and 
about wide variations in performance, none of the international literature about performance 
indicators has described the characteristics of general practices which continue to perform 
poorly over time. We decided to use the performance data contained within the QOF to identify 
the characteristics of sustained poor performance among general practices, during the four 






We obtained QOF data covering the four years April 2004 to March 2008 for all general 
practices in England. These data covered the following domains: chronic disease management; 
practice organization; patient experience; additional services; and access. 
 
Practice and population characteristics A detailed national summary of practice characteristics 
was obtained.3 Variables included: practice list size; age/sex breakdown of registered 
population; number of full time equivalent GPs; the age of the GP; the country where each GP 
was medically qualified; and training practice status. A variable was constructed to describe 
the mean age of GPs in each practice. We took the mid-point of each of the ten age categories 
in the original data and used this to determine a weighted average for the practice as a whole, 
based on the number of full time equivalent GPs in that category. This value was then used to 
allocate each practice into one of four mean GP age categories: under 45 years; 45–54 years; 
55–64 years; and _65 years. Data from the 2001 national UK Census were obtained based on 
the Lower Layer Super Output Area (SOA)4 for each practice and used as the basis for 
calculating social deprivation (the Index of Multiple Deprivation, or IMD-20075) and ethnicity. 
Each SOA consists of about 1500 people within a defined geographical locality. Census data 
based on the home address of all patients registered at a general practice are not available in 
England so the SOA in which the general practice was located had to act as a proxy for 




We constructed a dataset containing QOF data, practice and SOA-based census variables for 
all practices in England. We removed practices from the dataset if they were no longer 
independent at the end of the study year or had a list size of under 750 patients or under 500 
per full time equivalent GP on the grounds that these were likely to be newly formed or about 
to be closed. We defined longitudinal cohorts of poorly performing practices based on their 
total QOF score over each of the four years for which QOF data are available. We then explored 
the characteristics of these poorly performing practices using univariate analysis (simple 







for possible confounding variables using multivariate analysis (multiple logistic regression). 
The analyses were conducted using logistic regression which produces odds ratios (ORs) for 
the likelihood of being a poorly performing practice. Logistic regression requires a reference 
variable to be defined amongst the range of each ordinal variable. The ORs represent the 
likelihood of belonging to the poor performers’ cohort compared to the reference group. Values 
.1.0 mean that these practices were more likely to be in the poorly performing cohort than 




Practices included in the analysis Sixty-one practices were removed as likely to be newly 
formed or about to be closed in year 1, 145 in year 2, 180 in year 3 and 38 in year 4. Due to 
postcode and SOA anomalies, we were unable to match IMD-2004 and ethnicity data for 35 
practices in year 1, none in year 2, 361 in year 3 and 1 in year 4. The final dataset consisted of 
8515 practices (99% of the total) in year 1, 8264 (98% of the total) in year 2, 8192 (98% of the 
total) in year 3 and 8256 (99% of the total) in year 4; data were available for 7984 practices in 
all four years of the study. 
 
Defining poorly performing practices 
 
Overall, 212 (3%) practices remained in the cohort of practices with QOF scores in the lowest 
10% during each of the four consecutive years of the study, 542 (7%) remained in the lowest 
20% cohort and 753 (9%) in the lowest 25% cohort (Table 1). Rising national mean 
performances in all practices over the four-year period of study were mirrored by rising mean 
values in each of the poorly performing cohorts (Table 1). 
 
In order to focus on the poor performers, our principal analysis was based on the 212 practices 
remaining in the lowest 10% for total QOF scores during the first four years after the 
introduction of the QOF (the ‘poor performance cohort’). A more stringent definition of poor 
performance would have reduced the significance of the analysis; a more generous definition 
would have substantially increased the number of practices in the 
poor performance category, thus reducing face validity. The mean QOF score of the poorly 
performing cohort was 804 in year 4; the mean score for the remaining practices was 976. A 
total of 705,386 patients were registered at these practices in the final year of study. 
 
Practices omitted from the analysis 
 






had not missed poor QOF performance in their final year before closure, we explored mean 
QOF performance in these practices. Practices which closed in the subsequent year did have 
lower QOF performance than national mean levels, but their overall QOF performance was 
significantly higher than practices in the poor performance cohort (Table 2). 
 
Characteristics of the poorly performing practices – univariate analysis 
 
The characteristics of the 212 ‘poorly performing’ practices are summarized in Table 3. 
Characteristics strongly associated with poor performance were non-training practices and 
practices with older GPs. Practices with  large list sizes per full time equivalent (FTE) GP were 
not more likely to be in the poorly performing cohort. 
 
Characteristics of the poorly performing practices – multivariate analysis  
 
Multivariate analysis was conducted using the poorly performing cohort of 212 practices as the 
dependent variable. All of the variables explored using univariate analysis were included in the 
multivariate analysis (Table 4). Some variables were no longer significant in the multivariate 
analysis and some variables changed their direction of association. The ethnicity of the local 
population no longer remained a significant predictor, mainly because ethnicity was strongly 
confounded by social deprivation. Similarly, non-UK trained GPs initially appeared more 
likely to be poor performers, but once adjusted for confounding, particularly by singlehanded 
status and GP age, the association with poor performance was stronger for UK trained GPs. 
Based on the findings of the multivariate analysis, the strongest predictors of poor performance 
were singlehanded status, mean age of GPs and training practice status (Table 4). Smaller 
practices in general were more likely to be poor performers: the OR was highest for 
singlehanded practices at 13.87 (compared to practices with .4 FTE GPs) and fell progressively 
as practice size increased. Similarly, practices with older GPs were more likely to be poor 
performers: the ORs rose progressively in the three older age bands, reaching 7.32 for practices 
where the mean age of GPs was 65 years of more, when compared with practices where the  












Singlehanded status and variability In any study of the characteristics of general practices, 
singlehanders may be disproportionally represented  among the outliers. This is because 
variations in the performance of individual GPs may be cancelled out within a group practice. 
To determine if the association of poor performance with singlehanded status was the result of 
a statistical artefact, we calculated the variability of QOF scores in singlehanded and group 
practices. The standard deviation of total QOF score was 86.0 in singlehanded practices, 55.3 
in practices with 1.1–2 FTE GPs, 47.6 with 2.1–3 FTE GPs, 32.0 with 3.1–4 FTE GPs and 24.5 
with over 4 FTE GPs. Having established the greater variability in total QOF score among 
singlehanders, we determined whether singlehanded status was more strongly associated with 
poor performance or with high performance. We created a cohort of high performing practices 
by selecting those with total QOF scores in the top 10% for each of the four years of our study 
(n . 183). Based on the same method as above, the adjusted OR for singlehanded practices 
belonging to the high performing cohort was 1.41 (95% confidence interval [CI], 0.64 to 3.09; 
P . 0.40).  
 
Singlehanded practices were thus more likely to have a total QOF score scattered across a wider 
range than group practices, were significantly more likely to be in the poor performance cohort 
of practices, but not significantly more likely to be in the high performance cohort. Although 












Poor performance and geographical distribution 
 
The 212 practices in the poor performance cohort were distributed unevenly throughout the 
country. Of the ten strategic health authorities (SHAs) in England, those with the highest 
proportion of practices in the poor performance cohort were London SHA at 4% (n . 57), south 
east coast SHA at 3% (n . 21) and West Midlands SHA at 3% (n . 32). In contrast, less than 1% 
of practices were in the poor performance cohort in two SHAs: south central, 0.2% (n . 1) and 
north east, 1% (n . 4). 
 







The poor performance cohort was defined in terms of its total QOF score. But is achievement 
diminished equally across all domains and all indicators within the QOF? The profile of QOF 
performance in the poorly performing cohort is summarized in Table 5. Particular shortfalls in 
clinical indicator categories in the poorly performing cohort were achievements on  the 
depression, mental health and palliative care categories. Notable shortfalls in the achievement 
of individual QOF indicators were those related to mental health (five out of the nine clinical 
indicators with the greatest shortfall were depression or mental health indicators) and those 
related to poor record keeping (five out of the six organizational indicators with the greatest 




Overall, the poor performance cohort was characterized by poorer organizational domain 
scores than clinical indicator scores. Poorly performing practices scored a mean of 71% (95% 
CI, 69–74%) of available organizational domain QOF points and 84% (82–85%) of clinical 
QOF points. In contrast, the remaining practices had similar organizational and clinical 
indicator scores, achieving 95% (95–96%) and 98% (98.0–98.2%), respectively. Differences 
between the poor performance cohort and the remaining practices might have been distorted 
by differential exception reporting rates.6  Differences are known to occur in the willingness 
of practices to exception report certain patients, thus excluding them from performance targets. 
Exception report rates can only be calculated for those clinical indicators which apply to the 
whole disease register. Where available, values corrected for exception reporting are presented 







Prevalence of chronic diseases and poor performance 
 
Reporting bias may be introduced by differential prevalence rates for the chronic diseases 
which feature in the QOF. Because the poorly performing practices were located in more 
deprived areas, which could be expected to have higher disease prevalences, we adjusted for 
deprivation, ethnicity, age and gender. Prevalence rates for most of the chronic diseases were 






We have defined a cohort of 212 practices (3% of all practices in England) which remained in 
the bottom decile of QOF performance during each of the first four years since the introduction 
of the QOF. Smaller practices (fewer full time equivalent GPs) and practices with older GPs 
weremore likely to be ‘poor performers’; the association was strongest for singlehanded GPs 
and practices in which the average age of GPs was over 65 years. In spite of improvements 
over the last four years, the mean QOF score of these poorly performing practices still lags 165 
QOF points behind the remaining practices. Performance was unevenly diminished in the 
poorly performing cohort. Particular shortfalls were noted for indicators in the chronic disease 
categories of depression, psychotic illness, palliative care and epilepsy. Large shortfalls in 
individual targets were observed, particularly those relating to mental health issues or the 










The main limitations of this study were the limitations of the QOF itself. Many criteria of 
excellence such as personal care and diagnostic skill are difficult to capture by any performance 
indicator, whereas some eminently measurable aspects of care quality are included in other 
performance measures but not in the QOF.2 QOF performance is therefore only a snapshot of 
overall practice performance. Practices which appeared to be poorly performing in our study 
may have offered excellence in other domains of care which were not included in nationally 
reported data. In particular, there is evidence that singlehanded practices offer higher levels of 
access than group practices and offer a degree of continuity of care which few group practices 
can match.7 Only qualitative studies involving visits to practices and interviews with staff and 
patients are likely to determine whether performance was globally or selectively diminished in 




This is the first study to report on the characteristics of practices performing consistently less 
successfully in terms of QOF achievement. True, poorly performing practices accounted for 
only a small proportion of all practices (although less stringent definitions would have 
substantially enlarged the cohort), but these practices provided the primary care for just over 
700,000 registered patients. Patients are loath to change their GP8  and there is no evidence 
that patients in poorly performing practices are more likely to register elsewhere. Breaking this 
deadlock will be difficult to achieve unless the process of informing patients and changing GPs 
is made easier for patients. Moreover, QOF performance did improve in the poorly performing 
practices over the four years of the study, but the remaining gap between these practices and 
national average scores in year four was substantial at 165 QOF points.  
 
Previous regional studies have reported little or no difference in the clinical performance of 
singlehanded practices once the results were adjusted for confounding, 9,10, but national studies 
have consistently demonstrated poorer achievement.5 One option for improving reported 
quality achievement is to develop loose associations (forming networks) between small 
practices, but whether these can bring about quality improvement is not established.11   
 
The 2004 NHS Contract for GPs in England removed the requirement for GPs to retire at 70 
years.12  Our results question the wisdom of allowing elderly GPs to continue in practice 
without additional checks on the quality of their care, although we cannot be certain that 
alternative explanations, such as poor recording of performance, did not contribute to low 
scores in these practices. Future developments in primary care such as compulsory revalidation 
and practice accreditation may ensure that only practices offering high quality care will retain 
their NHS contract. Both processes are likely to emphasize professional values that are assessed 
by peer review and practice visits, rather than the data driven emphasis of the QOF.13  Poor 
performance affected most aspects of QOF, but we have identified specific indicators which 
are particularly poorly delivered in the poor performance cohort, some of which may be 
remediable by specific interventions. More broadly, the shortfall in poorly performing practices 
was more organizational than clinical, suggesting that these practices may benefit from greater 






rates for common chronic diseases. 
 
Under-reporting of chronic disease raises concerns about the use of QOF-derived prevalence 
rates for resource allocation purposes (which could selectively disadvantage more deprived 
areas) and also for the quality of care provided to patients whose chronic disease has not been 
recognized or coded onto a clinical ‘problem list’ by the GP.  
 
Finally, having identified a cohort of relatively long term poorly performing practices, the 
challenge for researchers is to identify successful interventions for transforming these 
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E. Do systems and complexity theories aid our understanding of poor 






The scope of this paper is to introduce systems and complexity theories as a potential 
framework for understanding poor performing general practices. Whilst systems theory 
emphasises the linear interaction and interrelationship of parts of an organisation, complexity 
theory concerns the study of those systems that feature non-linear dynamics. As complexity 
theory has its roots in systems theory, it is appropriate to explore the two theories together. The 
strengths and limitations of using each theory as a lens for viewing poor performance in general 




Before discussing the finer points of systems and complexity theories, the concept of poor 
performance in general practice warrants an introduction. Performance in general practice 
tends to take on a government policy-driven definition, inextricably linked to notions of 
‘quality’. Overwhelmingly, quality is presented using policy rhetoric as something measurable 
that can be achieved through meeting pre-defined top-down targets. The drive for improving 
quality in health services through performance indicators is seen as a key feature of the 
Thatcherite New Public Management introduction of market incentives to improve the 
efficiency of public services (Walsh, 1995). New Public Management was embraced by New 
Labour’s White Paper “Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation” (Department of Health, 1999) 
with the establishment of targets in priority areas to reduce health inequalities. 
 
Following on from this policy trend, in 2004 the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) was 
conceived as part of the new General Medical Services Contract (nGMS) (Department of 
Health, 2003) and became the dominant model for monitoring the quality of general practice 
in England on a ‘pay-for performance’ basis, accounting for around a third of a practice’s 
income. General practices receive payments for QOF points’ achievement on a variety of 
indicators in clinical, organisational and patient experience domains – currently with a 1000 
QOF points maximum.  
 
Against the policy backdrop of improving the quality of patient care through measurable targets 
becoming a key preoccupation within health services (Elwyn & Hocking, 2000), QOF has 
become synonymous with general practice performance in the language of health management 
and policy-makers. Indeed, there runs the risk of an overgeneralisation by labelling general 
practices on the basis of persistently lower than average QOF scores only as ‘poor performing’ 
(Peckham & Wallace, 2011), and not least publicly with QOF data not dissimilar to league 
tables available in the public domain.  
 
There is recent evidence that 141 general practices have continued to underperform on the 






(Ashworth et al., 2010). The strongest predictors of QOF underperformance appear to be 
practices which are small and single-handed. Westland and others (1996) argue that poorly 
defined management structures are a feature of single-handed practices and impact negatively 
on performance. De Koning et al. (2005), looking at stroke prevention, discovered that on the 
other hand, general practitioners with a higher level of integrated organisational structures (e.g. 
effective record keeping) were less likely to deliver suboptimal care. However, single-handed 
practices, whilst not having the infrastructure to report their QOF-related activities, may offer 
a more personalised service and better accessibility to a named GP for patients (Van den 
Hombergh et al., 2005). 
 
It can be seen therefore that factors assumed to impact on the quality of a practice can be placed 
within the context of the practice as an organisation. Definitions of what constitutes an 
organisation vary depending on one’s theoretical perspective (Handy, 1999). A general 
definition may be simply ‘a group of people who work together’. The link between how a 
practice functions organisationally and the quality of the service it delivers has been made 
within published literature. For instance, Huntington and Gillam (2000) discuss the challenges 
some organisational features of general practices pose to nationwide quality improvement 
programmes, such as lack of technical skills and effective leadership. 
 
Organisational characteristics of a general practice can also have an impact on adherence to 
clinical guidelines (Wiener-Ogilvie, S., 2008). Therefore, for the purpose of this paper, poor 
performing general practices will be viewed as synonymous with their organisational context. 
Indeed, the central concerns of both systems and complexity theories are to understand the way 
in which organisations function. Both theories will be now be explored in turn. 
 
Introducing Systems and Complexity Theories 
 
What is systems theory? 
 
Attempts at defining systems theory have been made by numerous commentators. Systems 
theory is most often associated with the work of the biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy. 
Bertalanffy emphasized the existence of principles common to all systems in all scientific 
fields. He argued that all systems are the product of the connectedness and relationships of their 
components (Von Bertalanffy, 1968). Furthermore, Bertalanffy’s theory called for a shift in 
focus from these components to the whole. In this vein, Sweeney (2006) describes one key 
characteristic of systems thinking as presenting systems as properties of the whole, none of 
these properties being held by the individual parts themselves. It follows that the properties of 
the system are destroyed by reducing the system to its component parts. Here parallels can be 
drawn with Gestalt Psychology. A system is not just any set of components, rather its essential 
property is that as a whole it is greater than and different from the sum of its parts (Köhler, 
1929).  
 
This approach can be set up in opposition to reductionism. Jackson (2003) explained 
reductionism in the context of systems as a ‘traditional scientific method (which) sees the parts 
(of a system) as paramount and seeks to identify the parts, understand the parts and work up 
from an understanding of the parts to an understanding of the whole’. The key limitation of the 






interactions and relationships between them may be missed. Jackson instead proposes that by 
viewing a system as more than the sum of its parts, one builds up a rich holistic understanding 
of that system. Indeed Poincare (1958) described the aim of science itself as ‘not things in 
themselves, but the relation between things. Outside these relations there is no reality 
knowable’  
 
Yet to move beyond the realms of pure theorising, systems theory can also hold practical 
applications for understanding organisations. Keep (2005) described systems theory as ‘a 
powerful analytical construct in the study of organisations, that suggests the concept of an 
organisation having interrelated parts’. Systems theory can therefore be viewed as a construct 
for organisational analysis, one that focuses on the organisation as a system consisting of 
components which interact to form the organisation in its totality.  
 
Systems theory as applied to organisational study can be classified into three key perspectives 
– rational, natural or open system (Scott, 1992). The rational systems perspective sees 
organisations as formal structures consisting of clear cut rules and roles, defined so in order to 
meet the organisation’s objectives. The emphasis here is on properly applied control 
resulting in attaining an organisation’s goals. Checkland’s (1994) definition of hard systems 
thinking is relevant to this perspective, whereby the world is assumed to consist of a set of parts 
which can be systematically engineered to achieve objectives. However, there also exists a soft 
tradition within systems thinking, which views the world as problematic, particularly in terms 
of human relationships binding the parts of a system, and has an interest in the process of 
inquiry into these problematic situations that make up the world.  
 
Along these lines, the view of the organisation as a natural system places more emphasis on 
informal structures and goal complexity. The interest in the systems theory approach is in how 
players within an organisation act within the context of its rules and formal structures. The 
organisation is not seen as holding a unitary goal, rather a plurality of aims and interests, which 
at times can be conflicting. From the natural system standpoint, the organisation does not 
exhibit highly formalised social structures, but they are self-evolving adapting systems.  
 
Lastly, the open systems perspective emphasises on the other hand process over structure. 
Organisations are not closed systems but they are influenced by their external environment. 
This can be understood through von Bertalanffy’s original biological analogy when illustrating 
his systems theory; the dynamic interaction of the internal and external environments is likened 
to the selective exchange of a semi-permeable cell membrane. Therefore an organisation’s 
ability to meet its goals is ‘dependent on continuing exchanges with and constituted by the 
environments in which they operate’ (Scott, 1992).  
 
It could be argued that these three perspectives simply reflect different views about how an 
organisation attempts to meet its goals. There is a sense of a move away from a linear approach 
to studying organisations as systems to a non-linear paradigm. Within such an approach, 
components of a system not only relate to one another, but also adapt and evolve, at times in 
unpredictable ways complicating the process by which the goals of an organisation are 
attempted to be met. Clearly the key characteristic of an organisation in systems theory is that 
its constituent parts relate to one another in order to meet a shared goal or a set of goals. Indeed 






therefore that a study of general practices as organisations must take into account the ways they 
work in order to meet their goals. And indeed to go a logical step back, what those goals 
actually are, for instance whether or not QOF performance features highly in the priorities of 
the practice. This leads onto the question of to what extent systems theory has been applied to 
the study of healthcare organisations, and in particular of general practice. This will be explored 
in the following section. 
 
Systems theory & health services research Systems thinking has obvious relevance to 
understanding healthcare organisations. In line with systems thinking healthcare can be 
described as ‘as a set of connected or interdependent parts or agents—including caregivers and 
patients—bound by a common purpose and acting on their knowledge.’ (Institute of Medicine, 
2001). Indeed systems theory has an established reputation of applicability to health services 
research. Anaf and others (2007) proposed combining systems thinking with case study 
research in order to study health services in an interpretivist exploratory framework. The case 
of the health service therefore becomes a specific, unique, bounded system with working parts 
(Stake, 2003). Anaf and colleagues argue that this combined approach can yield considerable 
insights, particularly in studying health services quality. Thus the systems case study approach 
has particular relevance to this study, as it allows for gathering multiple perspectives of players 
within a GP practice and as Anaf and others suggest, paints a picture of the impact of both the 
general practice case and system on quality.  
 
Systems theory has been used in research, but also as a theoretical framework for understanding 
healthcare services and as a management tool in health. Hogg and others (2008) argue that 
primary care organisation is best viewed through the theoretical lens of systems theory. They 
support the aforementioned open system perspective and propose an analysis of the 
sociopsychological, organisational structure and ecological factors. Therefore the behaviours 
of individuals, the organisation’s structural features and the influence of the external 
environment are of key interest to enriching the understanding of primary care organisations, 
such as the general practice. Hogg and others also suggested that this approach had an important 
role to play in the study of systemic drivers towards (and presumably away from) quality in 
primary care. No doubt, this is of particular relevance to understanding poor performing general 
practices.  
 
Keep (2005) listed some specific uses of systems theory in organisational research. These are 
- diagnosing individual and group behaviour, examining power relations, diagnosing 
environmental relations and establishing systems for learning in organisations. These uses can 
be directly applied to a general practice setting, both as a research method and a management 
tool. An enquiry of poor performing GP practices could explore how the senior partner relates 
to his reception team for instance and in turn how power is distributed within that interaction. 
The Primary Care Trust or Clinical Commissioning Group could both be viewed as the external 
environment and the extent to which their top -down mandates infiltrate the practice semi-
permeable boundary could be analysed.  
 
In the spirit of setting a solution-focus from the outset, one could develop an evidence-base for 
the types of systems which would be appropriate to improve the participants’ QOF scores. 
Research of this nature was conducted by Geboers and others (2002) with 39 general practices 






quality improvement, patient satisfaction, and medical performance. Those data were then used 
to drive quality improvement initiatives within the practices studied, based on systems which 
facilitated performance within the identified domains.  
 
In fact, Rhydderch and others (2004), in a review of general practice research from a number 
of countries, argued that systems theory is the dominant managerial approach used to drive 
indicator-based quality improvement programmes. Although these authors saw the benefits of 
systems thinking in fixing the current way of doing things, they proposed that this approach 
created too much homogeneity. This may in part be due to the systems approach presenting 
the general practice organisation as a neat system which can clearly be manipulated with 
quality improvement initiatives in order to bring about change. Rhydderch and others instead 
support striking a balance between systems thinking and an approach which anticipates and 
makes sense of likely changes. They view the role of approaches which take account of the 
complexity of general practice as playing a key part in striking this balance. In fact there has to 
an extent been a move away from systems theory towards understanding healthcare services, 
in particular primary care, as complex systems (Miller et al., 1998). Before the use of 
complexity theory in health services research is explored however, the next section of this 
chapter will present the key features of this theory.  
 
What is complexity theory?  
 
Complexity theory is the study of systems that feature non-linear dynamics. Systems are 
adaptive, consisting of local agents whose interactions lead to continually emerging new 
behaviour. Change emerges as a result of interactions between players at a local level in the 
complex system and between the system and its external environment. Complexity can be 
defined as the ability of a system ‘to switch between different modes of behaviour as the 
environmental conditions are varied’ (Nicolis & Prigogine, 1989). In other words, complex 
systems are able to adapt to their environments. Within this tradition systems are seen as having 
the ability to form new behaviours and characteristics in order to reach their goals. Frenk (1993) 
claimed that whatever the goals of the organisation, as an adaptive system it will invariably 
move towards increasing complexity as it tries to reach those goals. Therefore complexity 
theory is clearly rooted in systems theory, observing the goal-oriented relationships between 
parts of the system, however with a move away from cause and effect modelling.  
 
The term complexity itself refers to the middle state between an ordered and linear behaviour 
and a chaotic one. The nature of complexity is that it is the product of a ‘myriad of facets’ 
(Dodder & Dare, 2000). It can be argued that one of the strengths of this multi-facetted 
approach is that it challenges certain assumptions about how an organisational system 
functions. A recent report into the use of complexity theory in health services research by the 
Health Foundation (2010) claims that the following hypotheses are contested by complexity 
thinking: that every observed effect has an observable cause, that even the most complicated 
things can be understood by breaking down the whole into pieces and analysing it and that if 
past events are sufficiently analysed, this will help to predict future events. This no doubt paints 








On the other hand Sweeney (2006) described complexity as an uncertain dynamic state that 
conversely produces self-organising behaviour. There is therefore a tendency within complex 
systems for coherent behaviour to emerge from what seem to at first be random interactions. 
Another paradox was highlighted by Jantsch (1980) who pointed out that the more freedom 
there is in self-organisation, the more order there is. One could postulate from this that topdown 
quality improvement initiatives, such as the QOF, remove some of the freedom of 
selforganisation in general practice. Perhaps when the goal of the practice is not achieving high 
QOF scores, the potential for self-organisation around other goals is limited and chaos, rather 
than order, ensues. The self-organising behaviour is caused by a positive feedback loop within 
the organisational, or in fact any, system. Those actions that result in positive outcomes will be 
given preference over others, establishing repeating patterns of behaviour, which manifest as 
stable characteristics of the system.  
 
Lastly, complexity theory can be viewed as an evolutionary systems theory whereby 
organisations do not achieve success because of their ability to predict and create planned 
strategies. They achieve success because of their ability to constantly realign with the 
environment (Burnes 1996). A key feature of healthcare organisations is the need to adapt to a 
wide range of external influences and stakeholders, be it the constant assault of new policy 
mandates, or the changing health needs of the populations they serve. In this vein, Janecka 
(2009) described healthcare services as ‘arranged in ever-expanding circles of influence’, 
communicating the extent to which the health service is a self-evolving and unpredictable 
entity. The next section will explore complexity theory applications in the field of healthcare, 
with some examples taken from general practice.  
 
Complexity theory & health services research  
 
Plsek (2000) is considered to be one of the key commentators on complexity theory as applied 
to healthcare organisations. Through his appraisal of the US healthcare system, he promoted 
complexity as a new paradigm to guide an understanding of how systems work in healthcare. 
Plsek identified certain features of healthcare which result in system complexity. These include 
the need for care to be based on continuous healing relationships and customised according to 
patient needs and values. Additionally the priority given to cooperation and collaboration 
amongst professionals, as opposed to preference being given to professionals’ fixed role over 
the system, results in non-linearity as a feature of healthcare services.  
 
Fraser and others (2003) reframed this in the context of UK healthcare. Although they coined 
systems in health as ‘agile’, these to a large extent mirror the qualities of complex adaptive 
systems. These complex characteristics of healthcare services include flexibility in roles within 
a team and rapid changeover (e.g. in operating theatres). These principles of agility have for 
example been used to redesign older people’s services in London. It appears therefore that 
complexity theory can not only be used as an explanatory framework but as a tool for improving 
healthcare services. Rhydderch and colleagues (2004) support an approach which precedes 
efforts to change general practice by efforts to understand it through complexity theory. The 
focus is on analysing processes and structures in a way that helps a team to have a sense as to 
what works well and what could be improved.  
 






pertain to specific complexity principles (Mitelton-Kelly, 2003). These are complex responsive 
processes (observing outcomes/’ripples’ of conversations, actions, decisions), relational 
dynamics (interactive dimensions including the interpersonal, social, technical, economic and 
global), adaptations and co-evolution (connectedness within and between systems and their 
environment) and self-organisation (emergent properties of the healthcare organisation which 
cannot be predicted in advance). A similar model has been used in primary care itself, as a 
methodological framework for analysing GP decision-making processes and how an evidence 
base is constructed by the GP (Mears & Sweeney, 2000). The suggestion here being that 
decisions are made a non-linear fashion and therefore complexity theory is an appropriate tool 
for an enquiry of this kind. In this vein, Hassey (2002) argued that complexity theory is a useful 
framework for understanding consultation in general practice, given that the dynamics between 
a patient and general practitioner seldom follow linear principles.  
 
Like general systems theory, complexity theory has also been used as a management tool to 
bring about change in the healthcare delivery both at the policy (Frenk, 1993) and 
organisational level (Litaker et al., 2006). Litaker and colleagues postulate that while 
complexity in healthcare is sometimes viewed as problematic, its presence may also be highly 
informative in uncovering ways to enhance health care delivery. This is particularly the case 
when complexity represents unique adaptations to the values and needs of people within a 
general practice and interactions with the local community and health care system. This implies 
that quality interventions in general practice should be implemented with a flexibility that 
acknowledges the uniqueness of and variation within primary care practices. The key is to 
develop a local quality improvement strategy that is acceptable to and works within the context 
of the specific general practice system.  
 
However, one of the limitations to Litaker and others’ study may be that the local context of a 
general practice in all its complexity can conversely be rather difficult to measure in order to 
create a tailored quality improvement initiative. The next section of this chapter will explore 




Limitations of systems & complexity theories as theoretical frameworks  
 
Systems and complexity theories may well have their limitations as theoretical frameworks. 
Trochim and others (2006) identify the key limitation of applying a systems approach is the 
breadth of systems science and how overwhelming the vastness of the literature and the jargon 
within it can be to the healthcare services researcher. On the other hand the wealth of literature 
on this subject can equally be viewed in the positive light of a huge resource to draw on in the 
development of a theoretical framework for understanding poor performing general practices.  
 
The poor performing general practice, studied in the context of systems and complexity theories 
would be viewed as an organisational system of components interacting to achieve the goals of 
that practice. Although at times formalised through rules and organisational structures, these 
interactions are largely complex, non-linear and adaptive. Through positive feedback stable 







Boyett and Boyett (1998) argued that one of the key frustrations with systems theory is that 
there are no right answers about a given system, rather simply a range of actions is studied, 
alongside the variety of consequences they produce for the system. This implies that systems 
theory can be rather general, rendering it difficult to operationalize and evaluate empirically. 
This may be a particular problem for designing quality improvement schemes such as the QOF 
on a non-linear model. This does not of course mean that systems theory does not have its place 
in an explorative non-empirical study – one with the aim of improving understanding of poor 
performing general practices. Yet despite systems theory providing a conceptualisation, it may 
have poor explanatory power because its constructs are difficult to identify clearly and measure.  
 
However, one could argue that such is the nature of the NHS itself. Robinson and Le Grand 
(1994) in a King’s Fund report into NHS reforms aptly wrote that ‘there are rarely simple 
answers to simple questions, usually because the questions are not actually simple’. This has 
implications for one-size fits all quality improvement initiatives such as the QOF, which are 
perhaps based on the assumption that simple questions which can be reduced to a set of 
measurable indicators can indeed be asked.  
 
Lastly, systems theory can be criticised for what is its subtle assumption that all parts of a 
system have equal power and make an equal contribution to the organisation as a whole. This 
suggests that in studying general practices it is important to analyse the distribution of power 
and relative influence of parts of the system on the whole organisation. To some extent the 
application of complexity thinking may overcome these limitations by viewing power as 
dispersed and decentralised within a system, with the overall behaviour of the system being the 
result of many decisions made constantly by individual agents (Holland, 1992).  
 
Yet complexity theory is not without its own limitations as a theoretical framework. One such 
limitation was highlighted by Levy (2000) who was writing about the practical implications of 
using complexity theory to further the understanding of how to improve organisational 
processes in general. He claimed that complexity theory, whilst furthering the understanding 
of organisational processes, is difficult to utilise in practice to bring about change. Yet there is 
some evidence that beyond the theoretical, the theory has been used to drive change in 
healthcare, for instance through enabling doctors to make adaptive strategic decisions (Ashmos 
et al., 2000) and to plan quality improvement initiatives in general practice (Litaker et al et al., 
2006).  
 
Complexity theory has also been criticised for its lack of real time applicability. As it seeks to 
challenge the chain of cause and effect within linearity, the outcome which may emerge from 
the input may only be recognised post the event, in retrospect. Frenk (1993) claimed that it is 
crucial to develop a health system that not only has the adaptive ability to react to crises, but 
also has the skills to anticipate problems before they happen. Therefore the unpredictability 
inherent to understanding organisations though the lens of complexity theory, may render it 
limited in its application to understanding a range of phenomena, as well as to improving 
healthcare delivery.  
 
Furthermore, it has been claimed that ‘complexity’ may be an excuse for not striving to clearly 
understand the dynamics of a healthcare organisation (The Health Foundation, 2010). To an 






linear approaches. This suggests that organisational modelling, often quite static in nature, has 
the potential to offer a rich picture of poor performing general practices when combined with 
complexity theory. Furthermore, the players within an organisation may employ goal reaching 
strategies which are neither rational (linear) nor emergent (non-linear). Sweeney (2006) uses 
the example of gaming A&E waiting times targets to illustrate this point. It is clear that A&E 
departments encouraging ambulances to form queues outside and not letting patients disembark 
the ambulances until they were able to be seen is neither the product of rational thinking nor of 
feedback dependent emergence.  
 
There is a risk that through applying complexity theory as a general framework, the 
organisational processes of poor performing general practice may be abstracted out of its lived 
day-to-day reality, particularly at the individual level. Yet, perhaps this is simply the limitation 
of theoretical frameworks by their very definition. In defence of complexity and systems 
theories, research cited previously in this chapter has demonstrated their applicability in driving 
organisational change ‘at the coalface’. Furthermore, complexity theory allows for greater 
flexibility, not constrained by the rigidity of mapping how systems interconnect. Given the 
richness of general practice, complexity theory may well form a stronger theoretical framework 
for understanding its underperformance.  
 
Concluding Remarks  
 
To sum up it appears that the shortcomings of both systems and complexity theories centre on 
the difficulty of adequately measuring the phenomena of interest. There is a sense in the 
literature that complexity theory in order to survive as a useful theoretical framework must 
‘move beyond the festival of bad metaphors’ (Axelrod & Cohen, 2001). Yet this perhaps begs 
the question of whether complexity can ever truly be measured in quantitative terms and that 
numerical quality improvement frameworks such as the QOF have only limited value in aiding 
the understanding of performance in general practice. Moreover, the underlying essence of 
good general practice may well lie in factors such as rapport, compassion and inter-personal 
skills to name a few (Ashworth & Kordowicz, 2010). As such targets are unlikely to capture 
all facets of performance, particularly in light of these qualitative meanings of quality of patient 
care in general practice.  
 
The drive to measure may paradoxically hark back to the reductionism that systems and 
complexity thinking attempts to challenge. Undoubtedly, the application of systems and 
complexity theories as theoretical frameworks for understanding poor performing GP practices 
would produce a study which moves beyond the observed components of a practice 
organisation to the holistic products of the interrelationships of those constituent parts. In this 
vein, Green (2010) argued that it is necessary to recognise that measures based on complexity 
science deliver answers that differ from those of linear models in meaningful ways. Yet, most 
importantly, the aim studying poor performing general practices is not so much to measure 
complexity, but rather to present a picture of it grounded in particular organisational cases.  
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Whilst overwhelmingly quality is presented by policy-makers as measurable and as 
meeting pre-defined top-down targets, we argue that quality in general practice is multi-
form and multi-faceted. Quality is a notion that is hugely difficult to pin-down in all its 
richness and complexity and countless attempts have been made at defining quality in 
healthcare. Definitions range from the more concrete - quality as access and 
effectiveness for instance (1), to the abstract – quality as purely a social construct rather 
than an objective entity (2). There therefore exists a clear challenge of unifying the 
practical realities of general practice with subjective norms into one concept. 
The coalition Government’s agenda preaches values of openness and transparency 
through improved information capture to raise the quality of patient care (3). The type 
of information favoured for this purpose tends to take a numerical form, usually lending 
itself more quickly and readily to comparisons across services and strategic decision-
making than its ‘softer’ qualitative counterparts. The dominant method of data 






(QOF), with us since the introduction of the nGMS contract in 2004. There is no doubt 
that measurement plays a key part in enabling focussed quality improvement initiatives, 
for instance by identifying need in specific patient populations, and on a wider-level is 
likely to be a valuable tool in supporting commissioning decisions. QOF monitoring 
has also resulted in the creation of the largest general practice database in the world, 
prompting research around processes and outputs and their relationship to outcomes in 
general practice. 
However, increasingly monitoring is viewed as instrumental to quantifying quality. In 
the face of austerity, top down monitoring feeds into wider aims of justifying spending, 
delivering tax-payer value, and continued growth in productivity.  It could be argued 
that all of these policy aims have become ingrained as NHS values no less, introduced 
into the public sector by Thatcher with the advent of market incentives to improve the 
efficiency of public services (4). We are all too aware that the policy rhetoric of raising 
general practice quality through data submission has been wholly embraced by 
successive governments. Yet, it is likely that instinctively this view feels rather short-
sighted to those ‘at the coalface’ of general practice. Bold policy aims such as the 
implementation of ‘a more comprehensive, transparent and sustainable structure of 
payment for performance’ where ‘funding should follow the registered patient, on a 
weighted capitation model, adjusted for quality’ (3) appear to ignore the complexity of 
quality in general practice.  
Increased monitoring poses a further paradox for quality capture. The resulting 
bureaucracy and a feeling of being ‘watched’ can lead to GPs’ sense of professionalism 
being undermined. It is not a new point of view that potentially reducing patient care 
to a ‘pay for reporting’ approach (5) can be demotivating and even reduce quality in 
non-incentivised areas. There is a further risk that data capture through monitoring is 
no longer simply a tool for improving the measurable, but becomes an end in itself, 
superseding its original purpose. This view is likely to resonate with the thousands of 
GPs across the country as they chase elusive QOF points come the end of the financial 
year. 
Nevertheless, Lord Darzi (6) claimed that ‘we can only be sure to improve what we can 






definitions pertaining to process and output tend to reduce quality down to just that. In 
policy rhetoric, high general practice quality has become synonymous with high QOF 
scores. Yet, quality lies also beyond this in facets of general practice that can never be 
fully reduced down into measurable indicators – rapport, patient-centredness, kindness 
(that value described as the ‘most curative herb’ by Nietzsche) - those human dynamics 
of a consultation that make general practice the hub of the community that it serves.   
In fact, reflecting even on the four basic principles of medical ethics – autonomy, 
justice, beneficence, non-maleficence - suggests that what lies at the core of high 
quality care is greater than that which can be captured through measurable indicators. 
This is clearly one of the challenges for new CCGs. Whilst it is claimed that by placing 
the GP at the centre of local decision-making we can work towards true quality, it is 
simultaneously of great importance that a reductionist approach, despite easily lending 
itself to policy creation, does not overshadow the finer aspects of what it means to 
deliver quality in general practice. 
Our own ethnographic research exploring the reality of practices labelled as ‘poor 
performing’ by the QOF (7), suggests that top-down target frameworks based on an 
arguably limited definition of what constitutes quality are only a partial lens through 
which to view general practice. However, in ways that QOF can never truly capture, 
these practices had intrinsic flaws with their organisational practices and knowledge of 
IT systems, problems with team work and burnt out GPs out of touch with recent 
professional guidance. They had evolved into chaotic organisations, unable to adapt to 
new practices, particularly in the face of a challenging deprived patient population.  
They were poor performing in both quantitative measures and in terms of the three core 
values described by Marshall, excellence as medical generalists, commitment to whole 
person care and patient advocacy (8). Yet, even more strikingly, we have met GPs 
whose low QOF scores are often the result of an outright rejection of the framework, 
and they proudly continue to be exemplars of the four principles of ethical medical care 
within their communities. It is not inconceivable that GPs who do not prioritise 
achieving high QOF scores are able to remain outstanding holistic practitioners, central 
to preserving what their patients perceive to be high quality care. The danger of 
continuously producing a reductionist picture of general practice quality is real. We 






measurable on the one hand and the qualitative on the other, run in parallel rather than 
in conjunction with one another.  
This raises the question of whether the time has come for a new enhanced model for 
understanding general practice quality. Undoubtedly, the focus on metrics has resulted 
in a demonstration of primary care exceeding expectations and able to deliver far more 
than anyone expected when the QOF was originally introduced.  Metrics though distort 
the very activity that is being measured, producing contortions, sometimes extreme, as 
targets are at risk of becoming prioritised over patient care.  It is not that targets are 
inherently misguided, nor inevitably de-professionalising, nor worse still, unethical. 
Rather, it is more the case that targets have become the sole arbitrator of quality with 
no countervailing model for articulating alternative definitions. We would argue that 
the qualitative needs to be put back into quality.  
What is needed now is research that generates robust qualitative concepts of quality 
enabling the essence of excellence to be captured more clearly. The four principles of 
medical ethics may well be a useful starting point. Then for these concepts of quality 
to be tested on professionals, patients and health service managers alike until a 
consensus emerges of the key domains or components of quality. CCGs should develop 
a strategy for recognising and preserving the excellence within their practices which 
remains outside the breadth of current metrics. The College’s “Good Medical Practice 
for General Practitioners” (9) was one of the first publications to define ‘excellence’ 
within primary care. The original concepts have remained relatively static since first 
published in 2008 and many could be developed into criteria which general 
practitioners might consider to be more closely aligned to shared professional values 
than current quantitative metrics.  
In the model which we propose, quantitative indicators will have a central role both to 
define minimum acceptable standards but also to offer ‘stretch targets’ rewarding 
practices for exceptional achievements.  However, these will be balanced by the 
development of qualitative quality indicators primarily focussing on excellence and 
more clearly capturing the narrative of a primary care which so often goes the extra 
mile, and beyond. It needs to be recognised however that to develop a qualitative 






richness and complexity. Furthermore, quality is a self-evolving, fluid concept and as 
such indicators have to allow for continuous adaptation. It is a tall order, but 
undoubtedly one that gives due recognition to the true values at the core of high quality 
general practice. 
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